Opinion
No. 99-0570-CB-L.
January 30, 2001
FINAL JUDGMENT
Pursuant to separate order entered this date granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Darrell Pounds, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the claims of the above-named plaintiffs against the Defendant Darrell Pounds be and hereby are DISMISSED with prejudice.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Darrell Pounds. Upon Defendant's completion of filing summary judgment materials, the Court entered an order giving Plaintiffs twenty days, up until and including August 21, 2000, to respond to the Defendant's motion. Plaintiffs, however, have filed no response in opposition to the motion. Therefore, the Court finds that there is no dispute as to any material fact. See. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and Local Rule 7.2. Upon consideration of the undisputed facts in light of the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.
Defendant having filed a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the Plaintiffs to demonstrate, by reference to supporting affidavits or evidence, that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Clark v. Coats Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991).
Findings of Fact
This is a products liability action which involves a fire that occurred on May 20, 1997, at the resident of Ulysses Powell in Camden, Alabama. As a result of this fire, three children, Shazzamme Powell, Vashard Chandler and Kenneth Jackson, II, were killed.
This lawsuit concerns various claims of alleged liability with respect to a Scripto Aim-N-Flame multi-purpose lighter allegedly produced and marketed by several of the Defendants and purportedly sold at the Wal-Mart Store in Thomasville, Alabama.
Darrell Pounds was the manager of the Thomasville Wal-Mart store from the Spring of 1995 through September of 1997. Accordingly, at the time of the May 20, 1997, fire at issue in this case, Darrell Pounds was the store manager of the Thomasville store and, assuming the lighter was purchased one or two months prior to the fire, was the manager at the time the lighter was allegedly purchased by Ulysses Powell.
As the store manager of the Thomasville Wal-Mart store, Darrell Pounds did not have responsibility or authority for the ordering of products for the store. Wal-Mart uses a point-of-sale replenishment system where computers monitor the sale of merchandise. At the appropriate time, Wal-Mart sends various merchandise to the store for sale. Darrell Pounds did not personally order Scripto Aim-N-Flame lighters for the Thomasville store, and did not personally choose to sell the lighters at the store. Darrell Pounds did not have any contact with the manufacturer or distributor of the lighters and the Scripto Aim-N-Flame was just one of thousands of products sold at the Thomasville, Alabama store.
Darrell Pounds never received any customer complaints regarding Scripto Aim-N-Flame lighters, nor did he receive any notice from anyone regarding any potential dangers or hazards with these particular lighters.
Conclusions of Law
Alabama's Products-Liability Doctrine "retain[s] the fault concept based on a standard of conduct causally related in fact to the defective condition" of the goods in question. Atkins v. American Motorist Corp., 335 So.2d 134, 137 (Ala. 1976). Further, Alabama law rejects "the no-fault precept which imposes liability equally on all `sellers' without regard to culpability causally related in fact to the defective condition of the produce . . . ." Id. at 138. To do otherwise would place the test of culpability in the quality of the product rather than in a standard of conduct resulting in the quality of the product; and would also fail to distinguish between one whose conduct has not so contributed. Id. at 139.
In line with the concept of fault retained in Alabama under the Alabama Extended Manufacturers Liability Doctrine, it is an affirmative defense to liability that "there is no causal relation in fact between [a defendant's] activities in connection with handling the product and its defective condition." Id. at 143. One way to establish this lack of a causal relation is for the defendant to show "that he is in the business of either distributing or processing for distribution finished products; he received a product already in a defective condition; he did not contribute to this defective condition; he had neither knowledge of the defective condition, nor an opportunity to inspect the product which was superior to the knowledge or opportunity of the consumer." Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So.2d 1065, 1069 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Atkins, at 143).
In light of the foregoing, because Darrell Pounds had no direct responsibility or input into the selection of specific products such as Scripto Aim-N-Flame lighters sold at the Thomasville, Alabama, Wal-Mart store, there is no causal connection in the activities of Darrell Pounds with handling the product at issue in this case at the Thomasville Wal-Mart store and the product's alleged defective condition.
Likewise, Darrell Pounds had no notice of any alleged defect or problem with the Aim-N-Flame lighters as alleged by the Plaintiffs in this case. Although these pre-packaged items were sold at the store, he did not select the products and did not personally have any knowledge that they could, as alleged by the Plaintiff, pose a danger to children. This lack of knowledge, combined with Darrell Pounds' lack of participation in the purchasing and distribution of the subject lighters, mandates that summary judgment be entered in his favor with respect to the claims asserted against him individually. There are no disputed issues of material fact and Darrell Pounds is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that there being no genuine issue of material fact, the evidence is insufficient to support Plaintiffs' claims and as a matter of law the Defendant Pounds' motion for summary judgment as to all claims alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint is due to be and hereby is GRANTED. Furthermore, there being no just reason for delay, judgment shall be entered as to this defendant by separate order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).