Opinion
1:15-cv-001359 LJO BAM
09-04-2015
PREMIER ACQUISITIONS LLC, Plaintiff, v. SOMCHIT REYNA, MICK REYNA, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendant(s).
SUA SPONTE ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO STATE COURT
The undersigned revokes any actual or anticipated referral to a Magistrate Judge for the purposes of Findings and Recommendations in this case.
On September 4, 2015, Defendant Mick Reyna filed a Notice of Removal with this Court, seeking to remove an action from the Superior Court for the County of Merced. Doc. 1. For the following reasons, the Court sua sponte REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of California for the County of Merced.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove an action to federal court if the district court has original jurisdiction. Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 340 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2003)). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Generally, a defendant seeking to remove an action to federal court must file a notice of removal within thirty days of receiving a copy of the initial pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The defendant seeking removal of an action to federal court has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction in the case. California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004).
Defendant appears to be attempting to remove an unlawful detainer action based on both federal question subject matter jurisdiction and diversity of citizenship. Doc. 1. However, Defendant cannot establish jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack inherent or general subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts can adjudicate only those cases authorized by the United States Constitution and Congress. Generally, those cases involve diversity of citizenship, a federal question, or involve cases in which the United States is a party. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994); Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is never waived and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996). "Nothing is to be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is what its power rests upon. Without jurisdiction it is nothing." In re Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1988).
Furthermore, the law is clear in the Ninth Circuit that the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand and against removal. Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). The "strong presumption" against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).
In this case, Defendant is unable to establish subject matter jurisdiction before this Court because the complaint filed in the state court apparently contains a single cause of action for unlawful detainer based on California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a. Unlawful detainer actions are strictly within the province of the state courts. Defendant's attempt at creating federal subject matter jurisdiction by adding claims or defenses to a notice of removal will not succeed. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 50 (2009) (federal question jurisdiction cannot "rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim"); Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) ("A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not confer jurisdiction on a federal court, even if the defense is that of federal preemption and is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint.").
In determining the presence or absence of federal jurisdiction in removal cases, the "well-pleaded complaint rule" applies, "which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Moreover, "it is well established that plaintiff is the 'master of her complaint' and can plead to avoid federal jurisdiction." Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2007); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936)) ("It is long settled law that a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law"). Plaintiff's complaint raises a single state law claim. The face of a properly-pled state law unlawful detainer action does not present a federal question. Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint avoids federal question jurisdiction.
The next possible basis for this Court's jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction. District courts have diversity jurisdiction over "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs," and the action is between "(1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010).
Defendant attempts to raise diversity of citizenship for this Court's jurisdiction. However, even if raised, it is clear from the face of the complaint that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. When a state court complaint affirmatively alleges that the amount in controversy is less than the jurisdictional threshold, the party seeking removal must prove with "legal certainty" that the jurisdictional amount is met. See Lowdermilk, 479 F.3d at 1000. The complaint filed in this action states unequivocally that the amount in controversy is less than $10,000. Defendant's notice of removal does not challenge the amount in controversy, and does not provide any basis for a finding that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 required. The amount in controversy is determined without regard to any setoff or counterclaim to which defendant may be entitled. See Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, the amount in controversy is insufficient to provide this Court with diversity jurisdiction.
Moreover, in removal cases where the purported basis of jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction, removal is not permitted where a defendant in the case is a citizen of the state in which the plaintiff originally brought the action (even if the opposing parties are citizens of different states). See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Here, Defendant lists his address as Merced, California, and does not provide any alternative basis for a finding of his citizenship.
Accordingly, the Court REMANDS this case to the Superior Court for the County of Merced for all future proceedings. IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: September 4, 2015
/s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill
United States District Judge