Opinion
May 22, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lockman, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, with one bill of costs to the defendants payable by the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's causes of action sounding in defamation against all defendants except William Michell. The court's determination was correct.
The allegedly defamatory remarks fell within the scope of the so-called "common interest privilege" (see, Liberman v Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 437; Park Knoll Assocs. v Schmidt, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 211; Kamerman v Kolt, 210 A.D.2d 454; Buckley v O'Keefe, 210 A.D.2d 195; Williams v Tritschler, 184 A.D.2d 690). Although the privilege is conditional, and can be overcome by a showing that the statements were motivated by malice (Liberman v Gelstein, supra, at 437), the plaintiff's submissions (except as to Michell), failed to establish triable issues of fact with respect to the assertion that the subject communications were motivated by malice (see, Kamerman v Kolt, supra; Buckley v O'Keefe, supra). As to Michell, however, we concur with the Supreme Court's determination that issues of fact were presented as to whether he acted with malice in making the subject statements (see, Liberman v Gelstein, supra, at 439).
Lastly, the court properly concluded that the plaintiff's allegations fail to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (see, Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303; Ruggiero v Contemporary Shells, 160 A.D.2d 986; Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 A.D.2d 169). Mangano, P.J., Sullivan, Thompson and Hart, JJ., concur.