Opinion
No. CV 02 0513290 S
May 13, 2004
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff's evidence is that he was residing at 14 Prospect Place and was injured when he fell on snow and ice on "the sidewalk" in front of 4 Prospect Place. The defendant landlord has moved for summary judgment. The defendant relies on an ordinance of the town of Torrington that makes a property owner liable for a fine if a sidewalk is not cleared within twelve hours from the cessation of the storm. Torrington Code, Article I, § 180-2B. The defendant contends that there is no dispute of fact that the twelve-hour time limit had not passed, thereby justifying judgment.
The court denies summary judgment for two reasons:
1. In addition to the ordinance on clearing of snow, the town of Torrington has also adopted an ordinance shifting its liability for sidewalk injuries in snow storms to the adjacent property owner. Torrington Code, Article VIII, § 180-35. See also Dreher v. Joseph, 60 Conn. App. 257 (2000). This ordinance only applies to injuries on the public sidewalk. Article VIII, § 180-33 specifically refers to liability for injuries occurring on the public sidewalk. This indicates that the provisions of § 180-2B apply only to the public sidewalk situation. In addition, the municipality would have no jurisdiction to fine a resident for failure to clear his own walkways that are not public sidewalks. It remains a question of fact as to whether this injury occurred on a public sidewalk or a private walkway of the apartment complex. See Joyner-Mosby v. Stamford Strawberry Hill Association, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV95 0143439 So. (April 28, 1998, D'Andrea, J.) ( 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 59).
2. Even if the slip and fall occurred on the public sidewalk, the time limit in § 180-2B cannot control the liability of the defendant. The common law on notice is as follows: "[T]he length of time a defect in a sidewalk must exist in order to charge a municipality with notice of its existence is a question of fact. Unless the period of time is so long or so short that only one conclusion can result, the determination of the question should be left to the trier." Cusick v. New Haven, 148 Conn. 548 (1961). The provision placing liability upon the property owner, § 180-35, provides that after the shift of liability, the property owner has the "same duty of care" that had previously been placed on the municipality.
To accept the defendants' argument and make use of § 180-2B to set the time limit for notice would contradict the intent of § 180-35 that the property owner's liability, if any, be exactly the same as the municipality. Clearly the purpose of § 180-2B is to fine recalcitrant adjacent owners, not to affect civil liability. It cannot cause the length of time for notice to increase to twelve hours. The court must read the two ordinances to make a harmonious whole. Carter v. City of Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV00 374413S (March 19, 2002, Rush, J.) ( 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 540) (as here, Bridgeport had an ordinance shifting liability and a separate "clean-up" ordinance).
Since there is an outstanding issue of fact as to when notice occurred, the motion for summary judgment is denied. So ordered.
Henry S. Cohn, J.