Opinion
Case No.: 2:21-cv-02584-SB-JC
03-29-2022
Mo RAHMAN v. FCA US LLC et al.
Daniel A. Law, Tionna Dolin, Simi Peterson, Matthew Jeffrey Pardo, Strategic Legal Practices APC, Regina Lotardo, Blair and Ramirez LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Mo Rahman. Eric D. Sentlinger, Sarah Marie Carlson Lambert, Spencer Peter Hugret, Vernice Trina Louie, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Amy Patricia Maclear, Shook Hardy and Bacon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for FCA US LLC.
Daniel A. Law, Tionna Dolin, Simi Peterson, Matthew Jeffrey Pardo, Strategic Legal Practices APC, Regina Lotardo, Blair and Ramirez LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Mo Rahman.
Eric D. Sentlinger, Sarah Marie Carlson Lambert, Spencer Peter Hugret, Vernice Trina Louie, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Amy Patricia Maclear, Shook Hardy and Bacon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for FCA US LLC.
Proceedings: [In Chambers] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES [Dkt. No. 45]
STANLEY BLUMENFELD, JR., United States District Judge
This is a lemon law case filed by Plaintiff Mo Rahman against Defendant FCA US LLC. The parties reached a settlement on Plaintiff's claims in September 2021 that was finalized in February 2022. Pursuant to the settlement, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Dkt. No. 45. Defendant filed an opposition that does not dispute Plaintiff's entitlement to fees under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (SBA) but contends that the amount of fees claimed are excessive. Dkt. No. 58. The Court finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument and vacates the April 1, 2022 hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; L.R. 7-15. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion is granted in part.
Plaintiff counsel's request to appear remotely is therefore denied as moot. Dkt. No. 65.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff purchased a 2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee manufactured by Defendant in June 2016. Compl. ¶ 9, Dkt. No. 1-2. After experiencing repeated mechanical problems with the vehicle, Plaintiff filed this action in state court in July 2020 alleging violations of the SBA and an additional claim for fraudulent inducement. Id. The parties litigated the case in state court for eight months, including a motion to compel arbitration, a motion to strike, and the filing of two amended versions of the complaint. In November 2020, Defendant first offered to settle the action for $48,835.00 and $8,000 in attorneys’ fees, which Plaintiff did not accept. Dkt. No. 45-3. Defendant removed on the basis of diversity in March 2021 after Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the dealership, a non-diverse party. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand, which the Court denied. Dkt. No. 29. The parties resolved Plaintiff's claims during mediation and filed a notice of settlement on September 23, 2021. Dkt. No. 33. Under the settlement agreement, Plaintiff will receive $70,000 as full restitution for his claims, plus civil penalties, and Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff's attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to a motion before the Court. Motion at 14. The parties later resolved Plaintiff's request for costs. Dkt. No. 51, at 1 n.1. Thus, the only remaining issue for the Court to resolve is Plaintiff's attorneys’ fees.
REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff filed a request for judicial notice (RJN), and both parties filed numerous evidentiary objections. Dkt. Nos. 47 (RJN), 60–61 (Defendant's Objections), 64-2 (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Objections), 64-3 (Plaintiff's Objections). Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of 24 orders from state and federal courts granting motions for attorneys’ fees and costs to Plaintiff's counsel, as well as two declarations filed in support of prior motions for attorneys’ fees in other cases. RJN; Shahian Decl. Exs. 1–26, Dkt. Nos. 45-9 to 45-34. Defendant objects to these requests, arguing that they are not directly relevant to the issues before the Court. Dkt. No. 60. Plaintiff's request is unnecessary because "when a court takes judicial notice of another court's opinion, it may do so not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity." Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). Nonetheless, the Court grants Plaintiff's request and overrules Defendant's objections thereto because court filings are properly subject to judicial notice. Zargarian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC , 442 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1223 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
The parties make additional boilerplate objections to their respective declarations, most of which are objections to statements about the procedural history of this case. See, e.g. , Dkt. No. 61, at 10 (Defendant objects to Tionna Dolin's declarative statement that "[o]n September 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint"); Dkt. No. 64-3, at 2 (Plaintiff objects to Eric Settlinger's declarative statement that "[a]t 12:30 a.m. on March 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed this Motion and supporting declarations"). Defendant also objects to paragraph 7 of Payam Shahian's declaration, which lists cases that have approved her hourly rate, as irrelevant and prejudicial. Dkt. No. 60, at 2–3. Defendant's objection appears to be an argument on the merits of Plaintiff's claim, arguing that Plaintiff's cases do not present an accurate picture of prevailing market rates. Id . Indeed, Defendant cites the same case—and makes the same argument—in its opposition. Opp. at 10–11. In any event, this evidence is not irrelevant because the fact that "a lawyer charges a particular hourly rate, and gets it, is evidence bearing on what the market rate is, because the lawyer and his clients are part of the market." Carson v. Billings Police Dep't , 470 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2006). Nor is it prejudicial, as Defendant may rebut Plaintiff's market-rate evidence in its opposition. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc. , 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, Defendant's objection to paragraph 7 of Shahian's declaration is overruled . As the Court does not rely on any of other portions of declarations subject to an objection, the remainder of both parties’ objections are overruled as moot. A.B. v. Facebook, Inc. , No. CV 20-9012-CBM-(MAAx), 2021 WL 2791618, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2021).
LEGAL STANDARD
The SBA provides for the award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing plaintiff. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). The parties agree that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees under the SBA as the prevailing plaintiff pursuant to the settlement agreement; however, they disagree as to whether the fees incurred by Plaintiff in litigating this action were reasonable. In examining reasonableness under this section, a court must "ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable." Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. , 31 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 (1994). The Nightingale court explained:
At the outset, it is important to note that we are not concerned in this case with a customary statutory or contractual provision which merely provides for "reasonable attorney fees." The statute we are dealing with takes a somewhat different approach. It requires the trial court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are
reasonable. These circumstances may include, but are not limited to, factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved.... A prevailing buyer has the burden of "showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’ "
Id . (quoting Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. , 4 Cal. App. 4th 807, 816, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 (1992) ). A court may not "categorically deny or reduce an attorney fee award" due to a plaintiff's failure to accept an initial settlement offer if the ultimate recovery exceeds the original offer. Reck v. FCA US LLC , 64 Cal. App. 5th 682, 687, 279 Cal.Rptr.3d 175 (2021).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks to recover a total of $54,896.53 in attorneys’ fees: $38,071.50 in fees, plus an additional $13,325.03 for a 1.35 multiplier enhancement and $3,500 in anticipated fees incurred in bringing this motion. Motion at 16.
A. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The first step in calculating counsel's lodestar is determining whether the requested hourly rate is reasonable. Forouzan v. BMW of N. Am., LLC , No. CV 17-3875-DMG (GJSx), 2019 WL 856395, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2019). Plaintiff requests the fees of 14 attorneys who worked on this case:
| Name | Year Admitted | Rate |
|---|---|---|
| Aaina Duggal | 2018 (N.Y.); 2021 (Cal.) | $365 |
| Daniel Law | 2016 | $425 |
| Eliana Amirian | 2021 | $375 |
| Jaclyn Laing | 2017 | $385 |
| Jason Clark | 2007 | $565 |
| James Doddy | 2004 | $595 |
| Mark Gibson | 2008 | $450 |
| Matthew Pardo | 2017 | $390 |
| Neil Butala | 2013 | $460 |
| Nino Sanaia (law clerk) | N/A | $285 |
| Payam Shahian | 2003–2004 | $695 |
| Regina Lotardo | Unknown | $435 |
| Sean Crandall | 2015 | $425 |
| Tionna Dolin | 2014 | $425/$450/$490 |
Motion at 9–10.
Defendant cites two cases where lower rates were awarded. See Opp. at 11 (citing Arias v. Ford Motor Co. , No. EDCV181928PSGSPX, 2020 WL 1940843, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2020) ; Hernandez v. FCA U.S. LLC, No. CV 17-5452-GW, 2019 WL 2932637, at *3 C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2019 ). But Plaintiff cites to numerous recent opinions from courts in Los Angeles County that have approved the same or substantially similar rates for each member of Plaintiff's counsel, with the exception of Nino Sanaia. Shahian Decl., Dkt. No. 45-8, ¶¶ 7, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 55, 57, 59. Sanaia's rate also appears reasonable—she received her bar license in a foreign country in 2015 and requests a rate similar to what is reasonable for paralegals in this district, which the Court finds to be a fair comparison given her experience. See Taylor Farms Cal., Inc. v. Cooper's Cold Foods, Inc. , No. 19-cv-8924 DDP (GJSx), 2021 WL 5178475, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2021) ("[S]everal other courts within the district have held rates of $150 to $276.25 to be reasonable for the work of paralegals depending on their degree of experience and skill."). Accordingly, the Court finds that the attorneys’ requested hourly rates are reasonable.
B. Reasonable Number of Hours
Plaintiff submits that counsel spent a total of 86.6 hours on this case. Billing Records, Dkt. No. 45-35. Defendant argues that there are multiple deficiencies in Plaintiff counsel's billing records that justify reducing the number of hours: (1) extricable work, (2) excessive or duplicative billing, (3) improper block billing, and (4) overly vague entries. Opp. at 6–10.
Defendant argues that the work should not award counsel for work related to Plaintiff's fraud claim, citing Santana v. FCA US, LLC , 56 Cal. App. 5th 334, 349, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 (2020) and Akins v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of S.F. , 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1133, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 448 (2000). This argument is manifestly meritless. While Akins does state that a party may "recover only on the statutory causes of action" for which attorneys’ fees are provided, it also provides two exceptions to this rule: (1) the fees were "incurred for representation of an issue common to both a cause of action for which fees are permitted and one for which they are not" and (2) "[w]hen the liability issues are so interrelated that it would have been impossible to separate them into claims for which attorney fees are properly awarded and claims for which they are not." 79 Cal. App. 4th at 1133, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 448. The latter exception applies to Plaintiff's fraud and SBA claims—the same conclusion reached by the court in Santana . 56 Cal. App. 5th at 347, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 335, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d (describing the plaintiff's "two causes of action—fraud and Song-Beverly Act—as encompassing ‘one set of facts’ ").
Defendant points to only two entries as excessive: 1.7 hours to prepare the complaint and 0.3 hours to file the civil coversheet. Opp. at 7. These entries are excessive for a routine lemon law case; drafting a boilerplate complaint should not take more than an hour, nor should drafting the simple civil coversheet take more than 15 minutes. Indeed, Plaintiff's counsel appear to acknowledge that it used a template to draft the complaint. Dkt. No. 64-1, Ex. 1, at 1; see also James v. AT&T W. Disability Benefits Program , No. 12-cv-06318-WHO, 2014 WL 7272983, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2014) (finding one hour spent drafting and modifying a complaint derived from a template to be reasonable). Accordingly, the Court finds that some of counsel's entries are excessive and justify a reduction.
Defendant also contends that Plaintiff billed for duplicative work among the numerous attorneys on this case. But all the examples highlighted by Defendant are for time spent reviewing or revising work drafted by another attorney, which Defendant has not shown was improper here. See Mitchell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , No. CV 05-00810 DDP (RNBx), 2008 WL 1749473, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2008) ("It is not unusual for one attorney to draft a brief, for another attorney to review and revise the brief, and then for the drafting attorney to make final edits and changes."). And while the Court may agree that staffing 14 lawyers on a routine lemon-law case is excessive, the Ninth Circuit has held that a district court "may not set the fee based on speculation as to how other firms would have staffed the case." Moreno v. City of Sacramento , 534 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, a district court's review is confined to determining whether counsel's staffing choices resulted in excessive or duplicative billing. Here, Defendant has not shown that counsel's billing records are duplicative, or that the large number of attorneys resulted in excessive billing.
The Court agrees with Defendant, however, that Plaintiff's counsel engaged in block billing, which "does not allow the Court to scrutinize the amount of time spent performing each task." Servin v. FCA US LLC , No. 5:20-cv-00647-SB-KK, 2021 WL 4860691, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2021) ; see also Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 480 F. 3d 942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (suggesting that block billing may justify a reduction of up to 30% for block-billed time); Banas v. Volcano Corp. , 47 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (construing Welch to authorize a district court "to reduce block-billed hours by 10% to 30%"). The time entries submitted by Plaintiff contain multiple "examples where, because of block billing, it is impossible to determine whether the time requested for any one task was reasonable." Banas , 47 F. Supp. 3d at 967. For example, on February 24, 2021, Mr. Law billed 1.5 hours for: "Draft Opp to MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION due tomorrow; reviewed moving papers; pleadings; purchase agreement; repair orders; Felisilda; arbitration arguments; drafted request for dismissal of dealer; finalized; PROOF OF SERVICE; filed and served." Billing Records at 3. Similarly, on January 4, 2021, Mr. Crandall billed 3.3 hours for: "Prepared for and attended demurrer and motion to strike hearing; draft hearing memo re: same." Id . at 2 (cleaned up). And on April 7, 2021, Ms. Lotardo billed 2 hours for: "REVIEW file, review Judge's Standing Orders and the Scheduling Conference Order, prepare Joint Rule 26 Report and email to OPPOSING COUNSEL." Id . at 4. A close review of the billing entries shows that roughly 32.1 (37%) of the hours billed were block billed, but that most of the entries not block-billed were done so by default because they only included one task. Accordingly, counsel's use of block billing justifies a reduction to the lodestar.
Finally, Defendant argues that counsel's billing records contain vague or clerical entries that warrant a reduction. Opp. at 9. Counsel is "not required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended," but must at least "identify the general subject matter of his time expenditures." Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 437 n.12, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The examples highlighted by Defendant are short but "sufficiently descriptive," amounting to 0.3 hours or less for reviewing correspondence from opposing counsel. Forouzan , 2019 WL 856395, at *6 (declining to reduce for tasks of 0.2 hours or less for emails or phone calls with the client). Accordingly, the Court will not reduce the time for these tasks. The alleged clerical tasks include preparing a civil case cover sheet or a notice of interested parties and emails to the court about transcripts or docket filings. Id . Purely clerical tasks are not recoverable. Hernandez , 2019 WL 2932637, at *4. But these tasks, one of which has already been reduced by the Court's block-billing reduction, are not "purely clerical or secretarial tasks," thus the Court declines to further reduce for them. Zargarian , 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1228–29 (declining to exclude non-clerical tasks such as reviewing notices and "drafting documents to be filed with the Court").
* * *
Overall, the Court finds that a 10% reduction is appropriate given the excessive time entries and the significant amount of block billing. Shaw v. Ford Motor Co. , No. 5:18-cv-01169-JLS-KK, 2020 WL 57273, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2020) (applying a "haircut" reduction of 10% to the lodestar). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’ counsel lodestar, including the estimated $3,500 reasonably incurred in bringing this motion, is $37,770.35.
The declaration submitted with Plaintiff's Reply notes that counsel have already incurred $6,522.00 for work in connection with the Reply brief, but Plaintiff only requests the estimated $3,500.00. Amirian Decl. ¶ 21, Dkt. No. 64-1.
C. Lodestar Modification
Plaintiff requests a 1.35 multiplier of the lodestar. Motion at 13. The lodestar amount is considered presumptively reasonable, and only the "rare" or "exceptional" case will justify an upward adjustment. Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co. , 214 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2000). Four factors guide the Court's determination of whether to adjust the lodestar: "(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award." Ketchum v. Moses , 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735 (2001). None of these factors support an enhancement of the lodestar in this case. This was a largely routine lemon law case that involved few procedural demands and the exercise of limited skill from lawyers who specialize in this practice area and generally rely upon boilerplate pleadings and work product. Indeed, as the Court recently stated, counsel for both parties failed to timely the resolve this case for months following the notice of settlement in September 2021. Dkt. No. 63. Finally, while counsel took this case on a contingency-fee basis, the SBA is a mandatory fee-shifting statute which "eliminates any uncertainty about whether costs will be awarded to the prevailing party." Arias , 2020 WL 1940843, at *2 (declining to award an upward adjustment for fees awarded under the SBA). Accordingly, the Court declines to apply any enhancement to the lodestar.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED in part, and Plaintiff is awarded $37,770.35 in reasonable attorneys’ fees.