Opinion
No. 3D22-1263
12-26-2023
QUALITY BREEZE AIR CONDITIONING, INC., Appellant, v. AIG CLAIMS, INC., Appellee.
Agentia PLLC, Robert P. Charbonneau and Ian M, Corp. for appellant. Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Laura K. Whitmore and Ashley P. Hayes (Tampa), for appellee,
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mark Blumstein, Judge. Lower Tribunal No. 20-3351
Agentia PLLC, Robert P. Charbonneau and Ian M, Corp. for appellant.
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Laura K. Whitmore and Ashley P. Hayes (Tampa), for appellee,
Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Networkip, LLC v. Spread Enters., Inc., 922 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ("A cause of action for tortious interference requires a showing of both an intent to damage the business relationship and a lack of justification to take the action which caused the damage …. Protecting a company’s own economic interest to reduce the risk of incurring further loss does not constitute intent to damage within the meaning of a cause of action for intentional interference with business relationship.") (emphasis added); Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) ("[Activities taken to safeguard one’s own financial, and contractual interests are entirely non-actionable."); see also Genet Co. v. Annheuser-Busch, Inc., 498 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) ("Under Florida law, a cause of action for tortious interference does not exist against one who is [itself] a party to the business relationship allegedly interfered with…. Likewise, there can be no claim [for tortious interference] where the action complained of is undertaken to safeguard or promote one’s financial or economic interest."); Volvo Aero Leasing, LLC v. VAS Aero Servs., LLC, 268 So. 3d 785, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (the court held that in a case of tortious interference with a business relationship, for the interference to be unjustified, the interfering defendant had to be a third party, in other words, a stranger to the business relationship); Robobar, Inc. v. Hilton Int’l Co., 870 So. 2d 864, 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (the court held that a tortious interference claim was not "actionable" where the defendant was an "interested party in a business relationship"); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Zalay, 581 So. 2d 178, 179-180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (Under Florida law, "communications made … in business matters where both parties have a corresponding interest in the matter are … recognized as privileged occasions"; the appellate court applied the privilege in this defamation case involving an insurance investigation conducted in good faith and reversed the trial court’s judgment, stating that the insurance company "as a matter of law, had a qualified privilege to speak to its policyholders regarding the policies that plaintiff/Zalay had sold them" and explained that " ‘[e]xpress malice cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the statements were untrue.’ "); Crestview Hosp. Corp. v. Coastal Anesthesia, P.A., 203 So. 3d 978, 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ("The bottom line is that to overcome the privilege, find express malice, and hold the defendants liable for defamation, the jury had to decide that the [defendants] made the false statement with the primary motive of gratifying ill will, hostility, and their desire to harm the plaintiff. That the [defendants] said knowingly false things about [plaintiff], or recklessly disregarded his lights, didn’t necessarily mean that they were motivated by personal hostility against him."); Sorteli v. White Mountains Ins. Grp., Ltd., 2 So. 3d 1041, 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (affirming a dismissal with prejudice after plaintiff already had been given the opportunity to amend his complaint to correct his pleading deficiency and failed to do so).