Opinion
No. 2259 C.D. 2012
12-16-2013
Lazarus Pratt, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI
Lazarus Pratt (Petitioner), pro se, petitions for review of a determination of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) denying his request for administrative relief from the Board's decision to recommit him as a convicted parole violator for two counts of corruption of minors, of which he was charged and convicted after his maximum sentence had expired and he had been released from prison. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Petitioner was sentenced in 1995 to serve a two- to eleven-year sentence at the State Correctional Institution-Rockville (SCI-Rockville) for escape and reckless endangerment. The original minimum sentence date for this sentence was June 16, 1998, and the maximum sentence date was June 16, 2007. The Board initially paroled Petitioner on October 15, 1998, but recommitted him as a convicted parole violator by decision dated September 10, 1999, and recalculated his maximum sentence date to February 29, 2008. The Board reparoled Petitioner on January 10, 2001, but recommitted him as a technical parole violator by decision dated October 31, 2002, and recalculated his maximum sentence date to April 24, 2008. The Board again reparoled Petitioner on March 2, 2006, but recommitted him as a technical parole violator by decision dated August 19, 2008, and recalculated his maximum sentence date to November 4, 2009.
On November 4, 2009, Petitioner was released from custody because he had served his maximum sentence. On May 31, 2011, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint against Petitioner charging him with aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, indecent exposure and corruption of minors between January 10, 2001, and September 5, 2002. On June 13, 2011, Petitioner was arrested on those charges. After learning of these criminal charges, the Board issued a decision on August 25, 2011, declaring Petitioner delinquent for control purposes.
On April 2, 2012, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to two counts of corruption of minors in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County (trial court). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 129 days to 23½ months in the Centre County Correctional Facility, with 129 days credit for time served, and granted him immediate parole. On that same day, the Board lodged a detainer against Petitioner based on the corruption of minors' conviction, and Petitioner was returned to SCI-Rockview.
The Board then conducted a parole revocation hearing at which State Parole Agent Keith Wren testified that Petitioner committed the offenses between January 10, 2001, and September 5, 2002, and that Petitioner was on parole from January 10, 2001, to August 26, 2002. Among other reasons, Petitioner objected to the Board's authority to revoke his parole because his maximum sentence date had expired before he was charged with corruption of minors. The Board denied Petitioner's objections, recommitted Petitioner as a convicted parole violator and recalculated his maximum sentence date to April 25, 2014. Petitioner then filed a petition for administrative review, again arguing that the Board lacked jurisdiction to revoke his parole because his sentence had expired and, among other reasons, that the revocation is a violation of the statute of limitations. The Board found no ground for administrative relief and, accordingly, denied the appeal. This appeal by Petitioner followed.
Our scope of review of the Board's decision denying administrative relief is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, an error of law was committed, or constitutional rights have been violated. Yates v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 48 A.3d 496, 498 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
On appeal, Petitioner again argues that the Board lacked jurisdiction to recommit him as a convicted parole violator because he was not arrested, convicted and sentenced for corruption of minors until after the expiration of his maximum sentence date. We disagree because Section 6138(a)(1) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Code) gives the Board jurisdiction over a parolee who commits a crime even though, when charged, the individual has completed his or her sentence. That section provides:
A parolee under the jurisdiction of the board released from a correctional facility who, during the period of parole or while delinquent on parole, commits a crime punishable by imprisonment, for which the parolee is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which the parolee pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time thereafter in a court of record, may at the discretion of the board be recommitted as a parole violator.61 Pa. C.S. §6138(a)(1) (emphasis added).
This is consistent with our holding in Adams v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 885 A.2d 1121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 752, 902 A.2d 1242 (2006). In that case, the petitioner (Adams) was paroled from a sentence for burglary and, prior to the expiration of his maximum sentence, was involved in a domestic disturbance. Although the police were involved, Adams was neither arrested nor charged with a parole violation in connection with that incident, and subsequently completed his parole. However, nearly three months after his maximum sentence date had expired, Adams was arrested as a result of that domestic disturbance and charged with multiple criminal offenses, to which he ultimately pled guilty. Adams received a new sentence with immediate parole, but was arrested by the Board for the parole violations. Following a parole revocation hearing, the Board recommitted Adams to serve the remainder of his original sentence as a convicted parole violator and recalculated his maximum sentence date. After the Board denied administrative relief, Adams appealed to this Court, and we held that "[b]ecause the act constituting a violation occurred before the expiration of his maximum sentence date, the Board retains jurisdiction to revoke Adams' parole." Id. at 1124. In so holding, we affirmed the longstanding proposition that the Board retains jurisdiction over a parolee who committed a crime while on parole but was not convicted until after the expiration of the maximum sentence, while specifically rejecting the argument that the Board's jurisdiction depended on the parolee's arrest occurring prior to the maximum expiration date. Id. at 1124 n.6.
Adams was decided under Section 21.1a of the Parole Act, Act of August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, as amended, formerly, 61 P.S. §331.21a, which was repealed and replaced by Section 6138 of the Code. However, the prior version contained nearly identical language as Section 6138 of the Code ("Any parolee under the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Board of Parole released from any penal institution of the Commonwealth who, during the period of parole or while delinquent on parole, commits any crime punishable by imprisonment from which he is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which he pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time thereafter in a court of record, may, at the discretion of the board, be recommitted as a parole violator.") Therefore, our analysis does not change.
See, e.g., Holland v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 640 A.2d 1386, 1387 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994); Choice v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 357 A.2d 242 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976); Mitchell v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 335 A.2d 856 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975).
Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner committed crimes during the period of his parole to which he ultimately pled nolo contendere. As we held in Adams, the fact that Petitioner was not arrested, convicted or sentenced for those crimes until after the expiration of his maximum sentence does not divest the Board of jurisdiction to recommit him as a convicted parole violator. Therefore, we find no error in the Board's denial of administrative relief.
Petitioner also alleges that the Board's actions were barred by the statute of limitations because, the best we can determine, when the Board declared him delinquent, the statute of limitations on the new criminal charges had expired. In general, we are not aware of and Petitioner does not cite any statute of limitations for the Board to take action once they become aware of a parole violation. With respect to his argument that the criminal statute of limitations on the crimes to which he pled nolo contendere had expired, Petitioner offers no proof that the statute of limitations for those crimes had, in fact, expired. Even if he had, we have held that a statute of limitations for a criminal offense does not extend to an accompanying civil proceeding stemming from the criminal offense. Gelnett v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 670 A.2d 217, 219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). --------
Accordingly, the determination of the Board is affirmed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of December, 2013, the determination of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, dated November 30, 2012, at No. 0785-R, is affirmed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge