Opinion
CV617-159
01-28-2019
JASON EASTMAN PROTZMAN and MICHELLE ANGELA PROTZMAN, Plaintiffs, v. HENRY JACK PROCTOR., Defendant.
ORDER
This case was recently reassigned to the undersigned. See Docket entry dated Jan. 8, 2019. Because of my prior service as a private mediator in this dispute, and to avoid any appearance of impropriety, I recuse.
Two federal statutes govern judicial disqualification due to conflict of interests. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 144, only applies when "a party . . . makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit . . . ." Since no such affidavit has been filed, it does not apply here. The second, 28 U.S.C. § 455, "places a judge under a self-enforcing obligation to recuse himself where the proper legal grounds exist." United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by J.W. by and through Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 904 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018). It is unclear to what extent service as a mediator requires recusal. See Blackmon v. Eaton Corp., 587 F. App'x 925, 934 (6th Cir. 2014) ("[W]e cannot find authority for the proposition that participation in a mediated settlement conference categorically disqualifies a judge from later deciding a motion in that same case"); S.E.C v. ING Annuity and Life Ins. Co., 360 F. App'x 826, 828 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no authority for recusal if they served as mediators in a related proceeding); Black v. Kendig, 227 F. Supp. 2d 153, 155 (D.D.C. 2002)(collecting cases). Nevertheless, it is vital that litigants and the public see that the judicial process is fair and impartial. Accordingly, I will exercise my discretionary power to recuse in this case.
The Clerk is, therefore, DIRECTED to reassign this case to Magistrate Judge James E. Graham for all further proceedings.
SO ORDERED, this 28th day of January, 2019.
/s/_________
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA