Opinion
Decided March 1, 1938.
The Portsmouth Historical Society, a corporation "organized. . . to preserve, collect and perpetuate . . . historical facts, traditions, biography, features and possessions" of that city and vicinity and which maintains on exhibition antique furniture, books, pictures, manuscripts, c, associated with the locality or relating to its early history, and in which corporation the stockholders have no pecuniary interest, is a charity exempt from taxation under P. L, c. 60, s. 22 as amended by Laws 1930, c. 4. A charge of admission fees which are expended to defray operating expenses does not affect the society's standing as a charity.
PETITION, for the abatement of a tax assessed by the defendant upon the real property of the plaintiff for the year 1934. Facts agreed. The question of the plaintiff's right to an abatement was transferred without ruling by Connor, J.
The plaintiff is a corporation which was organized in 1917 under the general laws of this state. According to its articles of incorporation "The purpose for which this corporation is organized and established is to preserve, collect and perpetuate, to the advantage, credit and prosperity of Portsmouth, New Hampshire and vicinity, any and all of its historical facts, traditions, biography, features and possessions which may seem desirable, feasible and possible; and to carry out said purpose it shall have the power to hold and use lands, buildings and personal property."
The house and land upon which the tax was assessed was acquired by the plaintiff in 1917. The agreed statement of facts contains the following: "The real estate above mentioned, since its purchase, has been occupied and used by the petitioner solely as a historical museum, and for no other purposes. It has, therein, from 1917 up to now, on exhibition a collection, received largely by gifts, of antique furniture, books, publications, pictures, manuscript and articles of historical interest, chiefly associated with or relating to Portsmouth and its early history, but some of the same type and character relating to adjoining territory, of general historical or antiquarian interest.
"There is no capital stock or pecuniary interest of the stockholders in any way. An admission fee is charged of the public, but used solely for the operating expenses of the society."
The statement of facts concludes with a finding, "as an inference of fact, that said real estate is occupied by the petitioner for the purposes for which it is established, and that none of the income or profits is used for other than such purposes."
Charles H. Batchelder (by brief), for the plaintiff.
Leo Liberson, City Solicitor (by brief), for the defendant.
The plaintiff claims that its real property is exempt from taxation under the provisions of P.L., c. 60, s. 22, as amended by Laws 1930, c. 4. The pertinent parts of this statute read as follows: "The personal property of institutions devoted to educational purposes, charitable and religious societies, . . . incorporated or organized within this state, and the real estate owned and occupied by them, . . . for the purposes for which they are established, . . . shall be exempt from taxation, provided none of the income or profits of the business of such corporations or institutions is divided among the stockholders, or members, or is used or appropriated for other than educational, charitable, or religious purposes." The statute also provides that "No institution shall be deemed an educational institution which does not have a curriculum regularly approved by the state board of education and in which training is not given for at least six months of each calendar year."
The agreed statement of facts shows that the plaintiff conforms to the statutory requirements for an exemption in so far as its organization, the use of its property and the disposition of its income is concerned, but there is nothing in that statement to indicate that the plaintiff is either an educational institution, as that term is defined in the statute, or that its purposes are in any sense religious. It follows, therefore, that the sole question presented is whether or not its purposes are charitable in the statutory sense.
We believe that they are. Although the plaintiff corporation cannot qualify as an educational institution, still its services lie in that field. It offers to the public, or to such members thereof as are interested, information concerning the early history of the locality. Its purpose is not the private one of catering to the pleasure, profit or emolument of its members, but the public one of promoting the general welfare by imparting information of use, interest and value to persons generally. That this is a service in the field of education cannot be doubted (Missouri Hist. Society v. Academy, 94 Mo. 459; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174; Drury v. Natick, 10 Allen 169; Molly Varnum Chapter, D.A.R. v. Lowell, 204 Mass. 487), and such services "have evidentiary value to show its proper classification as a charitable organization within the act." Young Women's Christian Association v. Portsmouth, ante, 40.
The charge of an admission fee, all of the proceeds of which are used to defray operating expenses, does not alter the plaintiff's standing as a charity. New England Sanitarium v. Stoneham, 205 Mass. 335; Newton Center Woman's Club v. Newton, 258 Mass. 326. Its standing as a charity in the statutory sense is established because it appears that the plaintiff is an institution "organized and conducted to perform some service of public good or welfare, with no pecuniary profit to its officers or members, and with no restrictions which confine benefits to them." Young Women's Christian Association v. Portsmouth, supra.
Abatement ordered.
All concurred.