Opinion
Case No. 8:97-CV-1634-T-24TBM
January 5, 2001
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Defendants' Third Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 158) Plaintiff has responded to the summary judgment motion. (Doc. 205)
I
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The named defendants are twenty-two officers and employees of the Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC"). The defendants are sued only in their individual capacities, with the exception of Harry K. Singletary, Jr., the former Secretary of the FDOC, who also is sued in his official capacity.
Plaintiff alleges an organized effort by eleven prison officials to systematically retaliate against him for exercising his right to petition the government and free speech, and for assisting other prisoners in achieving meaningful access to court and with the preparation of administrative grievances at Hardee Correctional Institution ("HCI"). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that his job assignment at HCI was changed from inmate law clerk to food service clerk from November 8, 1993, until December 11, 1993, in retaliation for his filing numerous administrative grievances and for his assisting other prisoners in the preparation of administrative grievances. Plaintiff also alleges that thereafter he was convicted of a non-existent disciplinary offense and subjected to disciplinary confinement in retaliation for grievance practices. As a result of the disciplinary conviction, Plaintiff again was removed from his inmate law clerk position. Although the disciplinary conviction was later overturned, Plaintiff alleges that he was not reassigned to the inmate law clerk position. Plaintiff further alleges that eleven other prison officials purposefully failed to take any meaningful remedial action with respect to Plaintiff's administrative complaints about retaliation, in keeping with a long-standing, agency-wide practice of deliberate indifference to prisoners' retaliation claims, which lack of meaningful action allowed the systematic retaliation against Plaintiff to occur and persist. (Docs. 1 65)
Plaintiff claims that Defendants' conduct violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as three international treaties: (1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; (2) the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and (3) the Agreement and Charter Establishing the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. Plaintiff also raises a conspiracy claim. He seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages.
on August 27, 1999, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims under the three international treaties, dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment any damages claims against Defendant Singletary in his official capacity, and dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Miller, Henderson, and Shockley in their entirety. (Doc. 90) Pursuant to Rule 25(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court also substituted Michael W. Moore as the proper party defendant for Plaintiff's remaining claims against Defendant Singletary in his official capacity. Id.
Thereafter, Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (Doc. 91) On December 4, 2000, Defendants filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Counterclaim. (Doc. 215) On December 12, 2000, the Court granted the Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Counterclaim. (Doc. 223)
II
The Eleventh Circuit has discussed the standard for granting summary judgment as follows:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) authorizes summary judgment when all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 9/8 (1993), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 16 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 1994).
The Eleventh Circuit recognized the seminal case concerning summary judgment, Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986), by highlighting the following passage:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.Hairston, 9 F.3d at 918.
Finally, the parties' respective burdens and the Court's responsibilities are outlined:
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden to demonstrate to the district court the basis for its motion for summary judgment and identity those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions which it believes show an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Taylor v. Espy, 816 F. Supp. 1553, 1556 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (citation omitted). In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the district court must review the evidence and all factual inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 1992);Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). If the movant successfully discharges its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that there exist genuine issues of material fact. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.[,] 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Clark v. Coats Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991).
Applicable substantive law will identify those facts that are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Genuine disputes are those in which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the record.Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56. It is not part of the court's function, when deciding a motion for summary judgment, to decide issues of material fact, but rather determine whether such issues exist to be tried. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2135. The Court must avoid weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility determinations. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14. Instead, "(t)he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. Where a reasonable fact finder may "draw more than one inference from the facts, and that inference creates a general issue of material fact, then the court should refuse to grant summary judgment." Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933-34 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).Id. at 918-19. See Mulhall v. Advance Sec. Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589-90 (11th Cir. 1994); Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 523-524 (11th Cir. 1994).
III Eighth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff claims that Defendants' conduct violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff does not allege any physical injury but asserts claims of mental and emotional suffering resulting from alleged cruel and unusual punishment.
The eighth amendment, which applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Under that provision, states may not impose punishments that shock the conscience, involve unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, offend evolving notions of decency, or are grossly disproportionate to the offense for which they are imposed. Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1330 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1680, 44 L.Ed.2d 102 (1975). See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958). Under this provision, the Supreme Court has stated, "conditions of confinement . . . may make intolerable an otherwise constitutional term of imprisonment." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n. 38, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1411 n. 8, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973)). Various conditions, "alone or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Such conditions could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary standard of decency." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1571-72. (11th Cir. 1985),cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986).
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support his Eighth Amendment claim. Despite Plaintiff's apparent argument that all of Defendants' alleged conduct violated his right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from Cruel and Unusual Punishment, the only allegation in the complaint which tends to implicate that right is Plaintiff's allegation that "[p]unitive segregation at HCI imposed atypical and significant hardship on prisoners confined thereto in relation to ordinary prisoner life at HCI." (Doc. 1, ¶ 60) Plaintiff specifies that while in punitive segregation at HCI he was scalded by extremely hot shower water and forced to spend the night in a freezing cell with only one blanket and no clothing but a single pair of undershorts and a single t-shirt. Id. at ¶ 86. At night, Plaintiff alleges, the cell temperature was below 50°F. The food, Plaintiff continues, was always cold and unpalatable, and he was denied access to personal hygiene items such as soap, shampoo, dental floss, and a towel. Id.
All of Plaintiff's other allegations are hereby specifically rejected as failing to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff's claim that the food was cold and unpalatable does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment claim.
In their summary judgment motion, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff did not incur any cognizable physical injury due to the hot shower and cold cell, Plaintiff's claim for emotional distress and for violations of the Eighth Amendment should be denied. (Doc. 158, p. 27) In support thereof, Defendants cite Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997), and Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 1999), both of which interpret the physical injury requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which was enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
In Siglar, supra, the Court addressed whether a bruise to a prisoner's ear caused by a correctional officer amounts to a "physical injury" that can serve as the basis for excessive force or mental and emotional suffering claims. The Court reasoned that the well-established Eighth Amendment standards control in determining whether a prisoner has sustained the necessary physical injury to support a claim for mental or emotional suffering. The Court concluded that the prisoner's sore, bruised ear which lasted for three days was a de minimus injury which did not raise a valid Eighth Amendment claim for excessive use for force and did not constitute the requisite physical injury to support a claim for emotional or mental suffering.
Likewise, in Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated by, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), and reinstated in relevant part by, 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit fused the physical injury analysis under section 1997e(e) with the framework set out by the Supreme Court in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), for analyzing claims brought under the Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual punishment, and held that in order to satisfy section 1997e(e) the physical injury alleged by a prisoner must be more than de minimus, but need not be significant. The Court concluded that injuries resulting from a "dry shave," without more, are not the kind of injuries that are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
The Eleventh Circuit has never held that a prisoner must allege a physical injury in order to make out a Cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d at 1287.
In this case, Plaintiff does not allege any concrete, physical injury resulting from the conditions of his disciplinary confinement or any of the other alleged wrongful acts of the Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for emotional and mental suffering resulting from the conditions of his disciplinary confinement at HCI are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e).
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his claims relative to the conditions of his disciplinary confinement as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.See also Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir. 1998) (district courts should enforce exhaustion requirement sua sponte). The term "available" as used in § 1997e(a) does not mean that prison inmates must only exhaust their administrative remedies if the relief they seek is "available" within the administrative apparatus; instead, the term means that a prisoner must exhaust all administrative remedies that are available before filing suit, regardless of their adequacy. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d at 1286.
None of the administrative grievances filed with Plaintiff's complaint or otherwise filed in this action concern the physical conditions of Plaintiff's confinement at HCI. Furthermore, since Plaintiff is no longer in disciplinary confinement or located at HCI, he cannot show an immediate risk of substantial or irreparable harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims relative to the conditions of his disciplinary confinement are dismissed under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Finally, Plaintiff's claims relative to the conditions of his disciplinary confinement are facially insufficient in that Plaintiff fails to allege that any of the named Defendants were responsible for those conditions. On summary judgment, the Court will not assume that those Defendants who hold supervisory positions at HCI are responsible for the conditions of said confinement when that allegation is not specifically contained in the complaint or other pleadings and documents.
Conspiracy Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kerley, Atmore, Dobson, Skipper, Vinci, Harper, Padgett, Lawson, Noto, Beck, and Heckard conspired to violate his constitutional rights as alleged in the complaint. In civil rights cases, conclusory, vague, and general allegations of conspiracy are insufficient. Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984); Kearson v. Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Co., 763 F.2d 405, 407 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1065 (1986). The First Circuit stated:
In an effort to control frivolous conspiracy suits under 1983, federal courts have come to insist that the complaint state with specificity the facts that, in the plaintiff's mind, show the existence and scope of the alleged conspiracy. It has long been the law in this and other circuits that complaints cannot survive a motion to dismiss if they contain conclusory allegations of conspiracy but do not support their claims with references to material facts. This rule might have been applied with profit to this case. The complaint contains frequent references to conspiracy, but it offers few insights into the specific nature of the alleged concerted action. The only specific allegation regarding a conspiracy is the statement that the constable forged illegal documents and served them on the plaintiff at the request of the credit union's lawyer and with the knowledge of the court's clerk. Despite language hinting at a wider conspiracy, the plaintiff has failed to plead facts supporting these vague claims, and the courts need not conjure up unpleaded facts to support these conclusory suggestions.Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978) (citations and footnote omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit recently stated:
To prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff "must show that the parties 'reached an understanding' to deny the plaintiff his or her rights [and] prove an actionable wrong to support the conspiracy." Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 114 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2053, L.Ed.2d 459 (1991).
[T]he linchpin for conspiracy is agreement, which presupposes communication . . . .Bailey v. Board of County Commissioners of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112 (11th Cir. 1992).
This Court is satisfied that the Defendants against whom the conspiracy claims are brought have not adequately discharged their burden on summary judgment with respect to this issue and that Plaintiff should be given an opportunity to prove his theory of a conspiracy at trial.
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Vinci, Noto and Beck denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment at his disciplinary hearing by refusing to allow live witness testimony, by considering matters outside of the hearing, by finding Plaintiff guilty of violating a non-existent rule with no evidence to support the charge, and by imposing excessive punishment. (Doc. 1, ¶ 91) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Heckard and Padgettt violated his due process rights by filing false disciplinary charges against Plaintiff based on the alleged violation of a nonexistent rule. (Doc. 1, ¶ 92)
Defendants address Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims in their summary judgment motion by stating that Plaintiff's due process claim lacks merit and providing two sentences of general due process law to support that conclusion. (Doc. 158, p. 22) Plaintiff contends that "[t]his vacuous 'analysis' is contemptible, and can only be construed as a complete lack of desire on the part of the defendants to contest plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims." (Doc. 205, p. 10)
Defendant's discussion of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims is wholly inadequate for summary judgment purposes; Defendants have failed to engage in any analysis or application of the law to the facts of this case which would enable the Court to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate on this issue. For this reason, Defendants' Third Amended Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied on this issue.
At a Status Conference conducted on August 3, 2000, the Court rejected Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment and specifically instructed Defendants to address Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims in their Third Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.
First Amendment Claims
The crux of Plaintiff's complaint is that he was retaliated against for his use of the inmate grievance procedure and for using his position as an inmate law clerk to assist other inmates in achieving meaningful access to court and with the preparation of administrative grievances, all in violation of his First Amendment rights. The First Amendment claims are brought against Defendants Kerley, Atmore, Dobson, Skipper, Vinci, Padgett, Harper, Lawson, Heckard, Singletary, Smith, Perez, Redd, Carter, Holton, Philips, and Dickens.
An inmate who proves that he was retaliated against for filing an administrative grievance establishes a violation of his First Amendment rights. Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989) "The gist of a retaliation claim is that a prisoner is penalized for exercising the right of free speech." Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), quoting Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 1989).
A defendant may be liable for causing a constitutional deprivation if: (1) he directly participated in the alleged infraction; or (2) acting in a supervisory capacity, the defendant (a) failed to remedy a continuing or egregious wrong after learning of the violation, (b) created a policy or custom under which the unconstitutional practices occurred or allowed such policy or custom to continue, or (c) was "grossly negligent" in managing subordinates who actually caused the constitutional deprivation. McQurter v. City of Atlanta. Ga., 572 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D.Ga. 1983).
The Court has considered the alleged conduct of each named Defendant. Defendants Kerley, Atmore, Dobson, Skipper, Heckard, Vinci, Lawson, Padgett, and Harper were all employed at HCI and are alleged to have been directly involved in the retaliatory acts. Defendants Singletary, Smith, Perez, Redd, Carter, Holton, Philips, and Dickens are alleged to have purposefully failed to take any remedial action with respect to Plaintiff's administrative complaints about retaliation. A genuine issue of material facts exists as to whether Plaintiff's First Amendment rights were violated by these defendants.
Accordingly, the Court orders:
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims. The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's conspiracy claims against Defendants Kerley, Atmore, Dobson, Skipper, Heckard, Vinci, Noto, Beck, Lawson, Padgett, and Harper. The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants Vinci, Noto, Beck, Heckard, and Padgett. The motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff's First Amendment claims against Defendants Kerley, Atmore, Dobson, Skipper, Vinci, Padgett, Harper, Lawson, Heckard, Singletary, Smith, Perez, Redd, Carter, Holton, Philips, and Dickens. The motion is DENIED as to any matters not specifically addressed herein.
ORDERED