Opinion
Civil Action 22-5216
12-11-2023
WARREN H. RAFFENSBERGER, Petitioner, v. CHERYL STEBERGER, et al., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAMELA A. CARLOS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Warren H. Raffensberger is currently awaiting trial in state court on charges of possession of a prohibited firearm, terroristic threats, and harassment. Before the Court is Mr. Raffensberger's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, raising three grounds for relief. However, because Mr. Raffensberger has not yet exhausted his state court remedies, I respectfully recommend that his habeas petition be dismissed without prejudice to allow him the opportunity to do so.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2022, Mr. Raffensberger was arrested on one count each of illegal possession of a firearm, terroristic threats with the intent to terrorize another, and harassment. See Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. Raffensberger, CP-36-CR-0003515-2022 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.) (publicly accessed docket sheet). His bail was set at $150,000, but it appears that Mr. Raffensberger remains in custody at the Lancaster County Prison. See id.
A review of the state court docket indicates that since Mr. Raffensberger's arrest, he has been represented by an attorney associated with the Lancaster County Public Defender's office. See id. Despite this, Mr. Raffensberger has filed numerous pro se motions and letters in state court. See Doc. No. 12, at ¶ 3. The presiding state court judge has referred each of these to Mr. Raffensberger's counsel for consideration. See id. ¶ 4. Among these pro se filings are a notice of appeal to the Superior Court, a request for release or “nominal bail,” and a motion for reduction of bail. See id. ¶¶ 5, 6. Counsel has since withdrawn Mr. Raffensberger's appeal, see id. ¶ 7, and a hearing has been scheduled to address the status of Mr. Raffensberger's representation. See Id. ¶ 4.
Unsatisfied with the course of events thus far in state court, Mr. Raffensberger has come to federal court and filed the instant pro se habeas petition. In his petition, Mr. Raffensberger raises three claims: (1) that the affidavit of probable cause to arrest was insufficient to sustain the charges against him; (2) that the arresting officer's testimony at the preliminary hearing was hearsay and therefore the government is unable to prove a prima facie case; and (3) that his bail is “excessive and unconstitutional.” See Doc. No. 2, at 7. After this matter was referred to me for a report and recommendation, see Doc. No. 10, I directed the parties to address whether Mr. Raffensberger exhausted the claims raised in his habeas petition, see Doc. No. 11. Now that briefing has concluded, this matter is ready for disposition.
Since Mr. Raffensberger is proceeding pro se, I have liberally interpreted his habeas petition throughout this report and recommendation. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”).
II. DISCUSSION
Federal courts may grant writs for habeas corpus to petitioners in state custody if their custody is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Tyson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 976 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(a)); see also Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). Although individuals typically wait until after they have been convicted in state court to petition for a writ of habeas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts also have jurisdiction to review pretrial habeas petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441-42 (3d Cir. 1975)
Like in the post-conviction context, before a federal court can grant pretrial habeas relief, the petitioner must have first exhausted the available state court remedies. Id. at 442 (recognizing that “although there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned”). To satisfy this exhaustion requirement, petitioners must “fairly present” their claims in “one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerkel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Only in “extraordinary circumstances” will the exhaustion requirement be excused for a pretrial habeas petition. Moore, 515 F.2d at 443; see also Reese v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 246 n.2 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that “extraordinary circumstances,” in this context, may exist “when there is a showing of ‘delay, harassment, bad faith or other intentional activity' on the part of the state” (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 447 n.12)).
The exhaustion requirement provides states with the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam)).
See also Evans v. Court of Common Pleas Delaware Cnty., 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (“It is an underlying principle of federal habeas corpus law ever since the decision in Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), that ‘federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent “special circumstance,” to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court.' Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973). The rule barring pretrial intervention into pending state criminal proceedings by way of federal habeas corpus or otherwise is premised on the notion of comity, a principle of deference and ‘proper respect' for state governmental functions in our federal system.”).
Here, Mr. Raffensberger has not exhausted his claims through one complete round of the state's appellate review process. He will have the opportunity to raise his claims either pretrial, at trial, on direct appeal, and through the collateral review process. As such, his claims are presently unreviewable in federal court unless Mr. Raffensberger can establish grounds warranting excusal of the exhaustion requirement. He has not done so here. Although he attempts to prove “extraordinary circumstances” exist in his case, see Doc. No. 13, the circumstances he describes (alleged prosecutorial misconduct during plea negotiations, disagreements with his trial counsel, and challenges to the sufficiency of his arrest warrant and facts presented at the preliminary hearing) do not rise to the level of “extraordinary” justifying excusal. Accordingly, I recommend that Mr. Raffensberger's habeas petition be dismissed without prejudice.
Cf. Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed.Appx. 3, 4-5 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding petitioner's claims of a warrantless arrest, delayed probable cause hearing, and excessive bail were not extraordinary circumstances for purposes of excusing exhaustion).
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons explained above, I respectfully recommend that Mr. Raffensberger's habeas petition be dismissed without prejudice to allow him the opportunity to exhaust his state court remedies. In addition, I recommend that no certificate of appealability issue because jurists of reason would not debate my recommendation to dismiss the petition. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The parties may file objections to this report and recommendation within fourteen days of being served a copy of it. See Local R. Civ. P. 72.1. An opposing party may respond fourteen days after being served the objections. Id. Failure to timely file objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. See Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 2007).