Opinion
2:23-cv-01826-SB
07-24-2024
MARVIN RANDALL, Petitioner, v. ERIN REYES, Respondent.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN, United States Magistrate Judge
Petitioner Marvin Randall (“Randall”), a self-represented adult in custody (“AIC”) at Two Rivers Correctional Institution (“TRCI”), brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Section 2254”). Before the Court is Randall's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 30). For the reasons set forth below, the district judge should deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
On December 5, 2023, Randall filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his 2020 Washington County convictions for four counts of Compelling Prostitution and two counts of Promoting Prostitution. (Pet. (ECF No. 1) at 1.) Randall alleges, among other things, that the State of Oregon lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him and presented unlawfully obtained evidence during his trial. (Second Am. Pet. (ECF No. 14) at 4-5.)
Soon after Randall filed his habeas petition, the Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”) decided to transfer Randall from TRCI to Warner Creek Correctional Facility (“WCCF”), a minimum-security prison, due to his then-designation as “custody level 1.” (Resp. Mot. Inj. (ECF No. 32), Attach. A at 1-2.) On February 21, 2024, ODOC transferred Randall to Deer Ridge Correctional Institution Minimum (“DRCM”) on a temporary basis as part of the transfer to WCCF. (Id. at 2.) While in custody at DRCM, however, Randall was found to have engaged in misconduct, which ultimately raised his custody level designation. (Id. at 2, 9-10.) As a result, ODOC determined that it was no longer appropriate to transfer Randall to a lower-security facility and transferred him back to TRCI on February 23, 2024. (Id. at 2.)
On May 7, 2024, Randall filed the instant motion, seeking a court order “preventing the transfer of the petitioner to another [ODOC] facility for the duration of this proceeding.” (Am. Mot. at 1.) Respondent opposes the motion. (Resp. Mot. Inj. at 1.)
Randall initially moved for a preliminary injunction on April 23, 2024 (ECF No. 18), but later sought to amend the motion (ECF No. 21). The Court granted Randall's request to amend and denied the original motion as moot (ECF No. 28).
LEGAL STANDARDS
“The purpose of a . . . preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo if the balance of equities so heavily favors the moving party that justice requires the court to intervene to secure the positions until the merits of the action are ultimately determined.” Ardds v. Hicks, No. 1:19-cv-01738-DAD-SAB (PC), 2020 WL 8614084, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2020) (citing Univ. ofTex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). However, a preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the [petitioner] is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).
A petitioner seeking a preliminary injunction must establish “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. In the alternative, “serious questions going to the merits and hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (simplified).
A petitioner must also show that there is “a sufficient nexus between the claims raised in the motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying [petition] itself.” Pac.Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). A sufficient nexus exists where “the preliminary injunction would grant relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.” Id. (simplified). Absent such nexus, “the district court lacks authority to grant the relief requested.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Randall seeks a court order barring his transfer to another ODOC facility during the pendency of this action. He speculates that his transfer to DRCM in February 2024 “was an attempt to render his petition for habeas corpus moot or cause delay to the proceedings[,]” and insists that ODOC regularly engages in “diesel therapy”-the practice of transferring an AIC from one facility to another to interfere with the AIC's pursuit of legal remedies. (Decl. Supp. Mot. Inj. (ECF No. 31) ¶¶ 7, 10-16.) Randall claims that he will lose access to his legal documents and USB drive for an indeterminate amount of time if transferred, which will “impair his ability to respond to . . . future deadlines” in this case and “severely impair his access to the court.” (Id. ¶¶ 10, 17.) Randall thus argues that any transfer “would interfere with his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Reply Mot. Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 35) at 1.)
Respondent submits evidence that no such practice exists (Resp. Mot. Inj., Attach. A at 2), and, in any event, Randall's transfer to a new ODOC facility would not moot his petition but would merely require substitution of the appropriate respondent. See, e.g., Mickens v. Haynes, No. 3:20-cv-5325-RAJ-DWC, 2021 WL 1117279, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2021) (“Based on Petitioner's recent transfer to [a different correctional institution], the Clerk's Office is directed to substitute . . . the Superintendent [of the new correctional institution] . . . as respondent in this action.”) (citations omitted).
Randall is not entitled to the preliminary injunctive relief he seeks. As an initial matter, the injunctive relief Randall requests is not available in a habeas case. “Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus[,]” whereas “requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)); see also Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011) (explaining that “when a[n] [AIC]'s claim would not necessarily spell speedier release, that claim does not lie at the core of habeas corpus, and may be brought, if at all, under § 1983”). Randall's claim that he will lose access to his property if he is transferred to another ODOC facility “merely challenges the conditions of [his] confinement,” rather than its fact or duration, and therefore “fall[s] outside of [the] core [of habeas corpus].” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 n.13 (2004). The Court thus lacks jurisdiction to grant Randall's request for injunctive relief. SeeCase v. Miller-Stout, No. C12-0187-MJP-MAT, 2012 WL 6814175, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2012) (denying the habeas petitioner's request for a preliminary injunction preventing his transfer to another facility because it sought to “challenge the validity of his conditions of confinement in an action designed solely to review the legality or duration of his confinement”); Fowler v. Miller-Stout, No. C07-5356RJB/KLS, 2008 WL 60015, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2008) (denying the habeas petitioner's request for preliminary injunctive relief because his “objection to being transferred to another DOC facility is essentially a conditions of confinement claim” and therefore “the appropriate vehicle for his request . . . is . . . an action brought pursuant to [42 U.S.C. §] 1983”).
Furthermore, even if injunctive relief was proper in this Section 2254 action, Randall has not established that a sufficient nexus exists between the injury he alleges in his motion and the allegations he raised in the petition. As noted above, Randall's habeas petition challenges alleged errors in his state criminal prosecution, whereas his request for injunctive relief concerns his transfer between ODOC facilities and the resulting deprivation of his property. Because Randall's request for preliminary injunctive relief does not relate to the allegations in his petition, the Court cannot grant the relief he seeks. SeeMeriweather v. Reyes, No. 2-22-cv-00384-JR, 2023 WL 2709640, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 30, 2023) (holding that the district court lacked authority to grant the petitioner's request for preliminary injunctive relief because there was “not a sufficient nexus between the injury claimed in the motion and the conduct asserted in the petition”).
Randall also fails plausibly to allege that he will suffer an irreparable injury absent preliminary injunctive relief, much less that such injury is imminent. Although Randall claims that any transfer will impede his access to the court, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that a transfer is pending or even probable in the coming months, and Randall's insistence that he will be unable to meet deadlines or otherwise litigate this case is wholly speculative and disregards that he may move for an extension of time if necessary. See Caribbean Marin Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that to meet the “irreparable harm” requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate, rather than simply allege, imminent harm).
Finally, Randall has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in being confined in a particular prison. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (holding that due process does not “protect a duly convicted [AIC] against transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system”). Given the lack of evidence that ODOC transferred Randall for an illegitimate purpose, the Court must “afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials” managing Oregon's correctional facilities. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-82 (1995) (simplified).
For all of these reasons, the district judge should deny Randall's request for a preliminary injunction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the district judge should DENY Randall's Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 30).
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendations to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.