Summary
explaining that a final settlement agreement executed by the employee and the insurance carrier and approved by the labor commissioner has the same legal effect as an award made by the commissioner
Summary of this case from In re StreeterOpinion
No. 4431.
Argued May 1, 1956.
Decided May 31, 1956.
An agreement for workmen's compensation executed by the employee and the employer's insurance carrier and approved by the State Labor Commissioner pursuant to RSA 281:36 has the effect of an award made under Id., 37, both of which are subject to modification under Id., 40.
The right to reopen or review such an agreement or award for workmen's compensation is limited to the period prescribed by the statute (RSA 281:40) "not later than one year after the date of the last payment fixed by the award" and this limitation may not be extended either by the Court or the Labor Commissioner.
Since provision is made by the statute (RSA 281:40) for modification of awards for "mistake as to nature or extent of injury or disability" within a specified time limit the Court may not allow an award to be reopened for mutual mistake in the exercise of its general equity jurisdiction after expiration of the limitation period.
PETITION, for workmen's compensation under RSA ch. 281. On March 6, 1950, the plaintiff received an injury to his right foot by stepping on a tack while engaged in the course of his employment by the defendant shoe company. The plaintiff received medical aid and hospitalization and the defendant insurance carrier paid the plaintiff compensation until July 10, 1950, and a final settlement agreement was executed by the plaintiff and the insurance carrier and approved by the Commissioner of Labor. The plaintiff resumed work in July 1950, and did not receive any further treatment for his right foot until December 1951. At various times from that date the plaintiff received medical and hospital attention for his right foot until November 1953, at which time the insurance carrier was notified of a claim for further compensation. The petition for compensation was filed in June 1954.
The Court found as a fact that when the final agreement was executed on July 7, 1950, it was the intent of the parties to terminate compensation payments and that the plaintiff and the insurance company believed that the plaintiff's foot was healed and that "he was no longer disabled in his ability to work." The plaintiff's medical evidence indicated that his right foot had never healed from the date of the accident and that the original accident had resulted in permanent injury. Defendants' medical evidence indicated that the plaintiff's physical condition was due "to wearing improper shoes and overshoes without shoes. The man is suffering from overweight, diabetes, arteriosclerosis, which has caused him to lose so much time . . . His physical condition is responsible for his present condition."
The Court ruled that RSA 281:40 governed the present case and that more than one year having elapsed since the date of the last payment under the final agreement, which is deemed to be an award, it could not review the award or make any order ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously awarded. The Court denied compensation and dismissed the petition. The plaintiff's exceptions to the finding, ruling and decree of the Court were reserved and transferred by Leahy, J.
Sheehan, Phinney Bass (Mr. Phinney orally), for the plaintiff.
Wiggin, Nourie, Sundeen, Nassikas Pingree (Mr. Nourie orally), for the defendants.
This case involves a difficult problem in the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Law, where a relatively trivial accident is claimed to result in a serious disabling injury after the one-year period for modification has expired. The agreement for compensation executed by the employee and the employer's insurance carrier was approved by the Labor Commissioner pursuant to RSA 281:36. The legal effect of this agreement was the same as an award made under RSA 281:37, both of which were subject to modification under RSA 281:40. Diamond v. Employers c. Company, 97 N.H. 510, 513. The pertinent part of RSA 281:40 reads as follows: "Upon application of any party in interest upon the ground of change in the conditions, mistake as to nature or extent of injury or disability, fraud, undue influence or coercion, the commissioner of labor or the superior court, whichever made the original award, may, not later than one year after the date of the last payment fixed by the award, review said award, and upon such review, may make an order ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously awarded, subject to the maximum or minimum provided in this chapter . . . ."
The right to reopen or review a compensation agreement or an award is specifically limited to the period "not later than one year after the date of the last payment fixed by the award." This statute is not ambiguous and while it may constitute a severe time limitation (2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, s. 81.10), there is no indication that the Legislature intended that either the Court or the Labor Commissioner should have authority to extend it. Zeady v. Company, 96 N.H. 328, 331. This court has not hesitated to construe RSA 281:40 as inapplicable where the agreement for compensation had not been approved by the Labor Commissioner. Croteau v. Harvey Landers, 99 N.H. 264. However in the present case where the agreement was approved by the Labor Commissioner the one-year limitation period controlled. Therrien v. Company, 99 N.H. 137.
At least as early as 1921 this court has given a liberal interpretation to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law whenever possible (Mulhall v. Company, 80 N.H. 194) and has stated that it would continue to do so. Dustin v. Lewis, 99 N.H. 404, 408. However the wording of RSA 281:40 "is unequivocal to the effect that no proceedings for modification shall be brought `later than one year after the date of the last payment fixed by the award.'" Therrien v. Company, supra, 139, 140.
It is suggested that the general equity jurisdiction of the court (RSA 498:1) is broad enough to allow this agreement to be reopened on the grounds of mutual mistake. The difficulty with this argument is that the Workmen's Compensation Law and specifically RSA 281:40 allows modification for "mistake as to nature or extent of injury or disability" only during the one-year period from the last payment under the award. This quoted language covers mutual mistake as well as unilateral mistake and allows no modification after the one-year period. The plaintiff has submitted a strong argument which has considerable merit that an employee with a latent injury has no means of protecting himself. "Statutes of limitation generally proceed on the theory that a man forfeits his rights only when he inexcusably delays assertion of them, and any number of excuses will toll the running of the period. But here no amount of vigilance is of any help. The limitations period runs against a claim which has not yet matured; and when it matures it is already barred." 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, s. 78.42(b). The force of this argument can be conceded but the stark fact remains that the remedy for this situation is legislative and not judicial. Cf. Desrosiers v. Company, 97 N.H. 525. The Legislature has spoken clearly and emphatically and there is no room for judicial construction under the existing statute.
Since the Trial Court's ruling in dismissing the petition was correct, it is unnecessary to consider the defendants' argument that there was insufficient evidence of mutual mistake at the time the parties executed the compensation agreement. See Bee v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 94 N.H. 478; Robbins v. Nims, 90 N.H. 555.
Decree affirmed.
All concurred.