Opinion
2013-02-6
Segundo QUIZHPE, appellant, v. LUVIN CONSTRUCTION CORP., et al., respondents, et al., defendant.
Sacco & Fillas, LLP, Astoria, N.Y. (Andrew Wiese of counsel), for appellant. Weiner, Millo, Morgan & Bonanno, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Richard A. Walker of counsel), for respondents.
Sacco & Fillas, LLP, Astoria, N.Y. (Andrew Wiese of counsel), for appellant. Weiner, Millo, Morgan & Bonanno, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Richard A. Walker of counsel), for respondents.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Winslow, J.), dated November 30, 2011, which granted the motion of the defendants Luvin Construction Corp. and Jose I. Sanchez for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The protection against lawsuits brought by injured workers that is afforded to employers by Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11 and 29(6) also extends to entities that are alter egos of the entity which employs the plaintiff ( see Samuel v. Fourth Ave. Assoc., LLC, 75 A.D.3d 594, 594–595, 906 N.Y.S.2d 67;Cappella v. Suresky at Hatfield Lane, LLC, 55 A.D.3d 522, 522–523, 864 N.Y.S.2d 316). A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer ( see Cappella v. Suresky at Hatfield Lane, LLC, 55 A.D.3d at 522–523, 864 N.Y.S.2d 316;Ortega v. Noxxen Realty Corp., 26 A.D.3d 361, 362, 809 N.Y.S.2d 546). A defendant may establish itself as the alter ego of a plaintiff's employer by demonstrating that one of the entities controls the other or that the two operate as a single integrated entity ( see Samuel v. Fourth Ave. Assoc., LLC, 75 A.D.3d at 594–595, 906 N.Y.S.2d 67).
Here, the defendants Luvin Construction Corp. and Jose I. Sanchez proffered evidence that Luvin Construction Corp. and nonparty FML Contracting, Inc., the employer of the plaintiff and Sanchez, operate as a single integrated entity and their submissions established, prima facie, a defense under the Workers' Compensation Law ( see Morato–Rodriguez v. Riva Constr. Group, Inc., 88 A.D.3d 549, 549, 931 N.Y.S.2d 282;Anduaga v. AHRC NYC New Projects, Inc., 57 A.D.3d 925, 925, 869 N.Y.S.2d 801;Cappella v. Suresky at Hatfield Lane, LLC, 55 A.D.3d at 522–523, 864 N.Y.S.2d 316;Ortega v. Noxxen Realty Corp., 26 A.D.3d at 362, 809 N.Y.S.2d 546;Crespo v. Pucciarelli, 21 A.D.3d 1048, 1049, 803 N.Y.S.2d 586;Thompson v. Bernard G. Janowitz Constr. Corp., 301 A.D.2d 588, 588–589, 754 N.Y.S.2d 50;see also Naso v. Lafata, 4 N.Y.2d 585, 590, 176 N.Y.S.2d 622, 152 N.E.2d 59;Jaglall v. Supreme Petroleum Co. of N.J., 185 A.D.2d 971, 972, 587 N.Y.S.2d 413). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the motion of the defendants Luvin Construction Corp. and Jose I. Sanchez for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.