Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4753-11T2
05-03-2013
TYRONE RAEFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JANE A. BOZINOVSKI, ESSEX COUNTY PROBATION DIVISION, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION, FAMILY PART OF ESSEX COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, Defendants-Respondents, and LINDA WILLIAMS, JOSEPH ONUOHA, ESSEX COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, SGT. PHILLIP RIZZO, POLICE CHIEF CRAIG R. NOVICK, SOMERSET COUNTY, Defendants.
Matthew P. Pietrowski argued the cause for appellant (Levinson Axelrod, P.A., attorneys; Mr. Pietrowski, on the brief). Janine L. Long, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney; Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Long, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Koblitz and Accurso.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7213-10.
Matthew P. Pietrowski argued the cause for appellant (Levinson Axelrod, P.A., attorneys; Mr. Pietrowski, on the brief).
Janine L. Long, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, attorney; Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Long, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals from a May 11, 2012 order granting the motion for summary judgment of defendants Jane Bozinovski, a probation officer, and the Essex County Probation Division (Probation). The trial judge found that these two Statedefendants were not "persons" subject to the 2004 New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm.
Plaintiff concedes that the probation division is a State entity. Although Essex County appears in its title, New Jersey probation divisions are within the State Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), and probation officers are State employees. See State v. Nellom, 178 N.J. 192, 201 n.2 (2003) (noting that in 1999, "probation services became a centralized state function"). Probation's child support collection efforts are partially federally funded through Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-669(b).
Plaintiff apparently settled his claims with all of the other defendants.
Plaintiff's lawsuit stems from his arrest and incarceration on a warrant for non-appearance at a child support enforcement hearing that had been previously cancelled by the court, but remained active in the law enforcement database. Plaintiff initially filed his claim in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court dismissed these two defendants, as well as others, based on the State's qualified immunity. Raeford v. Williams, No. 3-10-cv-01314 (3d Cir. Jan. 9, 2013). The motion judge dismissed on the same basis.
See R. 5:25-3(c)(11) & (d)(3) (allowing issuance of a warrant for non-appearance at a child support enforcement hearing).
Plaintiff was stopped for a motor vehicle infraction and kept in jail over the weekend due to this warrant.
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The Appellate Division reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995), applying the same standard governing the trial court under Rule 4:46. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Generally, the court must "consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Ibid.
On appeal plaintiff argues that although no provision in the Act specifically allows for suits against the State, its agencies, or its subdivisions, we should read the statute to implicitly allow action against a state entity. Plaintiff argues that the Act was intended to fill in the gaps left by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including the recovery of damages from State entities.
Plaintiff points to no case holding that a statute may constitute an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Statutes have expressly waived the State's right to sovereign immunity. See the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49 (N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(e), which includes in its definition of "employer," "the State, any political or civil subdivision thereof, and all public officers, agencies, boards or bodies"); see also New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8 (N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(a), which defines "employer" as "any individual, partnership, association, corporation or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly on behalf of or in the interest of an employer with the employer's consent and shall include all branches of State Government, or the several counties and municipalities thereof, or any other political subdivision of the State, or a school district, or any special district, or any authority, commission, or board or any other agency or instrumentality thereof.").
In Allen v. Fauver, 167 N.J. 69, 72 (2001), our Supreme Court determined that New Jersey's Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56(a)(1) to -56(a)(30), did not apply to the State because it does not include the State of New Jersey in the definition of "employer." (citing N.J.S.A. 34:11-56(a)(1)(g)). The Court also held that "the State had not waived its sovereign immunity and consented to suit under the [Fair Labor Standards Act]" (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 to § 219. The Court stated:
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996), the United States Supreme Court held that Congress does not have authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and to require it to face suit under the FLSA in federal court, absent the state's consent to suit. Not long thereafter, the United States Supreme Court held in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999), that Congress similarly does not have the authority to render states susceptible to FLSA suits in their own courts, absent their consent to suit. The holding in Alden was based not on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but rather on the very structure of the Constitution and the "inviolable" and "residuary" sovereignty retained by the states following ratification of the United States Constitution. Id. at 715, 119 S. Ct. at 2247, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 653 (quoting The Federalist No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
[Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).]
The Supreme Court emphasized that "[c]onsent has required clear and unambiguous legislative expression." Id. at 74 (citation omitted). It also noted that "[r]ules of strict statutory construction control application" of statutes that "derogate[] sovereignty." Id. at 75 (citation omitted). Thus, our case law does not support the concept of implicit waiver of sovereign immunity.
In support of his position, plaintiff points to the language in Owens v. Feigin, 194 N.J. 607, 612 (2008) where our Supreme Court describes the Act as creating "a statutory cause of action for damages against public defendants . . . ." (Citation omitted). In Owens the Court determined that the notice-of-claim requirement in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, did not apply to a cause of action under the Act brought against a county medical examiner. The Court did not address whether State entities were included within those "public defendants" potentially liable under the Act, as that issue was not before it.
Plaintiff additionally argues that although the Act was modeled after 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it was not meant to merely duplicate the federal remedy. Rather, he argues that the Act's purpose is, in part, to fill any gaps in state statutory anti-discrimination protection and to ensure that there exists a state law cause of action for state and federal violations of constitutional rights. He asserts that the statute should be construed broadly and that "[a] significant gap in the remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that it does not provide a victim with a remedy when the State is the public entity that violates his or her constitutional rights."
We have analyzed this argument in a case where a police officer alleged a qualified immunity defense under the Act. Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 2012). In Ramos, the plaintiff asserted that the trial court erred when it found that the police officer should be provided immunity under the Act. Id. at 20-22. We did not agree that the Act provided this gap-filling function. Id. at 22.
In Ramos, Judge Waugh reviewed the legislative history of the Act and related statutes from Maine and Massachusetts:
The Statement to Assembly Bill 2073 (February 9, 2004) provides, in part, as follows:
This bill attempts to provide the citizens of New Jersey with a State remedy for deprivation or interference with the civil rights of an individual. By providing this remedy, the bill attempts to address any potential gaps which may exist under remedies currently in the law.The reference to "potential gaps" under current remedies could be construed as evidencing legislative intent to provide a
state law remedy that would not be subject to the defense of qualified immunity available in cases brought under § 1983. However, subsequent legislative history convinces us that this was not the Legislature's intention.
The Assembly Judiciary Committee's Statement on releasing the bill (February 19, 2004) clarifies the language quoted above and precludes such a reading of its language.
This bill attempts to provide the citizens of New Jersey with a State remedy for deprivation of or interference with the civil rights of an individual. By providing this remedy, the bill is intended to address potential gaps which may exist under remedies currently provided by New Jersey's "Law Against Discrimination," N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., and the law authorizing a civil cause of action for bias crime victims, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-21.In addition, the same statement provides that the bill was "modeled on the federal civil rights law which provides for a civil action for deprivation of civil rights (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983), the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MA ST 12 § 11H et seq.) and the Maine Civil Rights Act (5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4681 et. seq.)." Similar language is contained in the statement issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee (May 6, 2004).
The committee statements make it clear that the "gaps" referred to in the bill statement cannot be construed as an indication that the Legislature sought to avoid the application of the qualified-immunity defense available in § 1983 cases. There is no suggestion in the overall legislative history that the Legislature
intended to circumvent the qualified-immunity defense applicable to § 1983 as a matter of judicial interpretation and application of common-law principles.
Like our Civil Rights Act, neither of the two state statutes cited in the committee statements specifically provides for the application of qualified immunity. In Duarte v. Healy, [537 N.E. 2d 1230], 1232-33 [(Mass. 1989)], the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that qualified immunity is applicable to discretionary acts under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gan. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H & 11I (1982). Similarly, because Maine's Civil Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §§ 4681-4685 (Supp. 1993), was "patterned after 42 U.S.C.[A.] § 1983," courts have determined that qualified immunity is applicable in defending action under that statute.
[Id. at 22-23 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote and citation omitted).]
Judge Waugh's analysis in the context of qualified immunity is applicable here as well. Qualified immunity protects law enforcement officials, who serve a discretionary function, from civil liability under Section 1983 where the officer "[did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 410 (1982). "[Q]ualified immunity is 'an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability[.]'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565, 573 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 425 (1985)). Where a Section 1983 defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense on a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defendant's conduct violated some "clearly established statutory or constitutional right[][.]" Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S. Ct. at 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 410 (1982). The State should be afforded a similar degree of protection in these circumstances. The term "persons" should be interpreted in the same way by both the Act and its federal counterpart, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in this context. See ibid.; see also Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443 (N.J. 2011) (finding that the District of New Jersey "has repeatedly interpreted [the Act] analogously to § 1983").
"The Legislature's intent is the paramount goal when interpreting a statute and, generally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citation omitted). A court should "ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole[.]" Ibid. (citations omitted). Therefore, when analyzing a statute, a court should give effect to the Legislature's intent as evidenced by "the language of [the] statute, the policy behind it, concepts of reasonableness and legislative history." Johnson Mach. Co. v. Manville Sales Corp., 248 N.J. Super. 285, 304 (App. Div. 1991) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff highlights the Governor's signing statement, arguing that the Governor's comments are "clear that the Act 'provides additional statutory remedies for people whose constitutional rights are violated' and ' fills in the gaps in the breadth of our civil remedies.'" However, "'signing statements do not carry the interpretive force afforded to statements from the Legislature.'" Ramos, supra, 429 N.J. Super. at 23 n.2 (citing Owens, supra, 194 N.J. at 612 n.3). Accordingly, the statements from the Legislature should be given more weight.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, State officers and employees who are sued in their official capacity are not "persons" since "they assume the identity of the government that employs them." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27, 112 S. Ct. 358, 362, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 310 (1991) (citation omitted). "By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals. A government official in the role of personal-capacity defendant thus fits comfortably within the statutory term 'person.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). Both Probation and Bozinovski, acting within her official capacity as a probation officer, were fulfilling a State governmental function, and therefore do not fall within the meaning of "persons" under the Act.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION