Opinion
E047430
2-27-2009
R. R., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
Dale Rasmussen for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Robert M. Burns, County of Lassen District Attorney, and Sandra F. Mock, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
The court has read and considered the record in this proceeding and has concluded that an alternative writ would add nothing to the presentation already made and would cause undue delay in bringing the action to trial. We therefore issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178-179; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1222-1223, disapproved on another ground in Hassan v. Mercy American River Hosp. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 724, fn. 4.)
While Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 generally governs access to juvenile court records and allows inspection by any person designated by the court, it does not encompass juvenile records that have been sealed under section 781, with certain exceptions: such material is admissible in defamation cases and where the Department of Motor Vehicles has obtained it and disclosed it to an insurer.
One appellate court has held that juvenile court records sealed pursuant to section 781 by court order, upon a probation officers recommendation, may not be disclosed to the Board of Parole Hearings for use in a proceeding to declare a prisoner a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, section 6600 et seq. (In re James H. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1081 (James H.).)
James H. observed that the Legislature could have written an exception into the Sexually Violent Predator Act to allow the use of such records, but it did not. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the superior courts order denying a petition for disclosure and directing it to secure return of all copies of the record. (James H., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.)
One point that James H. skirted over was the Peoples argument that Welfare and Institutions Code section 781 prohibits sealing records when the underlying offense is one listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b). Although the People acknowledged that the defendant was found to have violated Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), which is not enumerated in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), they argued that the juvenile court was entitled to look beyond the bare elements of the prior adjudication to determine whether the defendant had actually committed at least one of the offenses with force or duress within the meaning of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (c), which is a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), offense.
James H. agreed that case authority supported the general proposition that a court may look beyond the bare elements of a juvenile adjudication to determine whether it is based on a qualifying section 707, subdivision (b), offense. However, it noted that the courts that have considered this issue have done so in connection with an appeal from a disposition hearing and not with a later order sealing or unsealing the juvenile record. It concluded that there were no cases in which sealed records were ordered unsealed on this basis and that the language of section 781 does not contemplate an order unsealing a record on this basis. In any case, it noted that there is no indication that the juvenile court made such a determination in their case. (James H., supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.)
However, there is no logical or policy reason for preventing a court from later considering whether the offense was in actuality a qualifying offense under section 707, subdivision (b), and, if it determines it is, vacating the original order sealing the record.
In the instant case, as in James H., there is no indication that the lower court made a determination that the petitioners offenses were qualifying offenses under section 707, subdivision (b), when it ordered the release of the juvenile records; the issue was never presented. It is not clear that the court was even aware the records were sealed.
The People contend that petitioner actually admitted a violation of Penal Code section 286, subdivision (c), not section 288, subdivision (c). Violations of Penal Code section 286 are crimes falling within Welfare & Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), which are not subject to record sealing. Therefore, the People argue that the matter should be remanded to the superior court to determine whether petitioners juvenile records were properly sealed. We agree.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to set aside its order ordering disclosure of the petitioners records and to reconsider the matter. On reconsideration, the court shall allow the People to vacate the 1999 order sealing the records by showing petitioners crimes were actually qualifying offenses under section 707, subdivision (b).
Petitioner is directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties.
We concur:
RICHLI, J.
MILLER, J. --------------- Notes: Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise mentioned.