Opinion
No. COA10-1341
Filed 17 May 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 9 June 2008 by Judge Michael R. Morgan in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 2011.
Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, LLP, by Harvey L. Kennedy and Harold L. Kennedy, III, for plaintiff appellant. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Elizabeth F. Parsons, for defendant appellees.
Wake County No. 04 CVS 14711.
Plaintiff appeals from an order entered by the trial court granting summary judgment for the individually named defendants based on the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We affirm.
I. Background
On 21 October 2004, plaintiff Johnny Max Puckett ("plaintiff") filed a complaint in state court against the North Carolina Department of Correction ("NCDOC"); David Mitchell ("Mitchell"), the Warden of Mountain View Correctional Institution ("the Institution") in Avery County, North Carolina; and three officials at the Institution: Richard L. Terry ("Terry"), Mark Edwards ("Edwards"), and Cherry P. Huskins ("Huskins"). The individual defendants Mitchell, Terry, Edwards, and Huskins (collectively, "the individual defendants") were sued in both their official and individual capacities. The complaint states a claim of employer misconduct substantially certain to cause death or serious injury to an employee (a Woodson claim) against defendant NCDOC, as well as negligence claims against the individual defendants.
Plaintiff's contentions center on his being ordered to paint areas of the Institution for several weeks using Kem-Kromik Universal Alkyd Metal Primer paint provided by the Institution. Plaintiff alleges this paint contains toxic chemicals and that he was ordered to use the paint without proper ventilation in the areas in which he was painting and without being provided a respirator or proper protective clothing by the individual defendants, even upon plaintiff's request for such items. Plaintiff claims he was overexposed to the vapors and fumes of the paint, which caused him to suffer pneumonia, bronchitis, asthma, lung damage and disease, and sores on his body, as well as mental and emotional distress. The facts underlying plaintiff's complaint are more fully set out in our previous opinion, Puckett v. North Carolina Dept. of Correction, No. COA09-782, 2010 WL 522497 (N.C. App. Feb. 16, 2010).
In addition to his state court action, plaintiff also filed a federal civil rights action in federal district court for the Western District of North Carolina, naming the same individual defendants and alleging the same facts and injuries as stated in plaintiff's state court action. On 13 September 2005, the federal court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants, finding, inter alia, that plaintiff failed to show that his exposure to the paint caused his lung disease injuries. Puckett v. Mitchell, No. 1:03CV286-03-MU, 2005 WL 2234595 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2005). Plaintiff did not appeal that decision.
On 29 February 2008, NCDOC and the individual defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in the state court action, which was granted in part and denied in part by the trial court on 9 June 2008. The trial court denied summary judgment as to plaintiff's Woodson claim against defendant NCDOC, which was reversed by this Court on 16 February 2010 on the basis of sovereign immunity. Puckett v. North Carolina Dept. of Correction, No. COA09-782, 2010 WL 522497 (N.C. App. Feb. 16, 2010). However, the trial court granted summary judgment as to the negligence claims against the individual defendants, finding that the federal court's ruling granting summary judgment for the individual defendants in plaintiff's federal action bars plaintiff's negligence claims against the individual defendants in the present state court action based on the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as that doctrine is interpreted and applied in this Court's decision of Youse v. Duke Energy Corp., 171 N.C. App. 187, 614 S.E.2d 396 (2005). From the order granting summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants, plaintiff appeals.
II. Standard of review
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. "Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Woodring v. Swieter, 180 N.C. App. 362, 369, 637 S.E.2d 269, 276 (2006). We note also that "`[c]ollateral estoppel can serve as the basis for summary judgment.'" Bradley v. Hidden Valley Transp., Inc., 148 N.C. App. 163, 166, 557 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Murakami v. Wilmington Star News, Inc., 137 N.C. App. 357, 359, 528 S.E.2d 68, 69 (2000)), aff'd, 355 N.C. 485, 562 S.E.2d 422 (2002). We review a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Town of Oriental v. Henry, 197 N.C. App. 673, 678, 678 S.E.2d 703, 707 (2009), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 813, 693 S.E.2d 353 (2010).
III. Collateral estoppel
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel because his prior federal court action was not decided on the merits or, alternatively, because he lacked "a full and fair opportunity to litigate" in the prior federal court action. We find plaintiff's contentions to be without merit under the circumstances of the present case.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel "`precludes relitigation of an issue decided previously in judicial or administrative proceedings provided the party against whom the prior decision was asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in an earlier proceeding.'" Lancaster v. N.C. Dep't of Env't Natural Res., 187 N.C. App. 105, 111, 652 S.E.2d 359, 363 (2007) (quoting Bradley, 148 N.C. App. at 166, 557 S.E.2d at 613). "[W]hen a fact has been agreed upon or decided in a court of record, neither of the parties shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over again at any time thereafter, so long as the judgment or decree stands unreversed." State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 623, 528 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2000) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In order for collateral estoppel to be applicable, certain requirements must be met. The elements of collateral estoppel, as stated by our Supreme Court, are as follows: (1) a prior suit resulting in a final judgment on the merits; (2) identical issues involved; (3) the issue was actually litigated in the prior suit and necessary to the judgment; and (4) the issue was actually determined.
McDonald v. Skeen, 152 N.C. App. 228, 230, 567 S.E.2d 209, 211 (2002) (citing Thomas M. McInnis Associates, Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 349 S.E.2d 552 (1986)). Furthermore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel "prevents `the subsequent adjudication of a previously determined issue, even if the subsequent action is based on an entirely different claim.'" Youse, 171 N.C. App. at 192, 614 S.E.2d at 401 (quoting Whitacre P'ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15, 591 S.E.2d 870, 880 (2004)). In addition, "[a]n action is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel `even if the first adjudication is conducted in federal court and the second in state court.'" Id. at 193, 614 S.E.2d at 401 (quoting McCallum v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv., 142 N.C. App. 48, 52, 542 S.E.2d 227, 231 (2001)).
Plaintiff's first contention is that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in the present case because the prior federal court action was not decided on the merits. Plaintiff asserts that his prior federal court action was dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore the first requirement of collateral estoppel that a final judgment on the merits in the prior suit is not met in the present case.
Plaintiff bases his contention on the language used by the federal court at the end of its order, which states: "NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is Dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED." Mitchell, 2005 WL 2234595, at *4 (emphasis added). In addition, in footnote 4 of the federal court's order, the federal court notes that the individual defendants would be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, but the court did not rule on that issue because "the Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of deliberate indifference and because Plaintiff has not specified in his pleadings the specific constitutional right he alleges Defendants have violated." Id. at *4 n. 4 (emphasis added). Plaintiff relies on this language for his contention that the federal court order actually dismisses plaintiff's action due to pleading defects, rather than on summary judgment.
However, despite the tenuous language on which plaintiff relies, we find that the federal court order is a summary judgment order. Notably, the federal court order first states: "THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 23), and brief and affidavits in support of motion (Documents No. 24, 25), Plaintiff's response to Defendants' Motion, (Document No. 29), and Plaintiff's Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Document No. 1)." Id. at *1. In addition, the federal court order recites the standard of review for summary judgment under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and proceeds to apply the summary judgment standard to the factual allegations presented in plaintiff's complaint. "In general, a cause of action determined by an order for summary judgment is a final judgment on the merits." Green v. Dixon, 137 N.C. App. 305, 310, 528 S.E.2d 51, 55 (2000). Accordingly, because we find the federal court order grants summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants in plaintiff's federal action, we conclude the requirement of a final determination on the merits in the prior action is satisfied in the present case.
Plaintiff further argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in the present case because plaintiff's federal court action was filed as a federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while plaintiff's claims in the present case are state common law negligence claims, which are distinctly different claims. Plaintiff contends that although both his federal and state claims involve the issue of causation, the issue is different as it relates to each claim. Regarding causation, plaintiff argues that "under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the issue before a jury would be whether a constitutional violation caused damages. . . . [T]he issue here is whether Defendants' negligence caused Plaintiff's damages." Plaintiff argues that because the claims are different and involve a different issue of causation, Youse is not controlling in the present case.
Plaintiff correctly states that in a state common law negligence claim, a necessary element that plaintiff must prove is that the negligent actions of the defendant caused his injuries. Hall v. Funderburk, 23 N.C. App. 214, 216, 208 S.E.2d 402, 403 (1974); see also Clontz v. St. Mark's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 157 N.C. App. 325, 328, 578 S.E.2d 654, 657 (2003). Likewise, as plaintiff concedes, in a federal civil rights claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is required to show that the alleged constitutional or statutory violation caused the injuries which plaintiff claims. First, the statute itself expressly uses the language of causation:
Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added). Applying the statute in the context of a claim by a prisoner for Eighth Amendment violations, such as the present case, the Fourth Circuit has held that "`a prisoner must allege a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.'" Brown v. North Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Odom v. S.C. Dept. of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003). Additionally, other federal courts applying the statute to federal civil rights claims have held that the issue of causation is a necessary element in stating a claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 669 (8th Cir. 1992) ("In order to establish a violation of constitutional rights under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's unconstitutional action was the `cause in fact' of the plaintiff's injury."). Regardless of which constitutional right plaintiff alleges was violated, the element of causation is necessary to establish a claim under this federal statute. Moreover, in applying § 1983, at least one federal court has expressly stated that, "[t]raditional tort concepts of causation inform the causation inquiry on a § 1983 claim." Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 608 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, the issue of whether defendants' conduct caused plaintiff's injuries is exactly the same in both plaintiff's federal action under § 1983 and plaintiff's state common law negligence claims. The fact that the claims are different is of no consequence for purposes of the collateral estoppel doctrine. See Youse, 171 N.C. App. at 192, 614 S.E.2d at 401.
In the present case, as in his federal action, plaintiff alleges his injuries to be pneumonia, bronchitis, asthma, lung damage and disease, sores on his body, as well as mental and emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges these injuries were caused by overexposure to the Kem-Kromik paint provided by the Institution, and as a result of the individual defendants' failure to provide plaintiff with adequate ventilation or proper protective equipment. These factual allegations are identical under both actions. In its summary judgment order, the federal court directly determined that the evidence was insufficient for plaintiff to show that the factual circumstances presented in the present case caused plaintiff's injuries. Whether the individual defendants' conduct rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, or was some degree of negligence, is irrelevant. The alleged factual circumstances and the issue of causation of plaintiff's injuries is exactly the same.
In Youse, this Court held "[a]lthough plaintiff's [federal court] case was based on different legal claims than the case before us, the state court and [federal court] cases involved identical underlying factual issues." Youse, 171 N.C. App. at 193, 614 S.E.2d at 401. As in Youse, the federal court order in the present case actually determines whether the same factual allegations caused plaintiff's injuries — a critical issue under both plaintiff's federal and state court claims. Accordingly, because the critical issue of causation has been actually determined on the merits by the federal court, the remaining requirements for collateral estoppel to apply are met, and that same issue cannot be relitigated in state court.
Finally, plaintiff contends the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in the present case because he did not have a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue in his prior federal action. Plaintiff bases his argument on the fact that he filed his federal action as a pro se litigant, had limited education, had no means to employ an attorney and therefore had no access to expert witnesses or affidavits, and because the federal court did not allow plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal.
Plaintiff relies heavily on the case of Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), for his contention that he did not have a "`full and fair opportunity' to litigate" the issues involved in the present action in federal court. However, plaintiff neglects the fact that in explaining this language, the court in Lee stated that a "`full and fair opportunity' to litigate" simply means the earlier proceedings "`need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.'" Id. at 894 (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481, 72 L. Ed. 2d 262, 280 (1982)). In addition, the federal court in Lee held that collateral estoppel would not apply under the circumstances of that case because procedural due process requires that criminal defendants be allowed sufficient time to prepare their defense, especially in a case, such as Lee, involving "an important and technically complex issue of constitutional dimension." Id. at 896.
In the present case, unlike Lee, which involved a criminal defendant, plaintiff is a civil litigant, and therefore the due process guarantee involved in Lee does not apply to plaintiff. Moreover, "[t]here is no statutory right to appointed counsel in civil cases, and a due process right to appointed counsel in a civil case arises only if needed to insure fundamental fairness (because of the complexity of the case or the party's inability to speak for himself)." Small v. Britt, 64 N.C. App. 533, 536, 307 S.E.2d 771, 773 (1983). We find plaintiff's lack of means to employ counsel or access experts in his prior federal action did not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness. Rather, plaintiff voluntarily filed a civil action in federal court, with full knowledge of the facts and injuries he would be required to prove, which was not unusually complex or technical. Accordingly, we find none of plaintiff's procedural due process rights were violated in his federal court action, and thus, he had "a `full and fair opportunity' to litigate" his claim. Moreover, we find this language, that "the party against whom the prior decision was asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in an earlier proceeding," simply restates the requirement that the issue involved was "actually litigated" or "judicially decided" in a prior action. See Bradley, 148 N.C. App. at 166-67, 557 S.E.2d at 613 (stating, after reciting the above language, that the defendant in that case had the burden of showing that the issue of vicarious liability has never been judicially decided) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, we find plaintiff's contention that he lacked a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue of causation in his prior federal action has no merit. As a result, because all the requirements are met for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply in the present case, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on that basis.
IV. Conclusion
We hold that plaintiff's prior federal civil rights action was determined on the merits in federal court upon the entry of summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants in that action. Because the prior federal court action determined the issue of causation, and because the issue of causation meets the requisite elements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply in plaintiff's present action, we find that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes plaintiff from relitigating the issue of causation in state court, and therefore summary judgment on plaintiff's negligence claims against the individual defendants in the present action was proper. Accordingly, the order of the trial court granting summary judgment for the individual defendants on the basis of collateral estoppel is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER (Robert C.), and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).