Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-2059, SECTION "R" (1).
January 16, 2003.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Johnny Crosby's motion to dismiss plaintiff's declaratory judgment action. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendant's motion.
I. Background
On July 4, 2001, Johnny Crosby, an alleged employee of plaintiff RB Falcon Drilling, U.S.A., injured his knee on plaintiff's drilling rig. Crosby received medical attention, including surgery, which Falcon paid for as part of its general duty to provide maintenance and cure to any seaman injured while in the service of the vessel to which he is assigned. Dr. Fleming G. Brooks, an orthopedist, examined Crosby on January 2, 2002, and opined that Crosby had reached maximum medical improvement. Dr. Christopher Cenac, the surgeon who performed Crosby's surgery, gave a similar opinion on February 26, 2002, and then again on March 12, 2002.
Crosby filed a petition in state court on July 3, 2002 under the Savings to Suitors Clause seeking to recover damages, including pain and suffering, medical expenses, and lost wages, arising from his July 4, 2001 accident. He also sought maintenance and cure. On the same day that Crosby filed his petition in state court, Falcon filed this action in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that it has fulfilled of its obligations to provide maintenance and cure. Falcon also seeks declaratory relief exonerating it from liability under the Jones Act and/or General Maritime Law. Crosby moves the Court to dismiss the federal action.
II. Discussion
Federal courts have great discretion to entertain, stay, or dismiss a declaratory judgment action. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 115 S.Ct. 2137 (1995). In exercising this discretion, the Court must balance on the record the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the factors relevant to the abstention doctrine. Travelers Insurance Company v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation, 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993). Among the factors that are relevant to this consideration are:
1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the matters in controversy may be fully litigated,
2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed by the defendant,
3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing the suit,
4) whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory plaintiff to gain precedence in time or to change forums exist,
5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the parties and witnesses, and
6) whether retaining the lawsuit in federal court would serve the purpose of judicial economy.Id. at 778; Torch, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1991).
First, the Court notes that there is a pending state court action in which each of the issues raised in this declaratory judgment action will be addressed. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A, Petition.) Second, it is clear to the Court that Falcon filed this federal action in anticipation that Crosby would file a lawsuit addressing the same issues in state court. In this regard, Falcon engaged in forum shopping and attempted to deprive Crosby, an injured seaman, of his ability to select a forum of his choice. See New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Majoue, 802 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The wholesome purposes of declaratory acts would be aborted by its use as an instrument of procedural fencing either to secure delay or to choose a forum"). Third, the record does not reflect that the federal forum is either more convenient or less convenient for either of the parties. Fourth, and finally, the Court notes that retaining the lawsuit would not serve the purpose of judicial economy. To the contrary, the Court finds that it would be wasteful to litigate at the same time the same issues in two different courts. Accordingly, the Court finds that each of the factors articulated by the Travelers court points toward dismissal.
The Court's conclusion is in accord with the well-established practice that courts in this district dismiss preemptive declaratory judgment actions in maritime personal injury cases. Torch, 947 F.2d at 195; The Complaint of T. Baker Smith Son, Inc., 1998 WL 151435, *5 (E.D.La. 1998); Doucet Adams, Inc. v. Hebert, 1993 WL 8623 (E.D.La. 1993); Belle Passe Towing Corp. v. Cheramie, 763 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D.La. 1991). When an employer files a declaratory judgment action in federal court after a seaman has filed a state court suit based on the same set of facts, "the district court should refuse to hear the matter." Lady Deborah, Inc. v. Ware, 855 F. Supp. 871, 874 (E.D.Va. 1994). But district courts have also refused to entertain declaratory judgment actions that are filed before a seaman files a state court suit. Baker Smith, 1998 WL 151435, at *5; Belle Passe, 763 F. Supp. at 1356. This situation, in which Crosby filed the state court petition on the very same day that Falcon filed the federal declaratory judgment action, fits squarely within this established body of jurisprudence. Upon balancing the factors articulated by the Travelers court, the Court sees no reason to depart from this longstanding practice. The Court therefore grants defendant's motion to dismiss.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendant's motion.