Opinion
5:21-cv-338-AB (MAR)
08-27-2021
ANTONIO ALEXANDER QUARTERMAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
HONORABLE MARGO A. ROCCONI, United States Magistrate Judge.
This Final Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable André Birotte Jr., United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
This Court has issued a Final Report and Recommendation that is nearly identical to the original Report and Recommendation, Dkt. 14, except that the undersigned has changed the language where it appeared to have caused confusion. The outcome of the Court's original Report and Recommendation remains substantively unchanged.
I.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION
On February 12, 2021, Petitioner Alexander Antonio Quarterman (“Petitioner”) constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1. On March 16, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition (“Motion”). Dkt. 6. Petitioner constructively filed his opposition on March 23, 2021, and three supplements with exhibits on March 28, April 21, and May 3, respectively. Dkts. 10, 11, 12. For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that this action be DISMISSED.
Under the “mailbox rule, ” when a pro se inmate gives prison authorities a pleading to mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating the “mailbox rule applies to § 1983 suits filed by pro se prisoners”).
II.
BACKGROUND
On June 23, 2020, Petitioner was arraigned on two (2) counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Cal. Pen. Code § 245(a)(4)) with an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury during the commission of a felony (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 12022.7(a)). “Hearings, ” FSB20001936, The People of the State of California vs. Antonio Alexander Quarterman, Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino, available at https://cap.sb-court.org/ (last visited August 2, 2021). The charges concern events that allegedly took place on June 11, 2020. Id. (under “Charges, Dispositions, and Pleas”). Petitioner is currently detained at West Valley Detention Center in Rancho Cucamonga, California, awaiting trial. Dkt. 1 at 2.
Petitioner appears to have filed a habeas petition in San Bernardino County Superior Court, which was denied on March 30, 2021. Dkt. 11 at 2. Petitioner also appears to have filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, which was dismissed on March 17, 2021, because “sentencing has not yet occurred.” Dkt. 12 at 17; see also Case Information, E076351, California Courts of Appeal, available at https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?docid=23 38011&requesttoken=NiIwLSEmTkw6W1BJSCJNUE5IIFQ6UlxbJCM%2BSz9TIC AgCg%3D%3D&start=1&docno=E076351&dist=42&search=party&auth=yes (last visited May 21, 2021).
On February 12, 2021, Petitioner constructively filed the instant Petition, alleging the following:
(1) Petitioner has been falsely imprisoned in violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights;
(2) Petitioner's appointed counsel committed misconduct and provided ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), violating Petitioner's Sixth Amendment and due process rights;
(3) A delay in Petitioner's arraignment violated his due process rights; and
(4) A delay in Petitioner's trial violated his due process rights.Dkt. 1 at 3-4, 7, 13-14.
On March 16, 2021, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the grounds that (1) Petitioner has ongoing state proceedings and (2) Petitioner's claims are unexhausted. Dkt. 6 at 1-2.
On March 23, 2021, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Grant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ” which the Court construes as his Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (“Opposition”). See Dkt. 9. Petitioner also filed three “Notice of Lodgments” on March 28, April 21, and May 3, respectively, which the court construes as exhibits to his Opposition. See Dkts. 10, 11, 12. In his Opposition and attached exhibits, Petitioner appears to argue that his state proceedings are not ongoing or, in the alternative, that extraordinary circumstances exist which warrant intervention with his state proceedings. /// /// ///
III. DISCUSSION
A. THE PETITION SEEKS TO INTERFERE WITH PENDING STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS 1. Applicable Law
“[T]he general grant of habeas authority in [28 U.S.C. § 2241] is available for challenges by a state prisoner who is not in custody pursuant to a state court judgment [such as] a defendant in pre-trial detention[.]” Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004)) (holding pretrial detainee's request for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) is properly brought).
“Only a limited number of pre-trial challenges have been found cognizable under Section 2241. Generally, pre-trial habeas challenges have been allowed only when a state defendant contends he is being deprived of his right to a speedy trial or the Double Jeopardy Clause will be violated if he is tried.” Fritz v. Cty. of Los Angeles CA, 2012 WL 5197971, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2012) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 488-93 (1973)); McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 824 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (as amended). However, as the Supreme Court has explained, “federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances,' to adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by a state court.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 489.
Principles of comity and federalism require federal courts to abstain from interfering with pending state court proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1971). The Ninth Circuit has held abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is “an ongoing state judicial proceeding”; (2) the proceeding “implicate[s] important state interests”; (3) there is “an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges”; and (4) the requested relief “seek[s] to enjoin” or has “the practical effect of enjoining” the ongoing state judicial proceeding. Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014)).
2. Analysis
As an initial matter, Petitioner admits, and the case information shows, that he is a pretrial detainee. See Dkt. 1 at 2; Case Information, FSB20001936, The People of the State of California vs. Antonio Alexander Quarterman, Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino, available at https://cap.sb-court.org/ (last visited May 14, 2021). Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“section 2241”), governs this case.
Here, all four (4) Younger abstention criteria are satisfied. First, Petitioner is awaiting trial on his charges and therefore has an “ongoing state judicial proceeding.”Second, the resolution of state criminal proceedings clearly implicates important state interests. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (“The right to formulate and enforce penal sanctions is an important aspect of the sovereignty retained by the States.” (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 46)); see also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432 (“Proceedings necessary for the vindication of important state policies or for the functioning of the state judicial system also evidence the state's substantial interest in the litigation.”). Third, Petitioner has “an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges, ” either at the trial or appellate level, and there appears to be nothing to prevent Petitioner from doing so. See Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 765. Fourth, habeas relief from this Court in the form of release would have the “practical effect” of enjoining the state court proceedings by releasing Petitioner prior to the adjudication of his criminal case. See Bowell v. Paramo, No. CV-17-9313-TJH-MAA, 2018 WL 4735721, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-17-9313-TJH-MAA, 2018 WL 4698250 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018), certificate of appealability denied, No. 18-56319, 2018 WL 6978341 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018) (finding if the Court were to grant emergency release, “it necessarily would entail interference because the ongoing state proceeding effectively would be terminated” (citing San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2008))). Accordingly, unless “extraordinary circumstances” exist, this Court should abstain from interfering with Petitioner's state court proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53-54
In his Opposition, Petitioner appears to argue he does not have “ongoing state proceedings” because the habeas petition he submitted in San Bernardino County Superior Court has been denied. Dkts. 9 at 5; 11 at 2. However, Petitioner is still awaiting trial on the underlying charges in state court. See Dkt. 1 at 2; Case Information, FSB20001936, The People of the State of California vs. Antonio Alexander Quarterman, Superior Court of California, County of San Bernardino, available at https://portal.sb-court.org/Portal/Home/WorkspaceMode?p=0 (last visited May 14, 2021).
B. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES” WARRANT THIS COURT'S INTERVENTION
1. Applicable law
“Extraordinary circumstances, ” may warrant exception to the “fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53-54; Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding “abstention principles ... prohibit a federal court from considering a pre-conviction habeas petition that seeks preemptively to litigate an affirmative constitutional defense unless the petitioner can demonstrate that ‘extraordinary circumstances' warrant federal intervention.” (citing Carden v. State of Mont., 626 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980))). To demonstrate an exception to Younger, Petitioner must show: (1) he would suffer irreparable harm that is “both great and immediate” if the federal court declines jurisdiction; (2) there is bad faith or harassment, on the part of state, in prosecuting him; or (3) the state court system is biased against Petitioner's federal claim. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975); see also Brown, 676 F.3d at 901 (citing Carden, 626 F.2d at 83).
2. Analysis
Petitioner argues that “extraordinary circumstances” warrant this Court's intervention, and that these circumstances “create a great and immediate threat of ‘irreparable loss,' to Mr. Quarterman's [invaluable] Family Support System [during] a time of [a global pandemic]”. Dkt. 10 at 2. Petitioner alleges he has shown “harassment, bad faith, [and] multiple substantial-vital rights that absolutely cannot ever be [cured] on the part of the government.” Id.
Petitioner argues that his original arrest was without legal basis, and that the arresting agency violated his constitutional rights and otherwise harassed him. See Dkt. 1 at 3, 5. Specifically, Petitioner alleges the arresting officer “unlawfully arrested [Petitioner] without any warrant or other legal process and took [Petitioner] into custody for something alleged [one week prior] against [Petitioner's] will.” Dkt. 1 at 3.
Furthermore, in his Opposition, Petitioner provides a copy of a complaint he appears to have submitted to the “State of California Commission on Judicial Performance, ” alleging that various judges who have presided over Petitioner's criminal proceedings have:
(1) “conflicts of interest” relating to “systemic racism, racial inequity ethnicity, racial injustice;”
(2) “[deprived] Petitioner of [his] rights under color of laws;”
(3) “[demonstrated] bias;”
(4) “motivated violence, intimidation, malicious official oppression, ethnic intimidation . . . and last but not least ‘obstruction of persons in their free exercise of Religious Beliefs;'” and
(5) “[conspired] against [Petitioner's] rights.”Dkt. 10 at 3-4. Specifically, Petitioner alleges Judge R. Glenn Yabuno:
(1) “permit[ed] Counsel (Rasheed Alexander) to disparage opposing counsel (Mr. Antonio A. Quarterman);”
(2) “limit[ed] and prevent[ed] objections of Mr. Quarterman;”
(3) “comment[ed] to the press re: pending case;”
(4) “encourage[ed] or permitt[ed] spectator misconduct;”
(5) “[made] prejudicial statements;” and
(6) “[did not] allow [Petitioner his] rightful due process of submitting motions, [or] having minute orders [and] transcripts.” Id. Petitioner also alleges that his counsel, both from the Public Defender's Office and Conflict Panel, have conflicts of interest, provided IAC, and committed misconduct.Id., Dkt. 1 at 4, 6, 7.
Additionally, Petitioner provides a copy of a complaint he has appeared to have submitted with Internal Affairs at the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department (“SBSD”) alleging that officials at the West Valley Detention Center used excessive force and “malicious harassing [and] threats” to get Petitioner to court. Id. at 7-8. Though unclear, Petitioner appears to allege he has suffered a broken hand and other injuries after prison officials deployed “MK-9S OC Vapor 2 canisters” in his cell and that the prison officials lied or omitted information in their incident report. Id.
a. Petitioner's speedy trial argument is not “an extraordinary circumstance”
To the extent Petitioner asserts his speedy trial argument creates an “extraordinary circumstance, ” the Ninth Circuit has explained that a claimed violation of the Speedy Trial Clause in and of itself is not an independent “extraordinary circumstance” necessitating pre-trial habeas consideration. Brown, 676 F.3d at 901. “[A]bsent specifically defined extraordinary circumstances, principles of federalism and comity prohibit a federal district court from entertaining a pre-conviction habeas petition that raises a Speedy Trial claim as an affirmative defense to state prosecution.” Id. at 900.
In Braden, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to raise his speedy trial claim through a federal habeas petition because: (1) he was in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241; (2) he exhausted all available state remedies; and (3) he did not seek to litigate a defense to a criminal charge, but instead, sought a prompt trial. Id. at 488-90. However, the Court emphasized that nothing in its decision “would permit the derailment of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.” Id. at 493.
Here, unlike the petitioner in Braden, Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies. Furthermore, while unclear, Petitioner appears to seek to litigate a defense to the criminal charge-i.e., he does not request an order directing Respondent to commence his trial, but rather appears to request his immediate release and that the charges against him be dropped. See Dkts. 1 at 2 (“When do you expect to be released: ‘At anytime [NOW] due to the false imprisonment'”); 9 at 6 (“The only remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the charges.”). Thus, the alleged violation of Petitioner's right to speedy trial does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance as to warrant federal intervention at this time.
b. Petitioner does not sufficiently allege the prosecution was brought in “bad faith”
“Bad faith” in the Younger context is “any ‘prosecution [that] has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.'” Lazarus v. Baca, No. CV 10-1423 GHK (FFM), 2010 WL 1006572 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2010), aff'd, 389 Fed.Appx. 700 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kugler, 421 U.S. at 126 n.6); see also Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding bad faith where the defendants brought multiple prosecutions against the plaintiffs).
Here, Petitioner attacks the validity of his arrest, and alleges several instances of misconduct and constitutional violations on behalf of the arresting agency, defense counsel, and presiding judges. Petitioner's allegations could be construed as general, conclusory allegations of bad faith. However, Petitioner does not allege any facts that would show the charges against him were brought “without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction, ” as opposed to in mistake or negligence. For example, Petitioner does not appear to allege that the charges are “motivated by a desire to harass, ” Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977), or that the his arrest is “only one of a series of repeated prosecutions to which he will be subjected, ” Younger, 401 U.S. at 49. In any case, Petitioner's allegations of bad faith are difficult to identify and understand. Accordingly, the Court cannot justify applying the bad faith exception to the principle of abstention here.
c. Petitioner's allegations of irreparable injury and bias
The Supreme Court has held that irreparable injury does not exist if the threat to a petitioner's federally protected rights may be eliminated by his defense of the pending case. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 53-54 (the “threat to the [Petitioner's] federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution . . . [c]ertain types of injury, in particular, the cost, the anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered ‘irreparable' in the special legal sense of that term”). However, the deprivation of physical liberty by detention does constitute irreparable harm. Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 767 (citing Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017)). The Ninth Circuit has applied the irreparable harm exception when “full vindication of the right necessary requires intervention before trial.” Id. (quoting Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1992)) (holding the irreparable harm exception applied where the petitioner had been incarcerated for over six months without a constitutionally adequate bail hearing).
In the case of bias, federal court intervention is only warranted if “extraordinary circumstances” render the state court “incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issue before it.” Kugler, 421 U.S. at 125 (finding extraordinary circumstances did not exist because it was “impossible to conclude” that the objectivity of the entire state court system was “irretrievably impaired”).
Petitioner's continued detention, if unconstitutional as alleged, could constitute irreparable injury. See Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 767. Furthermore, Petitioner's allegations of misconduct and conflicts of interest on behalf of the trial court and defense counsel could show bias on behalf of the state court, though it is unlikely that the entire state court system is “incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating” Petitioner's claims. See Kugler, 421 U.S. at 125. Still, construed as true, these allegations could justify the court refraining from abstention at the motion to dismiss stage. See Chiropractic All. of New Jersey v. Parisi, 854 F.Supp. 299, 307 (D.N.J. 1994) (refraining from dismissing an action under Younger at the motion to dismiss stage because the Court could not “conclusively determine at [that] stage of litigation whether or not subsequent discovery [would] bear out [the plaintiff's] allegations of bad faith”).
However, this Court need not determine whether Plaintiff's allegations of irreparable injury and bias justify refraining from abstention, because Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies.
C. PETITIONER HAS NOT EXHAUSTED STATE REMEDIES
1. Applicable law
Although there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for section 2241 actions, federal courts have imposed a prudential exhaustion requirement. See Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). “The rule of exhaustion in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of federal-state comity” and is “not limited to challenges to the validity of state court convictions.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973). “Where a petitioner seeks pre-conviction habeas relief, this exhaustion prerequisite serves two purposes: (1) to avoid isolating state courts from federal constitutional issues by assuring those courts an ample opportunity to consider constitutional claims; and (2) to prevent federal interference with state adjudication, especially state criminal trials.” Carden, 626 F.2d at 83.
A claim is exhausted when the petitioner has “fairly presented” his claims to the state courts in accordance with the state's procedures, including the California Courts of Appeal and, ultimately, the California Supreme Court. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (habeas petitioner must give the state courts “one full opportunity” to decide a federal claim by carrying out “one complete round” of the state's appellate process); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (“To exhaust a habeas claim properly, a petitioner must present his claim to the state supreme court even if that court's review is discretionary. Because California's established, normal appellate review procedure is a two-tiered system, [the California state inmate-petitioner] was required to exhaust his habeas claims in a petition for review to the California Supreme Court.”).
2. Analysis
Here, while Petitioner has filed a habeas petition in the San Bernardino Superior Court and the California Courts of Appeal, he has not sought relief from the California Supreme Court. See Dkts. 9 at 1-2; 11. Accordingly, Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies.
Furthermore, Petitioner's habeas petitions in the Superior Court and Court of Appeals were decided after Petitioner filed the instant Petition. Therefore, even if Petitioner were not required to seek relief from the California Supreme Court, it is unclear whether the petitions in the Superior Court and Court of Appeals would have been sufficient to exhaust Petitioner's remedies. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the PLRA exhaustion requirement must be satisfied before a petition is filed, as opposed to before a petition is decided).
The Ninth Circuit has suggested that an exception to this exhaustion bar may exist for the types of cases that involve “extraordinary circumstances” similar to those contemplated in Younger. See Carden 626 F.2d at 83-84. However, these “extraordinary circumstances” do not exempt a pretrial detainee from the requirement to exhaust by filing state habeas petitions, when such relief is available. See Ramirez v. Brown, No. EDCV191119CJCSS, 2019 WL 7562681, at *3 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. EDCV191119CJCSS, 2020 WL 127548 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2020); Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 766-67.
For example, in Arevalo, the Ninth Circuit found that the case fit “squarely within the irreparable harm exception” to Younger abstention, but only granted federal habeas relief after showing that the petitioner also exhausted his state remedies by filing habeas petitions in the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court. Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 766-67. Therefore, it can be inferred that, while the same types of circumstances could justify exceptions to both Younger abstention and the exhaustion requirement, the fact that certain circumstances exempt a petitioner from one does not necessarily imply the petitioner is exempt from the other.
Thus, even if Petitioner could show that “extraordinary circumstances” could overcome the general rule against federal intervention as defined in Younger, he must also show that he has exhausted all available state remedies or that those same extraordinary circumstances prevented him from exhausting otherwise available state remedies. Here, Petitioner has not sought any relief in the California Supreme Court, nor does he allege that his “extraordinary circumstances” have rendered these remedies unavailable. The Petition is therefore subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies.
IV. RECOMMENDATION IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order:
(1) accepting this Report and Recommendation; and
(2) directing Judgment be entered dismissing this action.