Opinion
D055927
08-05-2011
PROGRESSIVE CHOICE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SONIA GRACIANO, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2008-00075167
CU-IC-CTL)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William R. Nevitt, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Defendant and appellant Sonia Graciano (Appellant or Defendant) was injured in a multivehicle collision that involved, among others, a disabled automobile sitting by the roadside that was owned by family members, that was insured by plaintiff and respondent Progressive Choice Insurance Company (Progressive or Plaintiff). The third party drunk driver who hit the family members' automobile was underinsured. Several lawsuits were filed, including this one by Progressive, seeking declaratory relief on the policy provisions that provided automobile liability insurance to the family members, co-defendants Rosa Graciano (Rosa) and her husband Leonardo Graciano (Leo), brother of Appellant. At the time of the accident in October 2007, Leo had been driving the insured vehicle (a 2001 Dodge Intrepid, the "Dodge") before it ran out of gas and stopped, although Rosa, the policyholder on the vehicle, had a few months beforehand arranged with Progressive to exclude him by name from coverage as a driver, "for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle being operated by an excluded driver."
After court trial on stipulated facts of the declaratory relief issues raised by the complaint and Appellant's cross-complaint, a statement of decision and judgment were issued in favor of Progressive, granting it declaratory relief that it had no obligation under the policy to pay Appellant any benefits under the medical payments or uninsured/ underinsured motorist coverage (UM/UIM) coverage parts of the policy. The exclusionary policy language was not deemed to be ambiguous and therefore, since the loss occurred while Leo was operating the vehicle and while he was excluded from coverage, the policy provisions precluded recovery by Appellant. (Ins. Code, § 11580.2; all further statutory references are to the Insurance Code unless noted.)
Appellant primarily challenges the judgment by claiming the trial court erroneously interpreted a definitional provision applicable to liability insurance policies, section 11580.06, subdivision (f), which provides: "The term 'operated by' or 'when operating' shall be conclusively presumed to describe the conduct of the person sitting immediately behind the steering controls of the motor vehicle. The person shall be conclusively presumed to be the sole operator of the motor vehicle." The stipulated facts were that Leo was sitting inside the Dodge, trying to start it, after Appellant drove her own car to the roadside to supply him with gasoline, and Leo poured it in the tank. Leo then got into the driver's seat of the Dodge (hood up and emergency flashers on) and turned the key, while Appellant was standing outside and talking to him, but the car would not start. Suddenly, the underinsured motorist (insured by Mercury) plowed into Appellant's stopped vehicle, which hit the Dodge, together seriously injuring Appellant.
Appellant contends that, as a matter of fact and law, Leo was not "operating" the vehicle, since it was disabled, and any exclusion of him from coverage while "operating" it did not extend to exclude her from coverage as an additional insured, for purposes of the policy's UM/UIM coverage and medical payments. (§ 11580.06, subd. (f).) Appellant also argues that the exclusionary terms were ineffective and not specific enough regarding such coverage, because the document was not entirely filled out by hand by the policyholder, Rosa, but instead it had Leo's name and date of birth preprinted on it by Progressive, when Rosa signed and returned it. (§ 11580.2, subd. (a)(1) [requiring an "agreement in writing" to waive such coverage].)
For the reasons to be explained, we find Appellant's contentions to be unmeritorious and affirm the declaratory relief judgment in favor of Progressive.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Accident and Policy
According to the parties' stipulated facts, Rosa and Leo, a married couple, owned the Dodge and insured it through Progressive for a six-month term beginning in February 2007 (policy no. 32016718-1 or the policy). Although they also owned another car, it was inoperable and is not involved in this lawsuit.
At the time that the Progressive policy period began, both Rosa and Leo were insured as "good drivers" of the Dodge. After a few months, Progressive sent them a renewal proposal that raised the rates, because it learned that Leo had a driving record that included a suspension and a moving violation. Rosa called Progressive to inquire about reducing the rates, and a representative told her Leo's driving record was the reason for the higher rates, and they could be reduced if he were excluded. Leo's name would remain on the policy as her husband, but the exclusion would mean that if he drove the vehicle for any reason, the car would not be covered. During that discussion, Rosa decided to exclude Leo as a driver for the remaining policy and renewal periods. Progressive sent her a named driver exclusion election form, with Leo's name and birth date printed on it, with a cover letter stating: "We have received your request to exclude Leo R. Graciano from your policy. Before this driver can be excluded, the policyholder must write the excluded driver's complete name and date of birth on the enclosed Driver Exclusion form and sign, date, and return it. . . ." (Italics added.) Around this time, Rosa also added a lienholder to the policy information.
Rosa signed, dated and returned the named driver exclusion election form and continued to pay the premiums. Progressive sent her revised declarations pages and an excluded driver endorsement, advising her that her policy information and coverage had changed, to amend them to delete coverage "for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle that occurs on or after the effective date of this endorsement [July 27, 2007] while it is being operated or used by any person listed below [Leo]. This includes any claim for damages made against you, a relative, or any other person or organization that is vicariously liable for an accident arising out of the operation of a motorized vehicle by [Leo]." This endorsement also stated that insurers are required to provide UM coverage, but the insurer and the applicant may agree to delete the coverage completely or for operation of the vehicle by a person designated by name.
Nevertheless, apparently since their other car was inoperable, Leo continued to drive the Dodge to work for his night shift. In the early morning hours of October 20, 2007, he ran out of gas on Interstate 15 and called Appellant to assist him. She drove to the site, bringing a can of gasoline, and he fueled the car, which was sitting on the highway shoulder with the hood up and the lights on, but fading. Appellant may have sat in the Dodge briefly, but she was outside standing on the shoulder while Leo was sitting in the driver's seat, attempting to start the car. The drunk driver, Saul Ayala, then crashed into her parked vehicle, pushing it into the Dodge, throwing her about 35 feet and badly injuring her.
Rosa and Leo contacted Progressive to report the loss, and at first, they led Progressive to believe that Rosa had been in the car while Leo was driving. They then changed their story to admit that Leo was alone in the car on the highway. Originally, Leo said Appellant was not in the Dodge, even briefly, but he later stated that he did not know whether she was in the car or not.
B. This and Related Actions Are Filed; Summary Judgment Denied
In November 2007, Appellant sued the underinsured drunk driver (insured by Mercury), along with Rosa and Leo, alleging Leo was negligent. Progressive defended Rosa and Leo under a reservation of rights, paying $50,000 to Appellant, who then dismissed Rosa and Leo from the action. Also, Appellant alleged Mercury acted in bad faith by not promptly paying its $50,000 UIM/UIM policy limits on behalf of the underinsured drunk driver, and had thus subjected itself to further damages.
Discovery ensued about the reporting of the accident to the police officer who investigated and to Progressive, with conflicting accounts of whether Appellant was ever sitting inside the Dodge before the accident occurred, whether Leo was a passenger or a driver, and what was the meaning of "operating" the vehicle, in a lay sense. It is now stipulated that Leo was the driver, and was trying to start the car at the time of impact.
In January 2008, Progressive sued Appellant, Rosa and Leo for declaratory relief, to enforce the policy provisions excluding Leo from coverage for occurrences while he was operating the vehicle. Rosa and Leo defaulted and Progressive proceeded against them pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 585.
In her answer and in her amended cross-complaint versus Progressive, Appellant sought declaratory relief regarding coverage and damages for breach of contract and insurance bad faith.
Both Appellant and Progressive brought cross-motions for summary adjudication or summary judgment, based on their respective interpretations of section 11580.2, subdivision (f). Progressive argued that at impact, Leo was "operating" the Dodge, for purposes of interpreting an auto policy. (Ibid.)Appellant contended, among other things, that the car was inoperable, and it was the conduct of the drunk driver that should give rise to UM/UIM coverage.
The court denied the cross-motions, determining that at that time, neither party could meet its initial burden of proof as to the complaint or the cross-complaint under the standards of Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 890 (Scottsdale). In its order, the court stated, "Section 11580.2(f) does not define what conduct constitutes 'operating' a motor vehicle, rather it provides that if the vehicle is being 'operated,' then the 'person sitting immediately behind the steering controls,' and only that person, is 'operating' the motor vehicle."
Appellant now contends this denial of summary adjudication somehow remained binding upon the trial court at the later time of trial. However, she is incorrect. (See Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107 [court has inherent authority to correct its errors at any time despite a previous ruling on summary judgment].)
C. Stipulated Facts; Trial Court's Rulings
In preparation for trial, Appellant and Progressive supplied a joint statement of stipulated facts and evidence and a joint exhibit list. The court conducted a bench trial on March 26, 2009 on the declaratory relief issues raised by the complaint and cross-complaint, according to an agreement to bifurcate the issues. The parties entered into a stipulation that based on the complaint findings, resolution of the cross-complaint would follow consistently.
The court reviewed the exhibits and heard argument of counsel, on the issues framed at trial as follows: Whether the Dodge was "being operated by" Leo at the time of the loss, and if so, did the policy provisions preclude recovery by Appellant? On the latter point, the issues were whether the exclusion was sufficient to waive UM/UIM coverage, and even if that language were adequate, did Rosa have a knowing and intelligent intent to waive such coverage? Finally, the court inquired whether the exclusionary language was ambiguous so as to allow the UM/UIM and medical payment coverages to remain in effect as to Appellant.
After issuing an oral ruling, the court prepared a written statement of decision and judgment, determining that the Dodge was "being operated by" Leo at the time the drunk driver ran into Appellant's parked vehicle, pushing it into the Dodge and injuring Appellant. (§ 11580.06, subd. (f).) Next, the court ruled that Rosa's executed waiver of all coverage when Leo was operating the vehicle included the UM/UIM coverage, and the waiver complied with the statutory requirements and was not ambiguous. The meaning was clear; "that is, no coverage was being provided for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle being operated by [Leo]."
Further, the policy language regarding an excluded driver, here Leo, was determined not to be ambiguous, and it precluded recovery by Appellant of any medical payment or UM/UIM benefits. Therefore, the court issued declaratory relief as to all of the remaining defendants (of which Appellant is one), that as to this loss, Progressive had no duty under the policy (1) to defend or indemnify defendants; (2) to pay any benefits to defendants, or any of them, under the UM/UIM motorist coverage of the policy; nor (3) under the medical payments coverage.
With respect to Defendants Rosa and Leo alone, the court ruled Progressive had no duty to pay any benefits to them (under either the UM property damage coverage, comprehensive coverage, collision coverage, or the rental reimbursement coverage).
According to the parties' stipulation for resolution of the cross-complaint without the need for further proceedings, due to the similarity of the issues, Appellant took nothing. Progressive recovered costs as against Appellant. She appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
INTRODUCTION
Appellant claims the policy provisions, read properly under statutory standards, do not exclude her as a first party claimant of Progressive's UM/UIM or medical payment benefits, and the exclusion of Leo did not change that. She also makes a technical argument that the document utilized for exclusion of Leo as a named insured was defective under statutory standards, due to the manner of Rosa's execution of it or for its content. To assess these challenges to the declaratory relief judgment, we first set forth our standards of review and policy interpretation rules. We then apply them to this set of stipulated facts, presenting only issues of law.
"In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence, interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law which may be resolved by the court." (Scottsdale, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 890, 896.) On appeal, this court independently determines the meaning of the policy. (Ibid.)
"The rules governing policy interpretation require us to look first to the language of the contract in order to ascertain its plain meaning or the meaning a layperson would ordinarily attach to it. [Citations.]" (Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18 (Waller); Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ruiz (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1207 (Atlantic Mutual).)
The coverage provisions must be read in light of the exclusion clauses, which "remove coverage for risks that would otherwise fall within the insuring clause. [Citation.]" (Waller, supra, 11 Cal.4th. at p. 16.) " 'Before "even considering exclusions, a court must examine the coverage provisions to determine whether a claim falls within [the policy terms]." [Citation.]' " (Ibid.)" '[E]xclusionary clauses are interpreted narrowly, whereas clauses identifying coverage are interpreted broadly. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Atlantic Mutual, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1208.)
"The purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is ' "to protect one lawfully using the highway by assuring him of payment of a minimum amount of an award to him for bodily injury caused by the actionable fault of another driver." [Citation.]' " (Atlantic Mutual, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211, citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Macri (1992) 4 Cal.4th 318, 324.) "Cases uniformly hold that the statutes providing compensation for persons injured on the highways by uninsured motorists should be construed liberally in favor of coverage whenever possible to carry out the legislative objective. [Citations.]" (Atlantic Mutual, supra, at p. 1211.)
However, "[t]he principle of liberal interpretation should not be applied to give a forced construction or one which inserts a requirement not contained in the statute where the statute is clear in the context of the factual situation." (Craft v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1291-1292 (Craft).)
II
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
The stipulated facts included Appellant's statement that she had been sitting inside the Dodge shortly before she exited it, shortly before the drunk driver hit her own car, plowing it into the Dodge. Appellant contends she qualifies as an insured person under the UM/UIM coverage as a person "occupying" a covered automobile. For purposes of analyzing the statutory coverage questions, Progressive did not dispute that Appellant had standing as an "insured" who had occupied the vehicle, for purposes of her pursuit of UM/UIM or medical payment benefits. (Also see § 11580.2, subd. (b) [The term "insured," for UM/UIM coverage, includes "any other person while in or upon or entering into or alighting from an insured motor vehicle"].) However, since Appellant was not the policyholder, her reasonable expectations as an "insured" do not realistically come into play with regard to her ambiguity arguments. (Atlantic Mutual, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1203, 1210-1211.)
It should also be noted that as of the time of judgment, Appellant was still litigating her case against the drunk driver and his insurer, Mercury. The extent of his underinsurance, if any, had not yet been determined, and counsel stated at trial that Appellant was seeking a declaration she had a contingent right to recover $200,000 in UM/UIM coverage, since the drunk driver should get credit for the $50,000 policy limits expected to be paid by his insurer. Counsel for Progressive responded that such a judicial declaration would be premature. In any case, our inquiry is properly confined to the terms of the Progressive policy and to the stipulated facts and evidence before the trial court, and no such contingent declaratory relief would have been proper, as will be discussed.
We next address the claim that this exclusion and related policy documents were defectively drafted and completed. In part IV, post, we examine whether any covered loss took place, due to the participation of Leo in driving the car to the place of impact, when Leo had been the subject of an express exclusion as a named driver. This will require interpretation of Progressive's exclusionary language precluding coverage for any claim arising from a loss involving a "vehicle being operated by an excluded driver."
III
FORMAT OF EXCLUSION
Appellant claims that the named driver exclusion election form that Rosa signed, together with the revised declarations pages and an excluded driver endorsement, failed to meet statutory standards for format and specificity. She points out that Progressive's own cover letter required that before the exclusion could be processed, "the policyholder must write the excluded driver's complete name and date of birth on the enclosed Driver Exclusion form and sign, date, and return it." She now argues Progressive somehow rendered its exclusion defective by preprinting Leo's name and date of birth on the form that Rosa, as the policyholder, requested to be provided to her. Section 11580.2, subdivision (a)(1) permits an insured to enter into an "agreement in writing," in the form specified by statute (i.e., § 11580.2, subd. (a)(2) or (3), for deleting/reducing coverage), to delete or reduce UM/UIM coverage when a covered vehicle is operated by a natural person designated by name. When the named insured enters into such a written agreement, it is binding upon every insured to whom the policy or endorsement provisions apply while the policy is in force. (§ 11580.2, subd. (a)(1).)
We reject Appellant's contentions that the form provided by Progressive, as executed by Rosa, fails to meet the procedural standards of this section, which does not specify that the "agreement in writing" must be handwritten. Under section 11580.2, subdivision (a)(2), the mandatory terms of such agreement are laid out, and the agreement may also contain additional statements not in derogation of or in conflict with "the foregoing." Arguably, the preprinting of the name of the driver to be excluded and his birth date amount to such "additional statements" not in derogation of or in conflict with the statutory format. The cover letter did not create additional requirements when it accompanied the draft form, which was sufficient, and the revised declarations pages and excluded driver endorsement are also clear in advising Rosa that her policy information and coverage had changed, to delete UM/UIM coverage for incidents occurring during operation of the vehicle by Leo.
We further reject Appellant's contentions that Progressive's exclusionary form was substantively defective, because its first and last paragraphs refer to "any claim" and to "this policy," but without specifically repeating that UM/UIM language. In between those two paragraphs, this statutory language is included, referring to section 11580.2 requirements for an insurer to offer UIM coverage, but permitting the insurer and insured to delete the coverage completely or specifically when the vehicle is operated by a person designated by name. This was what happened here.
Appellant cannot persuasively contend that the waiver of UM/UIM coverage was ineffective, by arguing that the use of this form would not allow Rosa to have intentionally and on an informed basis relinquish her right to such coverage. Appellant bases her claim on either the content of the telephone calls Rosa made to Progressive (discussing how Leo's name would remain on the policy as a household member, while his operation of the vehicle was excluded), or on the format of the form she signed. However, as noted in Craft, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1291-1292, section 11580.2 was amended (in 1984), to clarify the binding effect of such a waiver agreement. (See, e.g., Dufresne v. Elite Insurance Co. (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 916, 923-924; Hagar v. Elite Ins. (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 505, 509.) Here too, Appellant relies on such older case law and cannot support her arguments that the deletion agreement fails to meet statutory standards of a written agreement that is "express" in nature. (Dufresne, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d 916.)
Further, under section 11580.1, subdivision (d)(1), a signed agreement is conclusive evidence of the validity of the agreement. When the named driver exclusion election form is read in context of the revised declarations pages and excluded driver endorsement, it clearly complies with statutory standards, and no further specificity or different manner of execution was required.
IV
EXCLUSION: OPERATION OF VEHICLE
Appellant challenges the trial court's statutory interpretation of section 11580.06, subdivision (f), which is one of many general definitions applicable to liability insurance policies. She also claims the exclusionary language was ambiguous as to the ordinary, lay meaning of the term "operated," or because the express language of the exclusion might have referred only to Leo, not to her, under the circumstances of the accident in which a third party drunk driver was involved.
We are required to interpret the statutory provisions in context of the factual situation of the loss. (Craft, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1291-1292.) In section 11580.06, subdivision (f), the key term is defined: "The term 'operated by' or 'when operating' shall be conclusively presumed to describe the conduct of the person sitting immediately behind the steering controls of the motor vehicle. The person shall be conclusively presumed to be the sole operator of the motor vehicle." This definition does not, on its face, require the vehicle to be in working order.
In Scottsdale, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 890, this "operating" term was analyzed in the context of an accident involving a multiuse vehicle, a truck with a cherry picker appliance mounted on it. The claimant, who fell from the cherry picker attached to the truck, was employed by one company, but was using the truck with permission of the truck/cherry picker's owner, a different business, at the time of injury. There were multiple insurance policies issued to the business owning the truck. Scottsdale provided it with commercial and excess general liability policies covering the cherry picker. The truck owner also bought automobile liability insurance policy from State Farm, and an excess automobile liability policy from CUIC. (Id. at pp. 893-894.)
On the relevant coverage issues in Scottsdale, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 890, 899, the appellate court determined that the claimant, who fell from the cherry picker attached to the truck, was not "operating" or "using" the truck within the statutory definitions, since he was not behind the truck's steering wheel at the time. (§ 11580.06, subds. (f), (g).) The claimant was therefore not an "insured" under the State Farm policy covering the truck, and he did not fall within a State Farm policy exclusion for bodily injury to an insured. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm based on the exclusion. (Scottsdale, supra, at pp. 901-902.)
In reaching its conclusions, the court in Scottsdale, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 890, interpreted section 11580.06, subdivision (f), "to apply to the various forms of the term 'operate' found within the article on automobile liability insurance." (Id. at p. 899.) It also examined legislative history and concluded "in enacting subdivisions (f) and (g) of section 11580.06, the Legislature intended to overturn the prior judicial decisions defining 'use' for purposes of automobile liability insurance policies and to provide a statutory definition of that term." (Scottsdale, supra, at p. 901.) As applied in our case, this analysis suggests that Leo, who was behind the steering wheel, falls within the related definition of "operating" a vehicle, when this loss occurred. (§ 11580.06, subds. (f), (g).)
In Atlantic Mutual, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 1197, the definitions in section 11580.6, subdivision (f) were analyzed in the context of "a multiple vehicle accident . . . that was followed by a secondary collision and concerns the uninsured motorist (UM) provisions of two different policies." (Atlantic Mutual, supra, at p. 1200.) There, the facts were that one Ruiz, the injured party and claimant, was a driver of his employer's truck, when involved in the multivehicle accident. He was then struck by an underinsured vehicle, after the original accident had just occurred and after he left the employer's truck and walked about 200 feet to another vehicle (a van), to check on that driver, exchange information, and help an injured passenger exit. (Ibid.)
In resolving those coverage issues regarding Ruiz, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the UM/UIM coverage of the van's owner applied to grant benefits to him as a claimant, because he was involved with the van to a sufficient degree that he was "occupying" it, or was "upon" it, when the injury occurred. (Atlantic Mutual, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1202-1208.) The court rejected the arguments of the insurer of the van that the claimant had to be a permissive user for the coverage to apply. Instead, since the claimant was positioned immediately adjacent to the van for reasons essentially related to the use of the insured van on the highway, the court interpreted those facts to show that he was "upon" the van and was an insured under its UM/UIM coverage. (Id. at p. 1211.) The court relied on "the principle that ambiguities in a policy are generally construed against the insurer [citation] and the underlying public purpose of the uninsured motorist statute." (Ibid.)
In Atlantic Mutual the court also determined that the claimant was unable to qualify as an insured under his employer's UM/UIM coverage, because he was too far away from the employer's truck (200 feet) to be "upon" it at the time of the loss. Therefore, there was no coverage under the employer's policy, and coverage did not have to be prorated. (Atlantic Mutual, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211-1212.)
Appellant believes that it should be dispositive for coverage purposes of her claim to Progressive that she was nearby the Dodge when injured by the crashes. Alternatively, she seems to argue that the conduct of the third party drunk driver (an underinsured motorist) should separately create coverage under this policy. However, in light of the governing statutes and the policy language, the proper focus of the analysis should be upon the conduct of Leo. At the time of impact, Leo was sitting in the driver's seat turning the key, attempting to operate the Dodge, although its hood was up and its lights were fading. Leo's conduct behind the steering wheel was sufficiently connected to the use of the vehicle to fall within the definition of "operating" a vehicle, as of the time that the loss occurred. (§ 11580.06, subds. (f), (g).) He had placed the Dodge on the roadside, in harm's way, and had requested that Appellant assist him. (See Atlantic Mutual, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1202 [trial court justified in considering how the subject vehicle came to be located in harm's way].) She cannot now claim he was not "driving."
Even though Leo's name remained on Progressive's policy declarations page as Rosa's household member, specifically identified as an excluded driver, the exclusion clearly meant that if he drove the vehicle for any reason, the coverage would not apply in a driving incident that led to any claim of loss. There is no significant ambiguity about the named driver exclusion election, which withholds coverage "for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle being operated by an excluded driver." (Italics added.) Appellant's losses arise from Leo's operation of the Dodge, and they do not fall within the coverage provisions of the policy.
"[T]he principle of liberal construction of uninsured motorist provisions should not be applied to give a forced construction or one which inserts a requirement not contained in the statute." (Craft, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1293.) We are unable to construe the language of the definitional statute as liberally as Appellant requests, to find that her claim of loss does not arise from the operation of the Dodge by an excluded driver. Progressive can properly rely on the written agreement creating this policy amendment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to Respondent.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:
McINTYRE, J.
AARON, J.