Opinion
No. CV 04-0833380
January 26, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT # 115
On April 12, 2004, the plaintiff, Christine Powers, as administratrix of the estate of Matthew Powers, filed a one-count complaint against the defendants, Edgar Torres, Bud Behling Leasing, Inc., and Rainbow Rentals, Inc., alleging negligence and carelessness. The defendant Torres was the operator of a vehicle involved in the incident at the center of this dispute. The vehicle was owned by the defendant, Bud Behling Leasing, Inc., and was leased to the defendant, Rainbow Rentals, Inc., which was Torres' employer. The plaintiff alleges that on the evening of December 18, 2002, at about 6:34 p.m., Matthew Powers was a pedestrian walking in a westerly direction on New Park Avenue, a public street in West Hartford. Torres was operating his vehicle In a southerly direction on New Park Avenue. As Matthew Powers was attempting to cross from east to west, Torres stopped his vehicle in the left lane of two southbound lanes to allow Matthew Powers to cross in front of him. When Matthew Powers did so, he was struck by a southbound vehicle, which vehicle was to the right of Torres's vehicle. The plaintiff further alleges that Torres was negligent and careless for stopping his vehicle in the left lane of the two southbound lanes to allow Matthew Powers to cross the street when it was unsafe to do so; that although Torres had no duty to stop his vehicle to allow Powers to cross the street, once Torres did so he had the obligation to make sure it was safe for Powers to cross, that Torres failed to warn Powers of the vehicle passing to Torres's right, that Torres failed to warn the driver of the vehicle passing to his right of Powers' movement and that Torres failed to take any steps to prevent Powers from entering the right lane of the two southbound lanes, Torres failed to sound his horn or give any other warning of the impending collision, Torres was inattentive and failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles that posed a danger to the plaintiff.
In their amended answer, the defendants deny the plaintiff's allegations of negligence and carelessness and deny they caused the injuries and losses alleged and deny that they allowed Powers to cross the road in the manner in which he did. The defendants admit that as Powers was attempting to cross New Park Avenue from east to west, the defendant Torres stopped his vehicle and further admit that as Powers did so, he was struck by a southbound vehicle, which vehicle was to the right of Torres's van. In its special defenses, the defendants allege that Matthew Powers' injuries were caused by his own negligence and that of the driver of the car that struck and killed him.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment. In support of the motion, they filed a memorandum of law, the affidavits of Torres and of Marvin Abraham, a passenger in his vehicle, as well as a number of other documents. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment along with the police report of the investigating officer and other documents. On August 10, 2005, the defendants filed a reply memorandum to the plaintiff's opposition memorandum.
Only the Affidavits and the Pleadings have been considered by the Court. P.B. §§ 17-45 and 17-46.
The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that they did not owe a duty to Matthew Powers to ensure that it was safe for him to cross the street. In their memorandum of law, however, the defendants make a two-part argument. First, they argue that Torres had fulfilled his duty to act as a reasonably prudent driver by stopping his vehicle when he saw Matthew Powers crossing the street. Second, they argue that, upon stopping, Torres did not assume an additional duty to ensure that Matthew Powers made it safely across the other lanes of traffic. The two parts of this argument will be addressed in turn.
"The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 687, n. 13, 849 A.2d 813 (2004). "Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). "Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where . . . the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation . . . [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975). "[T]he issue of whether a defendant owes a duty of care is an appropriate matter for summary judgment because the question is one of law." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozeleski v. Thomas, 76 Conn.App. 287, 290, 818 A.2d 893, cert. denied, 264 Corn. 904, 823 A.2d 1221 (2003). "The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Assn., Inc., 264 Conn. 474, 478-79, 823 A.2d 1202 (2003).
The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Torres was negligent and careless in that he stopped his vehicle in the left lane of two southbound lanes of travel to allow Matthew Powers to cross the street when it was unsafe to do so. In Connecticut, the duties of drivers to avoid colliding with pedestrians are set out in General Statutes § 14-300d, which states in relevant part that "each operator of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian . . . and shall give a reasonable warning by sounding a horn or other lawful noise emitting device to avoid a collision." As stated previously, the defendant argues in support of summary judgment that Torres fulfilled his duty to exercise due care by stopping his vehicle.
In his affidavit, Torres states that, because he observed Matthew Powers to be in the middle of the road, he slowed his vehicle to a stop. He further states that he observed Matthew Powers continue to walk across Torres' lane of travel and into the right lane of travel, and that he also observed a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed striking Matthew Powers. These facts are undisputed. The defendants offer no evidence, however, indicating whether it was safe for Torres to stop his vehicle when he did so. As stated above, the issue of negligence is a question of fact inappropriate for summary judgment. A question of fact remains as to whether Torres' conduct in stopping his vehicle met the standard of care under the circumstances of this case.
The plaintiff argues that, by stopping his vehicle, Edgar Torres assumed the duty to ensure that it was safe for Matthew Powers to cross the street, and that Torres breached that duty by failing to warn Matthew Powers of the passing vehicle, failing to warn the passing vehicle of Matthew Powers' movement, failing to take any steps from preventing Matthew Powers from entering the right lane, failing to sound his horn or keep a proper lookout. The defendants argue that, once Matthew Powers safely crossed in front of Edgar Torres' vehicle, Torres did not owe a duty to Matthew Powers to ensure his safe passage across the rest of the roadway.
"[T]here is generally no duty that obligates one party to aid or to protect another party . . . One exception to this general rule arises when a definite relationship between the parties is of such a character that public policy justifies the imposition of a duty to aid or to protect another . . . In delineating more precisely the parameters of this limited exception to the general rule, [the Supreme Court] has concluded that, [in the absence of] a special relationship of custody or control, there is no duty to protect a third person from the conduct of another." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murdock v. Croughwell, 268 Conn. 559, 566, 848 A.2d 363 (2004).
In the memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff cites no case law or other authority for the proposition that a driver owes a duty to a pedestrian to ensure their safe passage across other lanes of traffic than the one that the driver is in. Case law in some jurisdictions suggest that a driver has a duty to use reasonable care in signaling to a pedestrian or another motorist that it is safe to cross a street. Perret v. Webster, 498 So.2d 283 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986) (upholding a jury verdict assigning liability for negligence partially against a bus driver who motioned another motorist to proceed, resulting in a collision with another vehicle); Massingale v. Sibley, 449 So.2d 98 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1984) (reversing summary judgment in favor of a signaling driver because conflicting interpretations of the signal presented a genuine issue of material fact); Wulf v. Rebbun, 25 Wis.2d 499, 131 N.W.2d 303 (1964) (holding that whether a truck driver was negligent in signaling another driver to proceed, resulting in a collision with another car, was a question for the jury). The plaintiff in this case, however, does not allege that a signal was given by Torres or his passenger, and the defendants have presented undisputed evidence, namely, Torres' and Abraham's affidavits, indicating that no such signal was given. Edgar Torres assumed no duty to ensure Matthew Powers' safe passage across other lanes of traffic. As previously stated, however, there remains a factual dispute as to whether, as alleged, Torres' initial act of stopping the vehicle was negligent.
The defendants also move for summary judgment on the ground that no action or inaction on the part of the defendants was the legal cause of the collision that led to Matthew Powers' death. "The first component [of legal causation] is [c]ause in fact, occasionally referred to as actual cause, [that] asks whether the defendant's conduct `caused' the plaintiff's injury. Thus, if the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred `but for' the defendant's conduct, then the defendant's conduct is a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury . . . The second component is proximate cause. Proximate cause establishes a reasonable connection between an act or omission of a defendant and the harm suffered by a plaintiff . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Sordo, 43 Conn.App. 756, 761-2, 685 A.2d 1144 (1996), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 906, 688 A.2d 334 (1997). Proximate cause is defined as "[a]n actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm . . ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stewart v. Federated Dept Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597, 606, 662 A.2d 753 (1995). "Proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact . . . Establishment of the causal relationship between a defendant's actions or failure to act and a plaintiff's injuries requires a showing that the action or omission must have been a substantial factor in producing those injuries." (Citation omitted.) Mather v. Griffin Hospital, 207 Conn. 125, 130, 540 A.2d 666 (1988).
"Although the issue of causation generally is a question reserved for the trier of fact . . . the issue becomes one of law when the mind of a fair and reasonable person could reach only one conclusion, and summary judgment may be granted based on a failure to establish causation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abrahams v. Young Rubicam, Inc., 240 Conn. 300, 307, 692 A.2d 709 (1997).
Because there are no Connecticut cases directly on point, it is necessary to look to other jurisdictions for illustrative rulings on facts such as those found here. In the body of case law dealing with motorists' liability for signaling another vehicle or pedestrian to proceed, "[m]ost courts have held that, for [proximate cause] to be established, there must be reliance by the signaled driver or pedestrian to proceed. Thus, where courts have found that there was no such reliance, they have upheld summary judgments or verdicts against the plaintiff's bringing the actions." Annot., 14 A.L.R.5th 193, 202 (2005); citing to Dace v. Gilbert, 96 Ill.App.3d 199, 421 N.E.2d 377 (1981) (holding that a defendant's signal was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's accident with another vehicle where there was evidence that the plaintiff did not rely on the signal); and Kemp v. Armstrong, 40 Md.App. 542, 392 A.2d 1161 (1978). In Kemp v. Armstrong, supra, 548-49, the court held that even if a motorist acted without due care, in the absence of evidence of reliance the conduct of the motorist was not the proximate cause of the pedestrian's injuries. In Pennsylvania, a court held that, even if a signaling driver was held to be negligent in signaling, that conduct was not, as a matter of law, "in the legally responsible chain of events that caused the accident . . ." Askew v. Zeller, 361 Pa.Super. 35, 42-43, 521 A.2d 459 (1987).
It appears that Connecticut courts have only had an isolated opportunity to consider whether a driver in the vicinity of a pedestrian/motor vehicle accident had an obligation to ensure the safety of the pedestrian upon the road. See, Comfort v. Klobukowski, Docket No. CV 89-0287676, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven (1994, Martin, J.).
In a federal District Court opinion in New Jersey, the court stated that "[a] driver's courteous wave indicating that he will remain in place and permit another motorist to proceed is open to two opposing interpretations . . . Such a gesture could signal to the receiver either that safe passage is limited to the area in front of the signaler's vehicle, or, more broadly, that passage is safe beyond the signaler's vehicle . . . Because a signal interpreted as limiting the safe passage area to that solely in front of the signaler's vehicle cannot be the legal cause of an accident outside that area, liability ensues only when the signal communicates the message that the driver can proceed safely across both lanes . . . Where reasonable minds can differ on the interpretation of the signal, summary judgment is inappropriate." (Citations omitted.) Boucher v. Grant, 74 F.Sup.2d 444, 449 (D.N.J. 1999).
In the present case, there is no evidence that the driver or his passenger signaled to Matthew Powers to proceed across the road. In fact, the defendants provide undisputed evidence that such a signal was not provided, and the complaint does not allege that any signal was given. As the authorities discussed above indicate, courts have generally imposed liability only when a driver gives a signal that it is safe to proceed and a pedestrian or motorist actually proceeds in reliance on the signal. Furthermore, Boucher and the cases cited therein point out that there can be no reliance unless the signal is interpreted as communicating that it is safe to proceed beyond the area in front of the defendant's vehicle. If there is no causation in the case of a signal on which the plaintiff does not rely, there certainly is a lack of causation in the present case, where it is undisputed that Torres did not signal, but merely stopped his vehicle. While the cases indicate that a signal may under some circumstances imply that it is safe to proceed beyond the driver's vehicle, the mere stopping of the vehicle can not reasonably be interpreted in that way. Following the line of reasoning in the cases involving signaling motorists, the stopping of Torres' vehicle, even if it was arguably unsafe to do so under the circumstances, was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
For the foregoing reasons, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they had no duty to ensure Matthew Powers' safe passage across additional lanes of traffic and because the defendants' conduct of stopping his vehicle was not the proximate cause of Powers' injury.