Opinion
2:21-CV-00316-MRH
01-13-2021
FREDRICK A. POSTIE, Plaintiff, v. MALINDA ADAMS, SHANE DADY, WILLIAM WOODS, LISA GRAVES, BRENDA GOODALL, J.D. OLIVER, ALAN CLAYPOOL, ANDREW MEISEL, MR. NORRIS, MR. HAMILTON, MR. HARLIN, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, MR. TROOPER CHRISTOPHER CIALELLA, PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, Defendants.
FREDRICK A. POSTIE, pro se
FREDRICK A. POSTIE, pro se
MARK R. HORNAK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
ECF NO. 18
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated below, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) by the Individual Defendants Adams, Dady, Woods, Graves, Goodall, Oliver, Claypool, Meisel, Norris, Hamilton, Harlin, and Cialella (collectively the “Individual Defendants”), and by Defendants the DOC and the PSP, be granted.
II. REPORT
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Frederick Postie (“Plaintiff”), pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter involves Plaintiff's detention in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) of SCI-Mercer prison on a fugitive warrant from the State of Maryland, just after he was released on parole for the incarceration period he served for criminal convictions in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff had been incarcerated at SCI-Mercer in Pennsylvania since February 2012. ECF No. 1, ¶ 24. Before his incarceration in Pennsylvania, he was charged with crimes in Washington County, Maryland. Id. ¶ 26. When Plaintiff failed to appear for a hearing related to those charges in Washington County on February 14, 2012, the judge in that matter issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Washington County learned of his incarceration in Pennsylvania and issued an extradition request, which acted as a detainer, on March 1, 2012. ECF No. 1-4. The Washington County Warrant Task Force faxed this request, along with a copy of the bench warrant issued against Plaintiff, to SCI-Mercer on February 6, 2019. ECF Nos. 1-3, 1-4.
Nearing the end of his incarceration period in Pennsylvania, Plaintiff motioned in the Washington County, Maryland District Court to dismiss the pending charges against him in Maryland. ECF No. 1, ¶ 31. The Maryland District Court denied the motion on March 25, 2019.
Plaintiff qualified to be released on parole for his Pennsylvania charges, and was so released on April 10, 2019. However, right after being paroled, he was placed into handcuffs and escorted to the RHU by Defendant Hamilton. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Defendants Claypool, Harlin, and Norris escorted Plaintiff to his cell. On the way there, Plaintiff asked Claypool to let the administrators of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections know that he was being detained as a fugitive and to alert the Maryland authorities so the extradition process could begin. Id. ¶ 35.
On the same day, Defendant Oliver reviewed and signed a form that stated that Plaintiff was being held in the RHU temporarily for another authority. ECF No. 1-7. Defendant Oliver took no further action on Plaintiff's extradition process. ECF No. 1, ¶ 36. When Defendant Meisel delivered this paperwork to Plaintiff, Plaintiff asked Meisel to make sure the proper authorities were aware of his situation. Id. ¶ 37. Two days later, Plaintiff received a paper from Defendant Claypool stating, “Maryland notified 4/11/19.” Id. ¶ 38. Over the following weekend, Plaintiff attempted to inform several officers in the prison that he needed a bail hearing on his Maryland charges, and was told by all of them that the proper office knew where he was and had everything under control. Id. ¶¶ 39-40.
On April 16, 2019, Plaintiff appeared in front of the Program Review Committee (“PRC”), comprised of Defendants Woods, Dady, Graves, and Claypool, for an RHU intake interview. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. Plaintiff asked the persons present what the DOC process or policy is for extradition to another state and was met with defensive responses and told that he must wait where he is until Maryland comes to get him. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. When Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to a preliminary arraignment and bail hearing, Defendant Dady stated, “You don't tell us what to do. We're done here. I'm not letting you out until they pick you up or drop the detainer.” Id. ¶¶ 43-44. Plaintiff stated to them that he was being held illegally because they have failed to bring him before a magistrate within 72-hours of his arrest. Id. ¶ 45. Afterward, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Woods about his situation and received no reply. Id. ¶ 46.
Plaintiff filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas on April 22, 2019. Id. ¶ 47. On the same day, he filed a staff request to Defendant Adams explaining his detention and stating that his rights were being violated when he was not given a preliminary arraignment. Id. ¶ 48. Adams responded, “it is not our responsibility to ensure a preliminary arraignment.” Id. ¶ 49.
Plaintiff received an arrest summons from Defendant Cialella charging him with Arrest Prior to Requisition on April 29, 2019. Id. ¶ 50. The summons had been signed on April 25, 2019. Id. Plaintiff's preliminary arraignment was held on May 20, 2019, where bail was set at $40,000. Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff filed a second Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on the same day. At a hearing that took place on May 30, 2019, Plaintiff waived his right to challenge his extradition to Maryland, and the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas dismissed his Habeas petition as moot. Id. ¶ 53.
On June 20, 2019, Maryland authorities transported Plaintiff back to Washington County where Plaintiff was immediately released on unsecured bond upon a hearing with the Court Commissioner of Washington County. Id. ¶ 54. The Washington County District Court subsequently dismissed the charges against Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was detained for a total of 70 days between his release on parole for the Pennsylvania convictions and his release upon returning to Maryland. Id. ¶ 55.
Plaintiff asserts claims of violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights against all Defendants under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id., pp. 12-15. Plaintiff also asserts claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and failure to intervene under the Pennsylvania constitution and Pennsylvania law. Id. p. 15. Finally, Plaintiff emphasizes that the claims against the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) are being asserted under a Monell liability theory. Id. p. 17.
Plaintiff sets forth four causes of action in his Complaint. Some claims are duplicative. The Court has endeavored to re-organize Plaintiff's claims into a more coherent set.
Plaintiff initiated this action on March 4, 2021, with the docketing of his Complaint and Exhibits attached. ECF No. 1. Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss at issue on July 21, 2021. ECF No. 18. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on October 12, 2021. This Motion is now ripe for review.
B. Legal Standard
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”) (quoting Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 2102 (10th Cir. 1996).
C. Discussion
1) Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
Defendants argue in their Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss that the Eleventh Amendment bars any claims against the DOC, the PSP, and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. ECF No. 19, p. 7. Plaintiff concedes this in his Response in Opposition. ECF No. 25, p. 6. Defendants are correct that arms of the state as well as individual defendants in their official capacities are not subject to suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state in federal court by private parties. Laskari v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)). “Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has overridden it . . . a State cannot be sued directly in its own name regardless of the relief sought.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (citing Pugh, 438 U.S. at 781). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has specifically reserved its right to immunity from suit in federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that Section 1983 does not override a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979).
The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any Foreign State.U.S. Const. amend. XI.
Eleventh Amendment immunity protects entities created by state governments that operate as alter egos or arms of the State. See Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 402 (1979). Relevant here, the United States Supreme Court has held that a Section 1983 action brought against a State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment unless [the State] has consented to the filing of such a suit.” Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782; see also Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dept. of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections is a part of the executive department of the Commonwealth, see Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 71 § 61, it shares in the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). As a result, the State Police is also shielded from Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Allen v. New Jersey State Police, 974 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2020) (New Jersey State Police, a division of New Jersey's Department of Law and Public Safety, was an arm of the State entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The Court thus respectfully recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted as to all claims against the DOC, the PSP, and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. The Court further recommends that the claims against these Defendants be dismissed with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.
Defendants do not address Plaintiff's assertion that these Defendants are subject to liability under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). If Plaintiff asserts any liability under a Monell theory, the DOC, and PSP qualify as arms of the state, not municipalities, and thus are not subject to Monell liability in the first place. See Diorio v. Harry, 1:16-CV-01678, 2020 WL 1140307, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2020) (“The holding in Monell, however, is restricted to municipalities and local government units and does not extend to states, entities considered arms of the state, nor state officials in their official capacity.”) (citing Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990)).
The court must allow amendment by the plaintiff in civil rights cases brought under § 1983 before dismissing under Rule 12(b)(6), irrespective of whether it is requested, unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (asserting that where a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal under 12(b)(6), the district court must offer the opportunity to amend unless it would be inequitable or futile).
2) Remedies Under the PA Constitution
Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to state any claims under Pennsylvania law, because unlike Section 1983, which provides a cause of action for damages under the United States Constitution, there is no analogous statute or case law that recognizes a private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution. ECF No. 19, p. 27. Plaintiff does not address this argument in his Response. Defendants are correct that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for any violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, because no cause of action for damages exists under it. Pocono Mt. Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mt. Sch. Dist., 442 Fed. App'x. 681 (3d Cir. 2011)(unpublished); see also Moss v. Pennsylvania, 838 Fed. App'x. 702, 708 (3d Cir. 2020)(unpublished) (“…to the extent that Moss alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution, he failed to state a claim, as Pennsylvania does not recognize a private right of action for damages in a lawsuit alleging a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”). Equitable remedies, on the other hand, are available under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Pocono Mt. Charter Sch. at 688. Plaintiff does not ask for any equitable remedies. As the allegations at the center of his lawsuit have already transpired, there would be no basis for any equitable or injunctive relief. Thus, this Court respectfully recommends that all claims Plaintiff makes under the Pennsylvania Constitution be dismissed with prejudice, as any amendment would be futile.
3) Qualified Immunity
Defendants contend that they are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment claim against them. ECF No. 19, p. 11. Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would overcome the qualified immunity defense as established in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) and further elaborated on in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232-36 (2009)-namely, (1) whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of a federal right, and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id.
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to show a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution and false arrest. Since only Defendants Hamilton and Cialella were involved in initiating the prosecution of the fugitive charge against Plaintiff and arresting him, there is no basis against any of the other Defendants on which to make a Fourth Amendment claim. Id. pp. 12-13. Furthermore, Defendants assert, those two individuals had probable cause to take the action that they did. Id.
Defendants also assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to any due process claims based on allegations that Defendants did not bring Plaintiff to a preliminary hearing upon his arrest. Defendants state: “The Complaint does not contain facts establishing that a preliminary hearing had been scheduled, the Corrections Defendants knew about the preliminary hearing, or that the Corrections Defendants failed to take Plaintiff to a hearing.” Id. p. 13. In fact, Defendants assert, Plaintiff did have a bail hearing on May 20, 2019, and also filed two petitions for writs of Habeas Corpus. Id.
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has also failed to allege any due process right that was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Neither Hamilton or Cialella were aware of any facts violating a clearly established constitutional right; they each acted properly based on what, to them, appeared to be (and was) a facially valid Maryland detainer. Id. p. 15. In short, there is no clearly established authority for the proposition that a Pennsylvania prison or police official has a duty to ensure that a person held on a valid out-of-state warrant receives the proper process in that state.
Thus Defendants claim that the Fourth Amendment and due process claims against them must be dismissed because they are shielded by qualified immunity.
Plaintiff responds by citing the Pennsylvania criminal procedure rule which requires that when an individual is arrested, they be brought before a judicial officer for a preliminary arraignment “without unnecessary delay.” ECF No. 25, p. 3. Another subsection of those rules provides that “…a judge or issuing authority in this Commonwealth may admit the person arrested to bail by bond…” Id. p. 4. Plaintiff also cites the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (“UCEA”) as stating that a neutral determination that probable cause did exist must take place “with all practicable speed.” Id. p. 5. Plaintiff asserts that his arrest qualifies as the Supreme Court's definition of a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Id. p. 4. He quotes the Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-14 (1975): “…while a pre-arrest probable cause is made by a ‘neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible,' the Fourth Amendment admits of ‘practical compromise' allowing police to make an on-the-scene probable cause assessment so long as any prolonged restraint of liberty is supported by a prompt post-arrest judicial determination that probable cause does in fact exist.” Id. p. 5.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity ensures that, before they are subjected to suit, government officials are put on notice that their conduct is unlawful. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. “If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. In determining whether qualified immunity applies, the courts conduct a two-pronged inquiry. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232; Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015). First, the court must determine “whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged ... or shown ... make out a violation of constitutional right.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)); Spady, 800 F.3d at 637 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). “If the plaintiff fails to make out a constitutional violation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end; the [government official] is entitled to immunity.” Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002).
The crux of the “clearly established” analysis “is whether officers have ‘fair notice' that they are acting unconstitutionally.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 21 (2015). In other words, an officer is not entitled to qualified immunity if “at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of [the] right [were] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). “We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. “The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Mullenix at 12 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court begins the qualified immunity analysis with the claim of Fourth Amendment violations. The Fourth Amendment only prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures. United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2014). A claim under Section 1983 for false arrest/false imprisonment is grounded in the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures. Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F.Supp.2d 581, 592 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
To maintain his false arrest claims, “a plaintiff must show that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest.” … “Probable cause exists when the totality of facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent officer to believe that the party charged has committed an offense.”Id. (citing Garcia v. County of Bucks, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001)). In determining where a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the pertinent question is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful, given the clearly established law and the information in the officer's possession. Olson v. Ako, 724 Fed.Appx. 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (quotations omitted). Probable cause to arrest generally exists when a police officer makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant which meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Kis v. County of Schuylkill, 866 F.Supp. 1462, 1469 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). While there is no dispute that Plaintiff's right to be free from unreasonable seizure was clearly established at the time of his arrest, he has not sufficiently alleged that the right was violated. Plaintiff makes no allegations that the Maryland bench warrant, detainer, or subsequent Pennsylvania fugitive arrest warrant failed to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Nor does Plaintiff allege that his arrest and detention were without probable cause. His allegation that he was not given a hearing within a short enough amount of time to have a neutral magistrate determine whether probable cause existed to justify his detention implicates a due process issue which will be subject to analysis below. At any rate, based on the facts alleged, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the false arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment.
Similarly, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. To prove malicious prosecution under Section 1983 when the claim is under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir.2003)). As with the false arrest claim, the parties agree that the right was clearly established. However, as the Complaint lacks any disputes about the validity of the warrants and detainer, Defendants acted reasonably in initiating the prosecution against Plaintiff based on their knowledge of his fugitive status. The Pennsylvania criminal complaint was issued based on a bench warrant and detainer which appeared facially valid and were validly issued by the Washington County District Court of Maryland. Furthermore, the proceeding at issue, the extradition of a fugitive, did not end in Plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff was extradited. That his underlying criminal charges in Maryland were eventually dismissed matters little to the extradition itself - the basis for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim.
In his Response in Opposition, Plaintiff tries to place into doubt the validity of the Maryland detainer. “The arresting officers in this situation arrested and detained Postie because of a paper faxed to Defendant Brenda Goodall. There was no guarantee that what the paper said was the truth. It could be considered sufficient for an initial “on-the-scene probable cause assessment.” ECF No. 25, p. 5. However, Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege that the documents faxed from Maryland to SCI-Mercer were invalid, nor does Plaintiff contest or refute the fact that he was wanted in Maryland for criminal charges. There is no contention in Plaintiff's allegations that probable cause was ever in doubt in Plaintiff's arrest on the fugitive detainer.
Thus, while it is clearly established that Plaintiff had a right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, for qualified immunity purposes, Plaintiff does not allege that this right was violated by any Defendants, including Hamilton and Cialella. Qualified immunity shields the Defendants from any Fourth Amendment claims in this circumstance.
There are two ways to discuss Plaintiff's claim of “false imprisonment.” One way is to interpret it as a Fourth Amendment claim. See Russoli v. Salisbury Tp., 126 F.Supp.2d 821, 852 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (A false imprisonment claim under § 1983 that is based on an arrest made without probable cause is grounded in the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizure). If Plaintiff intends to assert a Fourth Amendment claim of false imprisonment, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the same reason as they are for the false arrest claim-Plaintiff fails to allege a lack of probable cause.
False imprisonment can also be a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Russoli at 852 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (citing Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir.1995)) (“Section § 1983 claims for false imprisonment are based on the Fourteenth Amendment protection against deprivations of liberty without due process of law.”) (quotations omitted). Qualified immunity shields Defendants from a false imprisonment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, as there is no clearly established standard for prison officials to ensure a preliminary hearing within a certain time period for a prisoner being detained on a fugitive warrant.
If Plaintiff asserts a false imprisonment state tort claim, he fails to state such a claim. Within the context of a state tort claim for false imprisonment, an arrest based on probable cause would be justified, whether or not the individual arrested was guilty. McBride v. O'Brien, CIV.A. 14-1129, 2015 WL 5167885, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2015), aff'd, 646 Fed.Appx. 277 (3d Cir. 2016)(unpublished) (citing Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994).
To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,' and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.'” Mulholland v. Government Cty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 (3d Cir. 2013). See also Evans v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 659 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that “[p]rocedural due process is implicated if [plaintiff] had a liberty interest in his release that cannot be infringed without procedural protections such as notice and a hearing”) (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708) (“[T]he procedural due process guarantee protects against ‘arbitrary takings.'”)Disco v. Thompson, 2:19-CV-00130, 2020 WL 3980655, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2:19-CV-00130, 2020 WL 2059745 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2020) (quoting Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 291 (3d Cir. 2014)) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim because it relates to a period of confinement subsequent to arrest.). Pretrial detention implicates a liberty interest and thus may not be imposed contrary to the mandates of procedural due process. United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397 (3d Cir. 1985). But due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protection as the particular situation demands.” Id. Plaintiff's allegations amount to the claim that his procedural due process rights were violated when it took more than one month-from the date of his arrest for the fugitive charge on April 10, 2019 to May 20, 2019-for the preliminary hearing on his fugitive charge to take place. See ECF No. 25, pp. 2-3. But these allegations do not amount to a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights, nor do they show that there was a clearly established rule that a fugitive arrested on a facially valid warrant or detainer is entitled to any time-sensitive procedural protections.
Plaintiff states that Defendants' characterization of his allegations as not delivering him to Maryland promptly is inaccurate, and that his argument centers on being “denied his liberty by not being given the opportunity to secure his own release on bail.” ECF No. 25, p. 2. Thus, the pertinent period involved in Plaintiff's due process claim should be from the date of his arrest on the fugitive detainer, April 10, 2019, to the date of his bail hearing on that arrest, May 20, 2019, which constitutes 40 days. The total of 70 days that Plaintiff refers to includes the time Plaintiff waited for Maryland to pick him up, which is beyond the control of DOC personnel.
Plaintiff also provides no authority to support his implicit argument that a fugitive arrest is to be treated the same as a new arrest.
Plaintiff cites the preliminary hearing procedures in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, apparently arguing that Defendants are also required to follow these rules. Violation of a state procedural rule does not necessarily equate to a violation of federal constitutional law. Jackson v. Rosen, CV 20-2842-KSM, 2020 WL 3498131, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020); see also Stevens v. Delaware Cty., 2:08-CV-02358-LDD, 2009 WL 10678659, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2009) (“Ample precedent establishes that a state rule of criminal procedure ... does not create a liberty interest that is entitled to protection under the federal Constitution.”) (collecting cases). Plaintiff has no liberty interest in being given a preliminary hearing within a set period of time from his arrest. Thus, he fails to allege a violation of his due process rights. The existence of these procedural rules also does not establish that Defendants could have been on notice of a rule to provide Defendant with a bail hearing as if he were a new arrestee. While being held for this amount of time must have been very frustrating to Plaintiff, he offers no authority to establish that failing to follow criminal procedures for a fugitive arrest on a valid warrant is a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff invokes the rationale in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) as support for the proposition that a neutral magistrate is necessary after arrest to determine whether probable cause for the arrest existed. ECF No. 25, p. 5. However, Gerstein involves the determination of probable cause when a police officer makes an arrest without a warrant. The Supreme Court reasoned that requiring every arrest to be reviewed prior to the arrest would “constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement.” Gerstein at 113. Thus, to balance the interests of law enforcement with protecting the arrestee's liberty interests, it is necessary for a prompt hearing by a neutral magistrate to make another determination of whether that officer was supported by probable cause in making the arrest. This is not the case at hand where a valid extradition warrant existed. Similarly inapplicable is Plaintiff's citation to the UCEA, prescribing for a fugitive to be brought before a judge “with all practicable speed.” ECF No. 25, p. 5. That section is entitled “Arrest without a warrant, ” which, like Gerstein, does not apply in this circumstance. 42 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. Ann. § 9135 (West). The lack of guidance or prescription that a fugitive must be given a preliminary hearing within an approximate or definite period of time shows that there is no clearly established rule for Defendants. For this reason and the fact that Plaintiff does not establish any due process violations to begin with, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for this claim.
Section 9134 involves arrest on a warrant prior to requisition. It more accurately applies to Plaintiff's situation, and does not allude to a time period for the accused to be brought before a judge.
Furthermore, there are no rules or statutes governing Pennsylvania criminal law or procedure which state that an arrested person must be brought to a judge for preliminary hearing within 72 hours of the arrest.
As to the Defendants' claim that only Hamilton and Cialella were involved in Plaintiff's arrest and detention as a fugitive, Plaintiff counters that Defendant Goodall had contact with the Maryland authorities. ECF No. 25, p. 6. Since she received their detainer via fax and she was “charged with insuring that the proper procedures were followed, ” she should have triggered the protections of the UCEA. Id. Even taking this allegation as true, Defendant Goodall is shielded by qualified immunity for the same reasons explained above.
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against Defendants Hamilton, Cialella, and Goodall, and any other Defendants against whom Plaintiff makes those claims in their individual capacities, be dismissed against them on the basis of qualified immunity. The Court recommends that these claims be dismissed with prejudice as even if Plaintiff alleges more facts, he will not be able to overcome the undisputed probable cause of the Maryland bench warrant and detainer, which set his extradition process into motion. Nor will he be able to overcome the lack of a clear rule that would have put Defendants on notice about any time-sensitive process that must be implemented. Any leave to amend would be futile.
4) Abuse of Process and Failure to Intervene Claims
Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege personal involvement against any of the Defendants in any alleged constitutional violation. ECF No. 19, p. 9. Plaintiff attempts in his Complaint to allege as many specific facts as possible about each individual Defendant. Still, Plaintiff's failure to overcome the qualified immunity bar means that any discussion of whether Plaintiff alleges sufficient personal involvement would be moot. At this point in the discussion, this leaves only the abuse of process and failure to intervene claims.
Defendants do not address the abuse of process claim in particular. Even so, Plaintiff fails to allege abuse of process. A Section 1983 claim for malicious abuse of process lies where prosecution is initiated legitimately and thereafter is used for a purpose other than that intended by the law. Milburn v. City of York, 612 Fed. App'x. 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989)). A purpose unintended by the law may be using the prosecution “as a tactical weapon to coerce a desired result that is not the legitimate object of the process.” Hall v. Berdanier, 1:09-CV-1016, 2012 WL 1004916, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2012).
[W]hen process is used to effect an extortionate demand, or to cause the surrender of a legal right, or is used in any other way not so intended by proper use of the process, a cause of action for abuse of process can be maintained. Examples of actions that are recoverable under the abuse of process tort are extortion by means of attachment, execution or garnishment, and blackmail by means of arrest or criminal prosecution.Bristow v. Clevenger, 80 F.Supp.2d 421, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted). There are no allegations that Defendants behaved in any way that would constitute an abuse of process when they held Plaintiff on the Maryland fugitive detainer and initiated the criminal complaint against him based on the detainer.
Failure to intervene is a standard for an Eighth Amendment claim that is used to assess the liability of a defendant who allowed a plaintiff to be injured by others' use of excessive force or violence without acting to intervene. The standard evolved out of claims against police officers who did not intervene when their fellow officers use unprovoked violence. It has since been extended to correctional officers who are alleged to have similarly failed to intervene. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 2002) (extending to corrections officers the scenario of a police officer who fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such as an unprovoked beating takes place in his presence); see also Okey v. Strebig, 531 Fed. App'x. 212, 214 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying the failure to intervene standard to allegations that corrections officer failed to intervene when the plaintiff was assaulted by four other inmates). Here, there is no basis within the allegations for a failure to intervene claim.
It is thus respectfully recommended that these remaining claims against any remaining Defendants in their official and individual capacities be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's allegations are so far removed from the scenarios contemplated by the abuse of process and failure to intervene claims that any amendment would be futile.
III. CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that Plaintiff was incarcerated on the fugitive detainer for 40 days before he was able to have a bail hearing on the fugitive charge, and then another month before Maryland could pick him up. However, Plaintiff's allegations show that he cannot overcome the qualified immunity bar or plausibly state any constitutional violations. It is thus the respectful recommendation of this Court that the Motion to Dismiss by the Individual Defendants Adams, Dady, Woods, Graves, Goodall, Oliver, Claypool, Meisel, Norris, Hamilton, Harlin, and Cialella, and by Defendants the DOC and the PSP, be granted in all respects, and that all claims against the Defendants in their official and individual capacities be dismissed with prejudice.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing such objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.