Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1328-M.
November 13, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On August 7, 2001, Defendants, the City of Campbell (the "City"), Mayor Pro Tem Donna Nelson ("Nelson"), Geri Barnes ("Barnes"), Pansy Young ("Young"), Kenneth Lindsey ("Lindsey"), and Collin Kanaman ("Kanaman"), filed Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), seeking partial dismissal of the claims of Plaintiff Wanda Pruitt ("Pruitt") against them. Specifically, Defendants sought to dismiss the following claims: (1) Pruitt's punitive damages claim against the City; (2) Pruitt's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the City; (3) Pruitt's defamation claim against the Defendants; (4) Pruitt's disability claim against the Defendants; and (5) Pruitt's 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim against the Defendants. Pruitt admits she erroneously included the City in her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and states she does not plan to pursue this cause of action against it. Further, she admits she has not properly pled defamation or disability claims against any of the Defendants. Therefore, the disability and defamation claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in their entirety and the intentional infliction claim against the City is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This Memorandum Opinion will analyze the Defendants' first and fifth arguments — that Pruitt failed to state a punitive damages claim against the City and that Pruitt failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Pruitt had been a part-time employee of the City and the Campbell Water Supply Corporation for twenty years when the City elected a new mayor, Barbara LeMoore ("LeMoore"). Defendants Nelson, Barnes, Young, Lindsey, and Kanaman were Aldermen of the City. Pruitt alleges she openly endorsed LeMoore's successful campaign, and LeMoore, acting as Mayor, entered into a thirty-six month employment agreement with Pruitt to serve as City Secretary for the City and the County of Hunt. Pruitt alleges a dispute arose between LeMoore and the individual Defendants over LeMoore's political agenda. Pruitt further contends that the individual Defendants conspired, in closed sessions, to eliminate LeMoore and anyone affiliated with her, including Pruitt and the police chief hired by LeMoore.
ANALYSIS
Dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is authorized when a Complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Defendants' Motion should be granted, of course, only if it appears beyond doubt that Pruitt could prove no set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. Accepting all of Pruitt's well-pleaded facts as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Pruitt, dismissal of Pruitt's punitive damages claim against the City and her § 1985(3) claim against all the Defendants is proper, for the reasons stated below.
Leffell v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994).
A. Pruitt's Punitive Damages Claim Against the City of Campbell
Pruitt seeks punitive damages from the City, arguing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 specifically authorizes the recovery of actual and punitive damages against a municipality. This argument wholly ignores Supreme Court and Circuit precedent. The Supreme Court, in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., erected an impenetrable barrier to punitive damage claims against a municipality under § 1983. In City of Newport, Justice Blackmun, for the majority, found the deterrence rationale of § 1983 did not justify the real costs of punitive damages to a municipality, noting:
453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981).
punitive damages imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the citizens footing the bill. Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers.
Id. at 267.
Contrary to Pruitt's analysis, which this Court finds to be unwarranted and distorted, containing citations which do not stand for the propositions for which they are cited, this holding has been followed repeatedly both by the Supreme Court and within this Circuit. The Court finds any imposition of punitive damages to the City of Campbell contrary to sound public policy and federal precedent and dismisses this claim for relief as it pertains to the City.
See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 786 n. 15 (2000) (finding treble damages under the False Claims Act were essentially punitive in nature and contrary to City of Newport and sound public policy); Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 76 (1997); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,167 (1985); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,36 n. 5 (1983). See also United States v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 486, 491-92 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[t]hough a local government can properly be made to pay compensation for the wrongful acts of its agents, punishing a local government is pointless"), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 20, 2001) (No. 01-510); Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 860 (5th Cir. 1984). See also Davenport v. Rodriguez, 147 F. Supp.2d 630, 641 (S.D. Tex. 2001); Funches v. City of Dallas, No. 99-224, 1999 WL 261842, *1 (N.D. Tex. April 28, 1999) (Fitzwater, J.) ("`[t]he punitive damages rule of City of Newport is not confined to Section 1983 and applies . . . as well as to Section 1981.'") (quoting Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1270 (7th Cir. 1984))); Sanders v. City of Garland, No. 982155, 1999 WL 33326506, *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1999) (Kendall, J.); Gates v. City of Dallas, No. 96-2198, 1998 WL 133004, *12 (N.D. Tex. March 18, 1998) (Fitzwater, J.) (dismissing a punitive damages claim against the City of Dallas under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 1983, the Texas Commission of Human Rights Act and the Texas Constitution). See also Winograd v. Clear Lake City Water Authority, 811 S.W.2d 147, 161 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.], writ denied) ("we believe that municipalities are immune from liability for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") (citing City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 263)).
B. Pruitt's 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Claim Against the Defendants
Section 1985(3) establishes a private right of recovery from persons who conspire directly or indirectly to deprive any individual of equal protection of the law or of equal privileges and immunities under the law. The Supreme Court, in Griffin v. Breckenridge, stated as a requirement of a cause of action based on § 1985(3) that: "[t]here must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." The "class-based animus" requirement forms the basis of the controversy in the present case. Defendants contend that Pruitt's Complaint fail to allege that Pruitt was a member of any class that was being discriminated against by the Defendants, and that, therefore, as a matter of law, she cannot satisfy the requirements of § 1985(3).
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . . or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.Id.
403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (emphasis added).
To state a cognizable claim under § 1985(3), Pruitt had to allege that: she was a member of a protected class, the Defendants conspired to deprive her of her constitutional rights, the Defendants acted with class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus, and she suffered damages as a result of the Defendants' actions. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971).
The Defendants also argue Pruitt has failed to allege "involvement of any type of federal matter or proceeding." Defs' Motion at 8. Though Pruitt does not address this contention in her Response, the Court agrees with the Defendants. Pruitt does not make claims based on alleged conspiracies to interfere in institutions and processes of the federal government, federal officers, federal judicial proceedings, or federal elections, so no such claims lie under those provisions of §§ 1985(2) or (3). See Scott, 463 U.S. at 839-40 n. 1 (Blackmun, J., dissent).
The purpose of the requirement of a class-based discrimination or an "invidiously discriminatory motivation" is to avoid converting § 1985(3) into a host for general tort grievances. The Griffin Court expressly refrained from defining what type of class-based discrimination was sufficient to satisfy the "class-based discriminatory animus" requirement of § 1985(3). However, the Fifth Circuit, consistent with the language in Griffin, cautioned district courts against extending § 1985(3) beyond the racial prejudice it was enacted to address:
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
Section 1985(3) will not be extended to every class which the artful pleader can contrive. . . . We remain mindful . . . of the Supreme Court's evident concern in [ Griffin, 403 U.S. at 88] over the broad literal sweep of the statute. That concern dictates the exercise of restraint when a court is confronted with class-based discrimination grounded in a non-racial animus.McLellan v. Mississippi Power Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 928 (5th Cir. 1977).
Since Griffin, the Supreme Court, though declining to define what non-racial classes could be entitled to protection under § 1985(3), has provided guidance as to types of classes that do not fall within the statute's purview. In United Bd. of Carpenters v. Scott, a construction company and two non-union employees claimed that a union and its members conspired to attack the company's construction site, to assault company workers, and to destroy company property because of their non-union class status. The Court rejected the claims, finding § 1985(3) did not cover conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activities. In doing so, it forewarned courts that manipulation of § 1985(3) into a general tort cause of action would not be justified:
463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983).
it is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause, most notably Republicans. . . . Although we examined with some care the legislative history that has been marshaled in support of the position that Congress meant to forbid wholly non-racial, but politically motivated conspiracies, we find difficult the question whether § 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the influence of or do other injury to a competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means. To accede to that view would go far toward making the federal courts, by virtue of § 1985(3), the monitors of campaign tactics in both state and federal elections, a role that the courts should not be quick to assume.
Id. at 836.
Justice Scalia, in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, likewise expressed concern over expanding § 1985(3) beyond its originally conceived boundaries. There, the Court rejected the district court's conclusion that opponents of abortion are a protected class under § 1985(3): "[w]hatever may be the precise meaning of a `class' for purposes of Griffin's speculative extension of § 1985(3) beyond race, the term unquestionably connotes something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors.'"
506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993).
Id. (emphasis added).
In conformity with recent Supreme Court case law under § 1985(3), the Fifth Circuit has restricted the movement of § 1985(3) into the general tort arena. However, the Fifth Circuit, in contrast to several other circuits, has repeatedly stated that § 1985(3) protection is granted to those classes characterized by some inherited or immutable characteristic, like race, as well as "political beliefs or associations," without explaining when such classes might exist.
See Hamill v. Wright, 870 F.2d 1032, 1038 (5th Cir. 1989) (class of "indigent contemnors brought before state district judges and routinely denied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel" was not a class protected from conspiracy under § 1985(3)); Galloway v. State of Louisiana, 817 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1987) (correctional officer contending he was discriminated against for not being a member of the "in-clique," did not state a claim under § 1985(3)); Daigle v. Gulf State Utilities Co., 794 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir.) (alleged conspiracy by union members against class of non-union members was motivated by economic or commercial animus outside of the scope of § 1985(3)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986); Roe I v. Abortion Abolition Society, 811 F.2d 931, 934-35 (5th Cir.) (patients, doctors, and abortion clinic and its staff did not form a class protected by § 1985(3) against anti-abortion society and municipalities), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); McLean, 817 F.2d at 1219 (company "scapegoats" allegedly conspired against by defendants who gave false testimony in court, failed to disclose information to former officer, and failed to produce documents to former officer, were not a cognizable class under § 1985(3)); Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1095 (5th Cir. 1989) (Section 1985(3) was too intertwined with employee's Title VII claim), aff'd, 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
See Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g granted and opinion and judgment vacated on other grounds, 648 F.2d 340, 347 n. 9 (1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1110 (1981) (differentiating the equal protection analysis from the § 1985(3) analysis because "section 1985 was certainly intended to cover conspiracies against Republicans; distinctions based on affiliation with a major political party are not among those traditionally subject to special scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment"). Though several Fifth Circuit cases state that § 1985(3) extends to those classes characterized by "political beliefs or associations," they uniformly deny coverage on the facts. See also Hammill, 870 F.2d at 1038; Galloway, 817 F.2d at 1154; Daigle, 794 F.2d at 978; Roe I, 811 F.2d at 934; Irwin, 874 F.2d at 1095; McLean, 817 F.2d at 1219; McLellan, 545 F.2d at 928-29.
A split among the circuit courts exists on whether those classes characterized by "political beliefs or associations" should be protected under § 1985(3). See Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 623 F.2d at 1066 (classes characterized by political beliefs or associations can be protected); Perez v. Cucci, 725 F. Supp. 209, 252 (N.J. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1990) (table); Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 1987); Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 386-88 (2d Cir. 1983). But see Harrison v. KVAT Food Mgmt., Inc., 766 F.2d 155, 163 (4th Cir. 1985) (§ 1985(3) should not be extended to encompass political classes); Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (7th Cir. 1985); Brown v. Reardon, 770 F.2d 896, 906-07 (10th Cir. 1985).
The right protected by § 1985(3) is the right to be free from a conspiracy based upon an invidiously discriminatory animus, aimed at an individual merely because that individual is a member of a particular class. In this Circuit, dicta suggests that a conspiracy to deprive a person of his right to free expression merely because he is a member of a group advocating an unpopular position or supporting the election of an unpopular candidate may very well be classified as a conspiracy based on an invidiously discriminatory animus, as required by Griffin. Yet, the facts alleged by Pruitt are insufficient, for several reasons, to forestall summary dismissal in this instance. First, the alleged class is not cognizable and distinct. No matter what the alleged bases for discrimination, the allegation of a "class-based animus" presumes the existence of a specific, identifiable class against whom the Defendants allegedly discriminated.
See McLean, 817 F.2d at 1219.
See id. at 1219 (the group must be "well-defined or traditionally disadvantaged").
Irwin, 874 F.2d at 1095.
Here, Pruitt asserts she was terminated because she was a part of a class of persons who "voted for and supported the platform enunciated by the newly elected Mayor." LeMoore's platform allegedly consisted of: requiring open meetings; forcing the Campbell Water Supply Corporation to act independently of, and at arm's length from, the City; and helping to get a police department for the City. However, Pruitt further alleges that sometime after becoming Mayor, LeMoore "lost the support of the Defendant [A]lderm[e]n members . . . and they retaliated by entering into a conspiracy to eliminate Ms. LeMoore, eliminate a police department and to eliminate anyone in the City of Campbell affiliated with Ms. LeMoore." From the face of Pruitt's Complaint, the Aldermen Defendants must have initially supported LeMoore. LeMoore lost that support. Therefore, the Defendants apparently were once a part of Pruitt's proposed "class" since they, at some time, supported the Mayor's policies. This vague, unrecognizable, and borderless class does not satisfy § 1985(3) even if political classes are protected. Pruitt does not claim she and LeMoore were part of the same political party, nor does Pruitt describe the beliefs she shared with LeMoore.
Pl's Resp. at 3.
Pl's Compl. at 4.
See Gleason v. McBride, 869 F.2d 688, 694-95 (2d Cir. 1989).
In Aulson v. Blanchard, the First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that political classes were covered by § 1985(3). The Aulson plaintiffs attempted to define their class as persons who support those "opposed to the politics of the `old guard.'" Rejecting the proposed class, the First Circuit stated:
83 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir. 1996).
Id. at 6.
[The class] might include all the voters in Georgetown, or it might include only voters who have spoken out against the incumbent Selectmen, or it might include only the two individuals featured in the complaint, or it might include anyone whose inclusion would benefit the plaintiff at any given time. There is simply no way to characterize this group as an identifiable segment of the community by reference to any objective criteria, and, hence, it cannot serve as a cognizable class within the purview of § 1985(3).
Id.
Like the proposed class in Aulson, Pruitt's proposed class is simply too indeterminate for the Court to perceive its limits. The class could include ardent supporters actively campaigning for LeMoore, who wore political buttons, organized rallies, and/or publicly associated themselves with LeMoore and her party — whichever party that may be. However, it may just as easily include one of many who simply voted for LeMoore.
In addition to failing to delineate a clearly defined class to which protection under § 1985(3) should be afforded, the degree to which Pruitt's allegations involve fundamental rights of speech and association which § 1985(3) might protect is minimal, at best. The conspiracy alleged, even if taken as true, is based on LeMoore's political agenda, not her association with her supporters. This falls short of minimum "class-based animus" requirements. As stated in Bray, "[w]hatever may be the precise meaning of a `class' for purposes of Griffin's speculative extension of § 1985(3) beyond race, the term unquestionably connotes something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors." United Bd. of Carpenters v. Scott, further instructed that § 1985(3) does not cover "conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activities." Here, even assuming a class could be found, such a class could not have been defined so as to exist independently of the activities that caused the Defendants to give up their support for LeMoore. Pruitt's proposed class manifests itself through activities, not association with a political belief or group. What the Eighth Circuit, cited by the Fifth Circuit in Roe I, refers to as an "intellectual nexus," an identifiable body with which the particular plaintiff associated himself by some affirmative act, is wholly missing. "[The body] must have an intellectual nexus which has somehow been communicated to, among, and by the members of the group." Here, the alleged class members support particular proposed activities, not an intellectual or philosophical approach. Political concepts, as contrasted to particular agenda items or support for a particular individual, are not the subject of the claim. Even if a political class could state a claim under § 1985(3), it would have to be bound by a philosophical tie, which is wholly absent here.
506 U.S. at 269. (emphasis added).
463 U.S. 825, 838 (1983) (emphasis added).
Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839-40 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
Id.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal is GRANTED. Pruitt has failed to state a cognizable punitive damages or intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the City. Pruitt has also failed to state a cognizable defamation, disability, or § 1985(3) claim against the Defendants.