Summary
In Post v. Hagan, 71 N.J. Eq. 234, 65 A., 1026, 124 Am. St. Rep., 997, a deed of a mother to her daughter, made under circumstances quite similar to those in the present case, was set aside because it was not shown that she had the benefit of independent advice.
Summary of this case from Roberts v. ChaseOpinion
07-08-1905
POST v. HAGAN et al.
Warne Smyth and James A. Gordon, for complainant. E. T. Paxton and William T. Hoffman, for defendant Sadie Hagan. Charles C. Black, for defendant William Hagan.
Bill by Henry Post against Sadie Hagan and another to set aside certain conveyances of land made to the defendant Sadie Hagan by their mother, Eunice Post Telfer, a short time prior to her death. Dismissed.
Warne Smyth and James A. Gordon, for complainant. E. T. Paxton and William T. Hoffman, for defendant Sadie Hagan. Charles C. Black, for defendant William Hagan.
STEVENSON, V. C. My conclusion is that the bill of complaint should be dismissed.
1. There are facts proved in this case which, taken by themselves, cast the burden upon the defendant Mrs. Hagan of showing that the deeds which she received from her mother are untainted by fraud of any kind. Mrs. Telfer, the grantor, was 63 years of age at the time of her death, on July 16, 1899. The deeds were executed June 9, 1899, and conveyed practically all the grantor's estate. The complainant and the defendant Mrs. Hagan were the two children of Mrs. Telfer; Mrs. Hagan being somewhat older than her brother. The evidence is inadequate to show that Mrs. Telfer during her lifetime had given her son, the complainant, what would naturally be deemed his portion of her estate. For 10 years preceding her death Mrs. Telfer lived with the defendants, who appear to have occupied a comfortable house on a farm at Seacaucus. The complainant, who bad a wife and children, appears to have resided under conditions of poverty in small quarters which he rented, or were rented for him, in Hoboken. At the time the deeds were executed Mrs. Telfer was confined to her room, if not to her bed, suffering from the disease from which she died, and undoubtedly she was contemplating her death as an event which was near at hand. Physically Mrs. Telfer was to a very large extent, if not exclusively, within the absolute control of the defendants.
2. Stating the presumption established against the deeds by the foregoing facts in the strongest possible way, in my opinion the defendants have discharged the burden cast upon them, and have established by evidence which is entirely convincing to my mind that these deeds were the voluntary, intelligent act of Mrs. Telfer, in execution of a purpose which she formed in her own mind, unaffected by any influence or suggestion from the defendants or either of them. The main fact which tends to explain and vindicate the transaction under investigation is that the complainant for years had been a drunkard and a spendthrift. At the time the deeds were made he was 41 years of age, and it does not appear that he was making or had made any effort to reform. His status appears to have been fixed as that of a person entirely unfit to be trusted with property. His mother, Mrs. Telfer, distinctly recognized this status long before her last illness began. The witnesses on both sides abundantly show that Mrs. Telfer for a long time aided her spendthrift son and his family with contributions of money. Mr. Frank Sturges, a brother of Mrs. Telfer, who was called on behalf of the complainant, and whose testimony was not in the slightest degree impeached, testified that Mrs. Telfer paid her son's rent and grocery bills, and stated to the witness that, if she gave him the money to pay them, she would have to pay them over again, "because he would go and blow it in." This same witness also said that at an interview which he had with his sister in the first part of May, at a time when it appears distinctly she was not confined toher room and was evidently competent to attend to business, she expressed a desire to "get over the hill" in order to consult counsel, with a view to having "the property fixed up," and at that time she told this witness that she "wanted to leave the property to Henry as long as he lived, and then after his death to go to his children," and that she declared: "If I leave it to him he will drink it up, and he will have no home, and the children will have nothing." Mrs. Rosen, a sister of Mrs. Telfer and a witness for the complainant, testified that Mrs. Telfer often told her that, if Henry would not drink, she would deed him the farm, but that she knew that, if she gave the farm to him, he would waste it, and that "she wanted it fixed so that he could not waste it, so that Mary, complainant's wife, would have something to take care of the children." This witness also testified that in the first part of May Mrs. Telfer expressed the hope that she would get strength so that she might "go up and have it fixed—have the papers fixed so that Mary would have something to take care of the children." Cornelius B. Sturges, a brother of Mrs. Telfer, testified on behalf of the complainant that Mrs. Telfer told him, at his house at Union Hill, some months before her decease, that she was going to have her children "share and share alike"; but she also said "I will have it fixed so that Hank cannot spend the money—that it will go to his children." It seems plain from the testimony that Mrs. Telfer for a long time before her death must have intended not to die intestate and leave one-half of her little estate to descend to this spendthrift son, who appears to have been capable of squandering it within a very short time.
3. The question arises what a woman in Mrs. Telfer's position would naturally do under the circumstances above stated. The evidence satisfies me that for a long time prior to her death, while Mrs. Teller was not only in full possession of her faculties, but able to go back and forth between Seacaucus and Hoboken or Jersey City without difficulty, she contemplated "making papers" which would dispose of the farm, or of half of her entire estate, in such manner that her son could not waste it, while he and his family would have the benefit of it. She talked about conferring with lawyers, but, with abundant opportunity for obtaining such assistance, she refrained from doing so. It is significant that in all of the quite numerous statements of the witnesses in regard to Mrs. Telfer's declarations there is no clear indication that the "papers" with which she contemplated "fixing" up her affairs included a will. One witness referred to a paper of some sort which had been made 10 years before Mrs. Telfer's death, and by which some disposition of property among her children was effected; but, while this witness stated that Mrs. Telfer destroyed the paper, it does not appear whether such paper was a will or a deed. While Mrs. Telfer may have refrained from employing counsel, because of an unwillingness to incur the expense, or may have for some other reason merely procrastinated in regard to the matter, it is probable that most persons would surmise from the evidence in this case that this old woman evaded the discharge of what probably she deemed her duty on account of a sentiment or superstition, which exercises a controlling influence over many minds. Not infrequently persons who are strongly influenced by this sentiment or superstition allow themselves gradually to approach death, which they see before them as inevitable within a few weeks or months, while they know that they are violating most solemn obligations, in respect of the disposition of their property after death, by refraining from making a will. But, whatever may have been the cause of Mrs. Telfer's conduct, the fact is proved beyond dispute that, while she recognized that she was beset with difficulties in endeavoring to make a proper disposition of her property, and that she ought to seek competent legal advice and assistance, she deliberately refrained from seeking such advice and assistance. If she had gone to a competent lawyer, she probably would have learned that a spendthrift trust might be created by will or by deed, which would present a complete solution of the problem which she was endeavoring to solve alone. But whether a spendthrift trust could have been devised which would have satisfied Mrs. Telfer's mind and would have accomplished the object which she had in view, relating to the support of her son and the protection of the property from his improvidence, is a matter about which it is vain to undertake to speculate. Mrs. Telfer, although proved to have been a woman of force of character and intelligence, presumably knew nothing of spendthrift trusts, and for some reason refrained from seeking legal advice. She stared at the problem before her, and apparently allowed months to go by during which she slowly but surely approached her end, endeavoring to solve this problem without help from any one.
In my opinion the evidence shows that the conveyance of this property to Mrs. Hagan was the solution which Mrs. Telfer finally reached of the difficult problem which she had long been studying. I think, also, that the evidence would probably satisfy most minds that from Mrs. Telfer's point of view, with the knowledge that she had, what she did was altogether wise and prudent. Mrs. Telfer probably knew, if she left the farm or any property to her son for life, that such life estate would be within his control and would be forthwith squandered. The choice that Mrs. Telfer seems to have finally made was between allowing one-half of her estate to descend upon her death to this spendthrift, who would immediately waste it, orto convey the whole of the estate in her lifetime to her daughter. If she were to die intestate, she firmly believed that the half of her estate which her son would receive would soon he dissipated, and he and his family would derive no permanent benefit from it. On the other hand, the evidence indicates distinctly that Mrs. Telfer contemplated that the gift of the whole estate to Mrs. Hagan would involve the administration of it, or a part of it, by Mrs. Hagan for the benefit of this unfortunate son. This devise, which is attacked as inofficious, appears after all to have been intended, in part at least, as a settlement in the nature of a spendthrift trust, however impossible it may be for any court of law or equity to deal with it in that character. It is not an uncommon thing for testators of intelligence, with the aid of counsel, to make an absolute gift which the legatee knows well is to be sacredly applied to the benefit of some person unnamed in the will. The evidence shows that Mrs. Telfer, whose maiden name was Sturges, comes from good stock. There is nothing in this case which reflects upon the character of any member of this family, three generations of which are represented among the witnesses, excepting what has been already set forth in regard to the complainant. The defendants impressed me as honest, trustworthy people. The indications to my mind are very strong that the defendant Mrs. Hagan, who is somewhat older than her brother, the complainant, might well be intrusted by her mother to occupy in a measure a relation to her brother after her mother's death similar to that which the mother in her lifetime had occupied. Mrs. Hagan on her direct examination testified frankly that the day after the deeds were delivered to her she had a conversation with her mother, in which her mother said: "The property is yours. Don't give him a dollar, but don't let him want for bread." On her cross-examination she repeated this solemn injunction, which her mother gave her practically on her dying bed. It is not surprising that Mrs. Telfer, with a daughter like Mrs. Hagan, should have concluded that the conveyances which she made were the wisest and best means of accomplishing all the objects which she had in view in relation to the support of her son and his family. The testimony of Judge Paxton directly supports the explanation of these conveyances above set forth. This experienced lawyer, in view of the character of the deeds, naturally felt it his duty to proceed with great caution, and to be sure that the deeds expressed the final and intelligent determination of the grantor's mind. He accordingly reminded Mrs. Telfer that she had a son, and she replied: "I know what I am doing, and I think he has had all that he deserves. I am disposed to leave it to the generosity of my daughter to give him (if he is entitled to anything) what he is entitled to." Elsewhere the witness says that Mrs. Telfer said that "she was disposed to trust her daughter to do what she might think was right and what he might be deserving of."
4. I shall not discuss the evidence at length. The complainant's case stands on the allegations of the bill that the deeds wove obtained by fraud and undue influence in the abuse of fiduciary relations, and at a time when the grantor's mind had become impaired by disease to such an extent as to render her incapable of performing any legal act. There is no evidence that can support these extreme allegations. The proof of a fiduciary relation need not be considered. I find as a fact that when these deeds were made the grantor, though weak, was in the full possession of her intellectual faculties, and that her will power was practically unimpaired, and that as a matter of fact no influence of any kind was exerted upon her by or on behalf of the defendants, or either of them, leading to the execution of these instruments. Of course, the witnesses who know most about the execution of these deeds are the defendant Mrs. Hagan and Judge Paxton. The testimony of these witnesses is throughout, I think, characterized by frankness and apparent honesty. Judge Paxton received the order to draw the deeds about a week before he prepared them, and took them to Seacaucus for execution. There seems to have been no urgency about the matter, and Mrs. Hagan's testimony, which is corroborated. I think, indicates that she (Mrs. Hagan) thought that her mother intended to make a will, and voluntarily procured information which she thought would be required in carrying out that purpose. When Judge Paxton found it convenient, on account of an appointment at North Bergen, he drew the deeds and took them to Mrs. Hagan's house in Seacaucus. He had no personal acquaintance with Mrs. Telfer, but was acquainted with very many members of her family. He knew of her and she knew of him. Judge Paxton testifies most positively to the effect that Mrs. Telfer, though physically weak, was entirely rational, and the picture which he presents is that of a woman who is engaged in carrying out a plan of her own. It is, perhaps, worth noticing that the answers in this case, which are not under oath, set forth that the deeds in question were made in order to make the property received by the daughter equal in amount to the property which the son had already received in the lifetime of his mother. The statements made by Mrs. Telfer to Judge Paxton, which he testifies to most positively, accord with this allegation of the answer, and no doubt were the origin thereof. Mrs. Hagan, however, in her testimony does not stand her case on any such claim. She admits that she received all her mother's estate charged with an obligation, the moral force of which she does not undertaketo deny. The exact matter to be decided in this cause must be kept ever in view while examining the evidence. We are not inquiring whether these conveyances were in fact wise and prudent transfers of property, or must be considered as effecting a harsh and unjust exclusion of the complainant from a share of the estate of his mother to which he had a moral claim, or whether, if Mrs. Telfer had been properly advised and aided by counsel, she would have made these conveyances. The sole question is, did Mrs. Telfer act voluntarily and intelligently in making these conveyances, or were they obtained from her by fraud or undue influence?
Without stating the evidence bearing on this question, I have endeavored to make plain what seems to me to be the point of view from which the examination of the evidence should be conducted, and from which it appears to me quite plain that the question must be answered in favor of the defendants.