Opinion
No. 3988.
Decided October 11, 1950.
In the absence of fraud, lack of jurisdiction or such arbitrary and capricious action as to constitute denial of due process of law the legislative provision (R. L., c. 34-A, s. 3 II, III) that decision of the Ballot-Law Commission is final, exclusive and not reviewable by any court is binding on the Supreme Court.
PETITION, for writ of mandamus, to compel the Secretary of State to cause the name of Wesley Powell to be placed on the ballots for the election to be held November 7, 1950, as an Independent candidate for the office of United States Senator. On September 28, 1950, it is alleged, there were filed with the Secretary of State twelve hundred forty-six individual petitions for the nomination of the plaintiff for said office. Objection to said petitions was made in writing by the defendant Tobey, the Republican nominee for the same office. Thereafter, following a hearing at which the contesting candidates were represented, the Ballot-Law Commission decided that the nomination petitions were not seasonably filed.
The petition before us alleges that the Ballot-Law Commission was without jurisdiction and that its decision was erroneous as a matter of law and prays that the decision be set aside.
Eliot U. Wyman, Kenneth E. Shaw and Howard B. Lane (Mr. Wyman orally), for the plaintiff.
Kenneth F. Graf and Tobey Zellers (Mr. Graf orally), for the defendant Tobey.
George R. Grant, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, orally, for the defendant Fuller.
It is ruled that the Ballot-Law Commission had jurisdiction to decide whether the nomination papers of the plaintiff were seasonably filed.
R. L., c. 34-A, s. 3 II, III provide in part as follows: "II. . . . The decision of the ballot-law commission shall be final as to questions both of law and fact, and no court shall have jurisdiction to review such decision. III. The jurisdiction vested in the ballot-law commission under . . . II of this section shall be exclusive of all other remedies." In the absence of fraud, lack of jurisdiction or such arbitrary and capricious action as to constitute denial of due process of law, the legislative command that the decision of the commission shall be final, exclusive and not reviewable by any court is binding on this court. Fraud is not suggested. The decision of the Ballot-Law Commission that the papers were not seasonably filed, if erroneous, was not so unreasonable as to be clearly arbitrary or capricious, in view of the recognized construction of the statutory requirements for warning town meetings. See R. L., c. 57, s. 4; Drowne v. Lovering, 93 N.H. 195; Osgood v. Blake, 21 N.H. 550, 564.
Petition dismissed.