Opinion
24A-JP-164
08-14-2024
In Re: The Paternity of R.R. (Minor Child); v. Ramar Henderson, Appellee-Petitioner Randi Raff, Appellant-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT KATHERINE N. WORMAN EVANSVILLE, INDIANA ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE L. KATHERINE BOREN STOLL KENNON OGDEN PLLC EVANSVILLE, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court The Honorable Leslie C. Shively, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 82D01-2304-JP-443
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT KATHERINE N. WORMAN EVANSVILLE, INDIANA
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE L. KATHERINE BOREN STOLL KENNON OGDEN PLLC EVANSVILLE, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pyle, Judge
Statement of the Case
[¶1] In this paternity action, Randi Raff ("Mother") appeals the trial court's order that: (1) ordered Mother and Ramar Henderson ("Father") (collectively, "Parents") to jointly share physical custody of their now two-year-old son, R.R. ("R.R."); and (2) awarded Father more parenting time with R.R. than is contemplated by the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines ("the IPTG"). Mother specifically argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) ordered Parents to jointly share physical custody of R.R.; and (2) awarded Father more parenting time with R.R. than is contemplated by the IPTG. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶2] Mother also correctly points out that the trial court's written order does not include the trial court's verbal order, made during the custody hearing, that Parents attend via Zoom the Parenting Time Center's parenting class.Accordingly, we remand with instructions to the trial court to issue an amended order that includes the requirement that Parents attend via Zoom the Parenting Time Center's parenting class.
Mother does not allege that either parent has refused to attend the parenting class.
[¶3] We affirm and remand with instructions.
Issues
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Parents to jointly share physical custody of R.R.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Father more parenting time with R.R. than is contemplated by the IPTG.
Facts
[¶4] The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that Father, who is from California, obtained a doctorate in rehabilitation psychology from Illinois Southern University in Carbondale in 2018. After completing his doctorate, Father moved to Evansville, Indiana to complete a two-year post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Southern Indiana ("USI"). In 2019, Father and Mother, who was the head volleyball coach at USI, began dating.
[¶5] In 2020, after completing his post-doctoral fellowship, Father returned to California for "an amazing job opportunity" at Fresno State University. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 8). Although Mother remained in Evansville because of her job, Mother and Father maintained their relationship and discussed plans to marry at some point in the future. Parents' future plans also included Mother moving to California. During this time, Mother and Father learned that Mother was pregnant. In December 2021, Father visited Mother in Evansville. During the course of the visit, Mother believed that Father was verbally provoking her and decided to end their relationship.
[¶6] R.R. was born in June 2022. Father was present for R.R.'s birth and signed a paternity affidavit. Father had to return to California because of his job; however, he made several trips to Indiana to spend time with R.R. during the first eighteen months of R.R.'s life, including R.R.'s first birthday. During Father's time in Indiana, Mother made it "extremely difficult" for him to exercise parenting time with R.R. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). For example, during one four-day trip to Indiana, Father, who had to stay in a hotel and rent a car, was only able to spend a total of thirteen hours with R.R.
[¶7] At the beginning of one of Father's visits with R.R., Mother and Father spent thirty minutes discussing whether Father could use the car seat that Father had purchased for Mother to use in her car. Father eventually rented a car seat. During Father's visits with R.R., Mother provided Father with an hourly schedule for the visits. Mother also wanted to know exactly what Father and R.R. were doing during the visits, essentially "requir[ing] that [Father] provide minute by minute updates[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). Mother also attempted to contact Father via FaceTime during his visits with R.R. and then sent Father several text messages when Father did not respond to her attempts to contact him via FaceTime.
[¶8] In November 2022, Mother lost her job at USI, and in March 2023, Mother moved to Avon, Indiana to be closer to her family. Mother's parents ("Maternal Grandparents") assisted Mother in buying a home in Avon. Mother's sister ("Maternal Aunt") and brother-in-law are Mother's neighbors, and Maternal Grandparents live about ten minutes away from Mother's home.
[¶9] In April 2023, Father filed a petition to confirm paternity and to establish custody, parenting time, and child support. The trial court held a hearing on the petition in December 2023 and heard the facts as set forth above. In addition, three witnesses testified at the hearing: Mother, Father, and Father's father ("Paternal Grandfather"). Neither Mother nor Father called an expert witness to testify at the hearing.
[¶10] Father testified that he is now a professor at California State University ("the University") in Los Angeles and a therapist. He lives in a two-bedroom home in an affluent, low-crime neighborhood in Arcadia, California, and R.R. would have his own bedroom at Father's home. Father comes from a very close-knit family and lives approximately forty-five minutes from his parents ("Paternal Grandparents"). Father has access to a high-quality child-care center at the University, and Paternal Grandparents are also available to provide child-care.
[¶11] Also, at the hearing, Father asked the trial court to award him joint physical custody of R.R. Father explained that R.R. "having a strong bond with his [f]ather is vital with regards to his ability to form bonds with others emotionally." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 16). Regarding parenting time, Father asked the trial court to order that R.R. spend alternate months with each parent until R.R. reaches the age to begin Kindergarten. Father explained that he was requesting that R.R. spend alternate months with each parent because he believed "that [R.R.] going too long with seeing either of us would be (indiscernible) to his development. Because at the end of the day we're talking about [R.R.]'s development and him developing not only seeing his Mother's side of the family but also seeing mine and kind of learning from both sides." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 18). Father further testified that there are six daily direct flights from Indianapolis to Los Angeles.
[¶12] Father also requested that the trial court award him daily FaceTime visits with R.R. when R.R. is in Mother's care and award Mother daily FaceTime visits with R.R. when the child is in Father's care. Father explained that he knew that "the attention span of a year and a half year old is maybe 10 seconds, but just to get that FaceTime so he can see people who are important to him. I think it's important." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 18).
[¶13] In addition, Father acknowledged that Mother is a "good [M]om" who loves R.R. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 28). Father further acknowledged that he has a brother ("the brother") who was previously convicted of child endangerment in a case involving the brother's children. Father agreed that he was "willing to commit to th[e] [trial] Court [that day], and to even ask for an order if it ma[de] everybody feel better, that [the] brother would never be left alone in the presence of [R.R.] without [Father's] supervision[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 23).
[¶14] Also, at the hearing, Mother testified that she has a job in remote sales. Maternal Aunt and Maternal Grandmother provide childcare for R.R. while Mother works. Mother acknowledged that Father loves R.R. and has R.R.'s best interests at heart. Mother further testified that she wants R.R. to have a relationship and a strong bond with Father. Mother denied any incidents of domestic violence in her relationship with Father. Mother also testified that R.R. is a healthy child.
[¶15] Mother further testified that she had planned to take R.R. to California for visits with Father and that "one of the impetus[es] of [her] taking th[e] remote job was for [R.R.] and for the flexibility of him to have time with [Father] and [Father]'s family in California." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 70-71). However, Mother further testified that after Father had initiated "court proceedings and legal action and all that stuff[,]" she had decided that she was no longer willing to take R.R. to California and to stay there for an extended period of time. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 70).
[¶16] Mother also acknowledged that, in 2018, she had spent time in a mental health facility following a "[m]anic episode." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 59). Mother denied receiving a diagnosis during her time in the facility. However, she further testified that it was possible that she had told Father that her manic episode had been "associated with bipolar[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 59).
[¶17] Mother asked the trial court to award her "modified joint legal [custody]," where she would discuss an issue with Father, and if they were not able to reach an agreement on the issue, Mother "would have the final say[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 72). When asked why she wanted "to be able to have the final say[,] Mother responded, "[b]ecause I know what's best for [R.R.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 78). Mother further testified that daily FaceTime calls between Father and R.R. were "highly inconvenient." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 74).
[¶18] Paternal Grandfather, who traveled from California to accompany Father to the hearing, testified that he and paternal grandmother ("Paternal Grandmother"), who had been married for more than forty years, would be able to provide child-care for R.R. in California. Paternal Grandfather further testified that he would follow a court order prohibiting the brother from being alone with R.R.
[¶19] At the end of the hearing, the trial court verbally ordered Parents to attend via Zoom the Parenting Time Center's parenting class. Specifically, the trial court stated as follows:
Let's do that. Because you two are going to have to learn how to get together and work together. And, Mom, I'm going to tell you something. You're not going to be the last and final word on everything about this child. You need to learn that, too. And I think the professionals need to deliver that message to both of you so I want you to enroll in the very first Zoom class you can do.(Tr. Vol. 2 at 85).
[¶20] In January 2024, the trial court issued an order that provides, in relevant part, as follows:
2. Legal Custody: The Parties shall share joint legal custody of their minor child. At [the] hearing, both parties testified that the other was an able, willing, and loving parent, each describing the other as a "good" parent. Thus, without limitation, the parties shall cooperatively communicate in advance of any major decisions involving the minor child,
including healthcare, religion, education, and participation in activities....
3. Physical Custody: Despite distance as a major factor in this cause, Mother and Father shall jointly share primary physical custody. The Court finds distance is a major factor as Mother lives in Indiana and Father lives in California. This custodial arrangement shall terminate upon the child reaching age 4. Thereafter one parent shall become the primary custodial parent. The Court retains jurisdiction to make said determination following an evidentiary hearing if no agreement can be reached.
4, Parenting Time: Beginning immediately, Mother and Father shall equally share parenting time with the parties' minor child with a month on/month off rotation with Mother enjoying parenting time in the even-numbered months and Father enjoying parenting time in the odd numbered months. Additionally,
a. When the other parent is in the area where the child resides but not in their custody, or when the child is in the area where the other parent resides but not in their custody, liberal parenting time shall be allowed. The parents shall provide notice to each other, as far in advance as possible, of such parenting opportunities.
b. Parties agreed at hearing, and the Court herein Orders, that the minor child shall not be left unsupervised for any reason at any time with Father's brother, Jordan Henderson.
5. Holiday and Special Occasion Parenting Time: Holiday and special occasion parenting time shall be alternating
pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines when distance is a major factor, beginning immediately as if the minor child were five (5) years of age.(App. Vol. 2 at 42-43).
Mother does not appeal the trial court's decision ordering Parents to jointly share legal custody of R.H.
[¶21] On January 16, 2024, Mother filed a notice of appeal. That same day, Mother filed a motion in the trial court to stay the trial court's order pending her appeal. Father filed a response to Mother's motion to stay, wherein he stated that he was "gravely concerned" about Mother's behavior since the entry of the custody order. (App. Vol. 2 at 91). In his response, Father also expressed his concern that the granting of Mother's motion "would lead to an extended time period of Mother continuing to alienate Father from [R.R.] as appeals can take months, if not more than a year." (App. Vol. 2 at 91).
[¶22] Also, that day, Mother filed a motion for a protective order and restrictions, wherein she stated that the trial court's order had incorrectly stated the name of Father's brother with whom R.R. should not be left unsupervised. Specifically, the trial court's order had stated that Father's brother was named Jordan Henderson, but the brother who posed a threat to R.R. was actually named Merle Henderson, Jr. Mother asked the trial court to issue an order requiring Father to supervise R.R. if he is in the presence of Merle Henderson, Jr. Father filed a response to Mother's motion, agreed that R.R. should not be left unsupervised with Merle Henderson, Jr., and asked the trial court to amend the order accordingly.
[¶23] In February 2024, Mother filed a designation of expert witness, wherein she designated Dr. Susan Emmick ("Dr. Emmick"), who is R.R.'s pediatrician, as an expert witness that she intended to call to testify on her behalf at the hearing on her motion to stay. Also, in February 2024, Father filed an information for contempt, wherein he stated that, pursuant to the trial court's January 2024 order, he had taken R.R. to California on January 15, 2024, for his scheduled parenting time. According to Father, Mother had arrived in California the following day and had asked for Father's work schedule so that she could schedule parenting time with R.R. Further, according to Father, although he had given Mother parenting time with R.R., Mother had "interfered [with Father's parenting time] on a daily basis[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 106). In support of his allegation, Father attached to his motion multiple email messages that Mother had sent to Father requesting additional parenting time and information about R.R., including photographs. Father believed that Mother's actions were in direct contempt of the trial court's January 2024 order and asked the trial court to hold Mother in contempt.
[¶24] In February 2024, the day after Father filed the information for contempt, the trial court held a hearing on the pending motions. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court scheduled a hearing in May 2024 on Father's information for contempt to allow Mother's attorney the opportunity to review it. Thereafter, the trial court addressed Mother's motion for a protective order and restrictions. The trial court verbally found that there was a scrivener's error in paragraph 4 of its January 2024 custody order and that the name of the brother should be changed to Merle Henderson, Jr.
[¶25] The trial court then addressed Mother's motion for a stay. Dr. Emmick testified that children R.R.'s age should see their caregivers every few days in order to maintain their attachment to those caregivers. Dr. Emmick further testified that children generally take longer to recover from jet lag than adults and that "obviously being on an airplane can be detrimental health wise with viruses and such[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 104). On cross-examination, Dr. Emmick acknowledged that it is in "a child's best interest to have two loving parents in [his] life[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 109). She also acknowledged that a clinical report by the Academy of Pediatrics had stated that a father's early involvement in his child's life contributes to the child's language development and protects the child from mental health and behavioral problems.
[¶26] Also at the hearing, the trial court stated as follows:
I'll be very honest with you. I thought long and hard about my decision. And I thought given the age of the child and given what appeared to me in open Court to be two really concerned parents, that we have this temporary situation where they split the physical custody time under proper conditions and then when the child reaches that age that they're going to go to school, obviously we can't have him going back and forth. At that particular time someone has to be the primary custodial parent and if the parties can't agree on that then we leave it open for a hearing. I thought about this very carefully. Obviously the Mother and her attorneys are very upset with my ruling. You know, that's life. I did not make it arbitrarily. I really thought it through. And that's where we are.(Tr. Vol. 2 at 98-99).
[¶27] Following the hearing, the trial court's verbal order finding there was a scrivener's error in the January 2024 order was memorialized in a February 23, 2024 Chronological Case Summary ("CCS") entry. Specifically, that CCS entry provides that "there was a scrivener's error in paragraph 4 in the order of 1/9/2024 and the paragraph should read Parties agreed at hearing, and the Court herein Orders, that the minor child shall not be left unsupervised for any reason at any time with Father's brother, Mer[]le Henderson, Jr." (App. Vol. 2 at 9). Three days later, the trial court issued an order denying Mother's motion to stay.
[¶28] Mother immediately filed in this Court a motion to stay. This Court's motions panel granted in part Mother's motion. Specifically, this Court's motions panel's order provides as follows: "Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the trial court's January 9, 2024 order pertaining to Physical Custody and Parenting Time are stayed pending resolution of this appeal. In particular, the portion of the order requiring the transport of the minor child from Indiana to California on odd-numbered months is stayed." (App. Vol. 2 at 142).
We lift that stay by separate order entered contemporaneously with the handdown of this opinion.
[¶29] In March 2024, Father filed in this Court a motion to remand the case to the trial court for an interim parenting time order. This Court's motions panel granted Father's motion. The following day, Mother filed a motion for a change of judge, which the trial court granted. Also, in March 2024, Father filed a motion to withdraw and dismiss his February 2024 information for contempt, which the trial court also granted. Mother and Father agreed to the appointment of a new trial court judge, who held a hearing and entered an order on Father's motion for an interim parenting time order.
Decision
[¶30] At the outset, we note that there is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to the trial court in family law matters. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). Appellate courts "are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence." Id. (cleaned up). "Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of time." Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1141 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). "Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense, particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved children." Id.
[¶31] "On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal." Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124 (cleaned up). "Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment." Id. (cleaned up). We now turn to the issues in this case.
[¶32] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) ordered Parents to jointly share physical custody of R.R.; and (2) awarded Father more parenting time with R.R. than is contemplated by the IPTG. We address each of her contentions in turn.
1. Custody
[¶33] Mother first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Parents to jointly share physical custody of R.R. Mother specifically contends that a jointly "shared physical custody arrangement . . . is not in [R.R.]'s best interest[s]." (Mother's Br. 15).
We note that Mother supports her custody and parenting time arguments with the testimony of Dr. Emmick. However, Dr. Emmick testified at the motion to stay hearing, and Mother is not appealing the denial of her motion to stay. Rather, Mother is appealing the trial court's January 2024 custody and parenting time order. Because Dr. Emmick did not testify at the custody and parenting time hearing, we do not consider her testimony in our analysis of the custody and parenting time issues. See Morey v. Morey, 49 N.E.3d 1065, 1073 n.3 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (explaining that evidence that has not been admitted into evidence at the hearing may not be submitted on appeal).
[¶34] In an initial custody determination, both parents are presumed equally entitled to custody. In re Paternity of V.D., 226 N.E.3d 816, 827 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024). The trial court "shall determine custody and enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the child" by considering all relevant factors, including:
(1) The age and sex of the child.
(2) The wishes of the child's parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.
(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
(A) the child's parents;
(B) the child's siblings; and
(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.
(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community.
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.
(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian....I.C. § 31-14-13-2.
[¶35] The trial court's consideration of the child's best interests is not limited to those factors explicitly listed in the statute. V.D., 226 N.E.3d at 827. Further, when a trial court is making an initial custody determination, the trial court is required to consider all evidence from the time of the child's birth in determining the custody arrangement that would be in the child's best interests. Id.
[¶36] We do not disturb a trial court's custody determination absent an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Id. Rather, we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment. Id.
[¶37] Mother first argues that the trial court's order "appears to only consider some of the factors set forth in I.C. § 31-14-13-2." (Mother's Br. 16). However, a trial court is not required to make special findings in support of its custody determination where, as here, neither party requested them. Ind. Trial Rule 52; Anselm v. Anselm, 146 N.E.3d 1042, 1047 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (explaining that "[t]he plain language of the statute only requires a court to 'consider' the factors, not to make a finding regarding each one."), trans. denied.
[¶38] Moreover, a trial court is presumed to have known and to have followed the law. Matter of Z.H., 219 N.E.3d 187, 193 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023). We will abandon this presumption "only if the trial court's order leads us to conclude that an unjustifiable risk exists that the trial court did not follow the applicable law." In re Paternity of A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d 423, 431 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (cleaned up). Here, Mother has failed to argue or establish that the trial court failed to follow the law.
[¶39] Further, our review of the evidence reveals that at the time the trial court issued its order, Parents' son, R.R., was nearly two years old. Father was present at R.R.'s birth and signed a paternity affidavit. Both parents love R.R. and want to have a relationship and a bond with him. Each parent also acknowledges that the other parent is a good parent who loves R.R. and that it is in R.R.'s best interests to have a relationship with both parents. Father and Paternal Grandparents live in California, and Mother and Maternal Grandparents live in Indiana. R.R. lives with Mother. However, Father has built and maintained a relationship with R.R. by: (1) visiting him in Indiana; (2) taking him to California; and (3) making regular FaceTime calls. In addition, there is no evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent. These facts support an order for Mother and Father to jointly share physical custody of R.R. Although the evidence might support some other conclusion, it does not positively require the conclusion contended for by Mother. Rather, Mother's arguments regarding the statutory factors are simply invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See V.D., 226 N.E.3d at 827. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Parents to jointly share physical custody of R.R.
2. Parenting Time
[¶40] Mother further challenges the parenting time schedule that the trial court ordered. Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Father more parenting time with R.R. than is contemplated by the IPTG.
[¶41] We initially observe that in all parenting time controversies, trial courts are required to give foremost consideration to the best interests of the child. In re Paternity of C.H., 936 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied. When reviewing a trial court's determination of a parenting time issue, we grant latitude and deference to the trial court and will reverse only when the trial court abuses its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. If there is a rational basis for the trial court's determination, then no abuse of discretion will be found. Id. Therefore, on appeal, it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal. Id. Further, we may not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
[¶42] The IPTG "are applicable to all child custody situations, including paternity cases[.]" Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, Preamble (C)(1). Although the IPTG provide courts with specific parenting times for a child of a given age, the IPTG clearly state that "the purpose of these guidelines is to provide a model which may be adjusted depending upon the unique needs and circumstances of each family." Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, Preamble. Thus, the IPTG "should not be interpreted as a limitation of time imposed by the court." Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, Preamble, Cmt. 2. Further, the IPTG are not meant to foreclose the court from granting additional parenting time in any given case. Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, Preamble, Cmt. 2.
[¶43] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Father wants to be active in R.R.'s life. When Father moved to California, he expected that he and Mother would eventually marry and that Mother and R.R. would join him there. However, Mother and Father's relationship did not last, and Mother moved to Avon to live near her family. Father has attempted to exercise parenting time with R.R. in Indiana, where he incurs hotel and rental car costs. However, during those visits, Mother has limited Father's time with R.R. Specifically, during one four-day visit to Indiana, Father was only able to exercise thirteen hours of parenting time with R.R. And, during the parenting time, Mother attempted to contact Father multiple times via FaceTime and then texted Father when he did not answer her FaceTime calls. In California, Father has a two-bedroom house where R.R. will have his own bedroom. Father teaches some of his classes remotely, and the university where Father teaches has a child-care facility. In addition, Paternal Grandparents live nearby and will be able to spend time with R.R. and develop a relationship with him.
[¶44] Based on these facts and circumstances, the trial court crafted an order that maximized each parent's parenting time before R.R. begins school. Although the evidence might have supported another conclusion, the evidence neither positively requires the conclusion contended for by Mother nor provides a basis for reversal. See id. Rather, this evidence provides a rational basis for the trial court's parenting time order, and we are not in a position to second-guess the trial court's assessment in this regard.
We note that Mother's reliance on Matter of Paternity of Joe, 486 N.E.2d 1052 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985), is misplaced. First, as Father points out, this Court decided Joe nearly forty years ago, well before the adoption of the IPTG. Further, the facts in Joe are distinguishable from the facts before us. In Joe, the child's father lived in Indiana, and the child's mother lived in Washington, D.C. At the time of the custody and visitation hearing, the child was twenty-two months old and had a neurological disability that affected the development of her muscular tract. The trial court awarded Mother legal custody of the child, which Father did not appeal. In addition, the trial court awarded Father parenting time in Indiana for alternating two-week periods. On appeal, we concluded that there was "no substantial probative evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that the extremely liberal visitation granted to Father [was] in [the child] 's best interests." Id. at 1057. We further noted that we believed that the trial court's visitation order would "impermissibly infringe" on Mother's statutory rights as the legal custodial parent of the child to determine the child's upbringing. Id. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's visitation order. Here, however, R.R. is a healthy child with no disabilities. Further, the trial court's order in this case requires monthly exchanges of R.R. rather than exchanges every two weeks. In addition, here, the trial court awarded Father joint legal custody of R.R., which Mother does not appeal. Lastly, we noted in Joe that our decision was "not to say that, when all other factors bearing on the best interests of the child are considered, a visitation schedule such as the one in this case could never be found in a particular child's best interest." Id. at 1056 (emphasis in the original).
Mother also argues that "[t]he [trial court's January 2024] Order is clearly erroneous in that it incorrectly identifies the family member that [R.R.] should not be around. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to correct this error." (Mother's Br. 22). Generally, once a judgment is entered, an appeal is filed, and the clerk's record is complete, "Appellate Rule 8 divests the trial court of jurisdiction to act upon the judgment appealed from until the appeal has been terminated." Conroad Associates, L.P. v. Castleton Corners Owners Association, Inc., 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1005 (Ind. 2023) (cleaned up). However, trial courts "retain authority over matters which are independent of and do not interfere with the subject matter of the appeal." Id. (cleaned up). Such independent matters include "reassessing costs, correcting the record, or enforcing the judgment." Id. (cleaned up). Here, the trial court's order that R.R. not be left unsupervised with Merle Henderson, Jr. and the memorialization of that order in the February 23, 2024 CCS entry merely corrected the record and did not interfere with the subject matter of this appeal. Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter it.
[¶45] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.