Opinion
19-P-1745
12-31-2020
EDDISON RAMSARAN v. CANDACE LAPIDUS SLOANE & another.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, a physician licensed in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, brought this suit against Joseph P. Carrozza, Jr., M.D., a member of the Board of Registration in Medicine (board), and Candace Lapidus Sloane, M.D., the chair of the board. The first amended verified complaint included counts for tortious interference with advantageous relationships, malicious prosecution, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleged wrongdoing by defendant Carrozza, acquiesced to by defendant Sloane. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was allowed by the motion judge on the ground of absolute immunity. The plaintiff has now appealed.
The plaintiff alleged that during board proceedings, defendant Carrozza acted as a "covert expert," bringing to bear his own expertise and "outside information which was not contained in the Board's investigatory files and which was not considered by the Board as a whole" in deciding as a member of the complaint committee (CC) that sufficient cause existed to issue a statement of allegations (SOA) against the plaintiff, proposing a consent order (CO) with onerous conditions in lieu of moving forward with the SOA, and ultimately recommending that the board issue an SOA when the plaintiff refused to agree to the CO. The plaintiff alleged that some or all of this was wrongful.
It is well established that when a member of the board acts in a prosecutorial or adjudicative capacity, he or she is absolutely immune from suit. See Bettencourt v. Board of Registration in Med., 904 F.2d 772, 782, 784 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that board members acting in their "quasi-judicial" capacities enjoy absolute immunity and explaining that "the [Supreme] Court has recognized that there are some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability . . . . Such officials include . . . certain 'quasi-judicial' agency officials who, irrespective of their title, perform functions essentially similar to those of judges or prosecutors" [quotation, citation, and emphasis omitted]).
In Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 783-784 and n.13, the court also concluded that "enough checks on malicious action by Board members exist to warrant a grant of absolute immunity for the Board members' actions in their adjudicatory capacities," and that "[t]o the extent the claims relate to the Board members' roles as 'public' prosecutors, Werle v. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 755 F.2d 195, 198-99 (1st Cir. 1985), we agree with the district court that the Board members' actions were intimately connected with the advocacy phase of the judicial process. See id.; Horwitz v. Bd. of Med. Examiners of State of Colo., 822 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964, 108 S. Ct. 453, 98 L.Ed.2d 394 (1987)." We agree with this analysis.
In evaluating the judge's ruling on the motion to dismiss, we take all the facts in the complaint and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Jacome v. Commonwealth, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 487 (2002). The question before us is whether Carrozza was discharging a prosecutorial or adjudicative function when undertaking the allegedly wrongful acts.
The plaintiff alleged that an investigation of the plaintiff was undertaken by a board investigator between 2011 and 2014. Following the transmission to the CC of the evidence gathered by the investigator and the board expert's report containing recommended board actions, the complaint alleged that Carrozza used his "covert expertise" and information received outside of committee proceedings to propose a CO that exceeded the recommendations made by the board's only recognized expert, and to recommend that the board issue an SOA that was unsupported by the findings of the board's investigation.
We conclude that all of the actions undertaken by Carrozza were undertaken in a prosecutorial, or quasi-judicial, capacity. Determining whether to bring a charge, and assessing and negotiating terms by which to settle a matter short of an adversarial proceeding, are all ordinary functions of a prosecutor within our legal system. The complaint alleged wrongdoing in the way in which Carrozza carried out these functions. We express no opinion about whether anything that Carrozza is alleged to have done would have been wrongful. But even if it were, the conduct alleged -- relying on his own expertise, making inquiry at a regulatorily authorized hearing of the plaintiff himself, obtaining information about the plaintiff from third parties following the completion of the investigator's investigation -- were all properly considered part of the exercise of Carrozza's prosecutorial function.
Consequently, we see no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the defendants are protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See Johnson v. Board of Bar Overseers, 324 F. Supp. 2d 276, 287 (D. Mass. 2004) (holding that officials at Massachusetts Office of Bar Counsel and Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers enjoyed absolute quasi-judicial immunity from § 1983 actions). See also LaLonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 207, 211-212 (1989) (holding that psychiatrist appointed by Probate Court to perform psychiatric evaluation enjoyed absolute quasi-judicial immunity from negligence action).
To the extent the judge relied on materials attached to the complaint, or materials of which he could properly take judicial notice, he was not required to convert the 12 (b) (6) motion into one for summary judgment. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974). See also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Boston, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 555 (2008) ("while the allegations of the complaint generally control in evaluating a motion under rule 12(b)(6), matters of public record . . . and exhibits attached to the complaint, also may be taken into account" [quotation and citation omitted]).
Given the conclusion articulated in the text, we need not address the alternative grounds for affirmance urged by the defendants.
By the Court (Rubin, Neyman & Ditkoff, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: December 31, 2020.