Opinion
C24-5494JLR
07-30-2024
LANCE C. RAIKOGLO, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
JAMES L. ROBART UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court are (1) pro se Plaintiff Lance C. Raikoglo's complaint against “United States Government (Joint Operations), ICE, CBI, USCIS, FEMA, TSA, [and] HSI” (“Defendants”) (Compl. (Dkt. # 5)); (2) Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke's order granting Mr. Raikoglo's application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and recommending that the court review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (IFP Order (Dkt. # 4)); and (3) Mr. Raikoglo's motion to appoint counsel (Mot. (Dkt. # 6)). The court has considered Mr. Raikoglo's submissions, Magistrate Judge Fricke's order, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised, the court DISMISSES Mr. Raikoglo's claims without prejudice and with leave to amend and DENIES Mr. Raikoglo's motion to appoint counsel.
II. BACKGROUND
This is the fifth lawsuit Mr. Raikoglo has filed in this court. See Klobas v. United States of America, No. C23-6072BHS [Raikoglo I]; Raikoglo v. United States of America, No. C23-6073DGE [Raikoglo II]; Raikoglo v. United States of America, No. C23-6127DGE [Raikoglo III]; Raikoglo v. United States Government, No. C24-5128DGE [Raikoglo IV]. His previous cases were dismissed without prejudice. See Judgments, Raikoglo I (Dkt. # 11), Raikoglo II (Dkt. # 7), Raikoglo III (Dkt. # 8), Raikoglo IV (Dkt. # 12). The entirety of Mr. Raikoglo's allegations in the present lawsuit are as follows:
“my civil sovereign rights are being attacked and I request Asylum from attack. United States has affected the estate of my deceased Aunts and has made collecting trust left to me a[n] Abusive state of disregard as to compounding Attacks. Request immediate relief, pursuant to me residing in U.S.A.”(Compl. at 2.)
Mr. Raikoglo filed his complaint contemporaneously with a motion to appoint counsel. (See generally Mot.) In his motion, Mr. Raikoglo writes that he has previously “tried” to retain an attorney but is “under attack by U.S. Government.” (Mot. at 2.)
Magistrate Judge Fricke recommended review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because “it did not appear [that Mr. Raikoglo] has adequately stated a claim.” (IFP Order.)
III. ANALYSIS
Below, the court reviews Mr. Raikoglo's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) before considering his motion to appoint counsel.
A. 1915(e)(2)(B) Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), district courts have authority to review IFP complaints and must dismiss them if “at any time” the court determines that a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (clarifying that § 1915(e) applies to all IFP proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners). Because Mr. Raikoglo is a pro se plaintiff, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, his complaint must still contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although the pleading standard announced by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it demands more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (requiring the plaintiff to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1)-(2) (requiring a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
Mr. Raikoglo's complaint contains only conclusory allegations and an imprecise request for “immediate relief.” (See Compl. at 2.) He has failed to allege sufficient facts, such as what “civil sovereign rights are being attacked,” where and how those attacks are taking place, and the individuals orchestrating those attacks, to give Defendants “fair notice of what [his] claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. Glasser, 945 F.3d 1076, 1089 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Mr. Raikoglo's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
When a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff's complaint, it must give the plaintiff leave to amend “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect” in the complaint. Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). In light of the Ninth Circuit's liberal policy favoring amendment, the court GRANTS Mr. Raikoglo leave to file an amended complaint. If he does so, he must include short, plain statements setting forth: (1) the legal basis for his claim(s); (2) the names of the defendants who committed the offending conduct; (3) exactly what the defendants did or failed to do and when that conduct occurred; (4) how the defendants' actions are connected to his legal claims; and (5) the specific injury he suffered as a result of the defendants' conduct and when he suffered it. Mr. Raikoglo shall file his amended complaint, if any, by no later than August 16, 2024. The court warns Mr. Raikoglo that his failure to timely comply with this order or to file an amended complaint that remedies the deficiencies discussed in this order will result in the dismissal of his claims with prejudice and without leave to amend.
B. Motion to Appoint Counsel
The court next considers Mr. Raikoglo's motion to appoint counsel. The court has reviewed Mr. Raikoglo's motion and exercises its discretion to DENY it.
Generally, a civil litigant has no right to counsel. See Campbell v. Burt, 141 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1998). The court “may,” however, “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants if “[e]xceptional circumstances exist.” See Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2017). “When determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances' exist, a court must consider ‘the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the [litigant] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.'” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). “Neither of these considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” Id.
The first consideration, Mr. Raikoglo's likelihood of success on the merits, does not favor a finding of exceptional circumstances. This is the fifth lawsuit Mr. Raikoglo has filed since late 2023, and each of his previous lawsuits has been dismissed. The allegations contained in his most recent complaint come no closer to stating a plausible claim for relief. The court finds that Mr. Raikoglo's likelihood of success on the merits is low.
The second consideration, Mr. Raikoglo's ability to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved, is neutral. On the one hand, Mr. Raikoglo has considerable difficulty articulating his claims. (See Compl. at 2.) On the other hand, the court has no means of determining the complexity of the legal issues involved in this matter because Mr. Raikoglo's complaint is factually deficient and fails to specify his requested relief. (See id.)
Taking these considerations together, the court finds that this is not an exceptional case warranting appointment of counsel. The court therefore DENIES Mr. Raikoglo's motion to appoint counsel without prejudice to filing a renewed motion after filing his amended complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court DISMISSES Mr. Raikoglo's complaint (Dkt. # 5) with leave to amend. Mr. Raikoglo shall file his amended complaint by no later than August 16, 2024. The court DENIES Mr. Raikoglo's motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. # 6).