Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-1307
04-26-2012
MATTHEW R. PORTERFIELD Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. Defendant.
Respectfully submitted, Christopher M. Murphy, Esq. Doran & Murphy, PLLC Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs David L. Lockard, Esq. David Lockard & Associates Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs
Hon. Gary L. Lancaster , Chief Judge
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
At approximately 3:30 AM on October 16, 2007, Plaintiff Matthew Porterfield, a 39-year-old freight railroad conductor, fell and suffered a fractured right ankle and ruptured ligaments while working for Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX). He sued CSX to recover for his on-the-job injury pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 49 USC §51, et seq., claiming that CSX was negligent in failing to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work by failing to maintain the ballast where he fell. CSX denied that it was negligent.
There were several uncontested facts in this case. Matthew Porterfield was an employee of CSX at the time of his injury. See Final Jury Instructions, attached hereto as EXHIBIT A at 9. Matthew Porterfield was performing his duties in the course of his employment when he was injured. Id. CSX was at such time a common carrier by railroad, engaged in interstate commerce. Id. Matthew Porterfield broke his ankle when he fell at work on October 16, 2007. See CSX Pretrial Statement, Document No. 29, attached hereto as EXHIBIT B at 2 ("Plaintiff suffered a fractured lower leg in his accident.").
The Final Jury Instructions attached were provided by the Court to counsel during the charge conference and were slightly modified by the Court based on issues raised at the conference. Counsel was never provided with a copy of the modified charge read to the jury.
The parties proceeded to trial on March 26, 2012 with the jury returning a verdict on March 29, 2012. The jury found that CSX was negligent, but that CSX's negligence was not a "legal cause" of Matthew Porterfield's injury. See Verdict Sheet, attached hereto as EXHIBIT C. Judgment was entered in CSX's favor on March 31, 2012. Matthew Porterfield moves this Court for a new trial because the jury's finding that CSX did not cause or contribute to his injury is against the weight of the evidence presented.
Legal Standard Governing Motions For A New Trial
A trial court can grant a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, "when the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence; that is, where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand." Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2001). "A new trial may be granted when there is legally sufficient evidence to support the verdict, thus foreclosing judgment as a matter of law, but the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence; that is, where 'a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand.'" Kimmen v. Conrail, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2973 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 1999)(quoting Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han Yang Chem Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 1993).
Allowing this verdict - that there was no legal causation of any of Matthew Porterfield's injuries from CSX's negligence - to stand when all of the evidence demonstrated that Matthew Porterfield suffered, at the very least, a fractured ankle as a result of his workplace accident on October 16, 2007 would be a miscarriage of justice. The jury's determination was against the great weight of the evidence, as well as CSX's admission that Matthew Porterfield did in fact suffer at the very least, a fractured ankle as a result of his workplace accident on October 16, 2007.
The Jury's Determination That CSX Was Negligent
The Court instructed the jury with respect to determining negligence as follows:
In this case, Mr. Porterfield's claim is asserted under the Federal Employers Liability Act (the "FELA"). The FELA is a federal law that makes railroads liable in damages when an employee is injured as a result of a railroad's negligence as long as certain conditions are met.EXHIBIT A at 8 - 9 (emphasis added).
In order to prevail on his FELA claim, Mr. Porterfield must prove each of the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence:
First: That at the time of his injury, Mr. Porterfield was an employee of CSX performing duties in the course of his employment;
Second: That CSX was at such time a common carrier by railroad, engaged in interstate commerce;
Third: That CSX was negligent in failing to properly maintain, inspect or repair the ballast where Mr. Porterfield's fall occurred on October 16, 2007; and
Fourth: That such negligence by CSX was a "legal cause" of the damages sustained by Mr. Porterfield.
In this case, the first and second elements are not in dispute. That is, the parties have agreed that at the time of the incident, Mr. Porterfield was an employee of CSX performing duties in the course of his employment, and that CSX is a common carrier by railroad engaged in interstate commerce. Accordingly, you must only determine whether Mr. Porterfield has proven the third and fourth elements by a preponderance of the evidence. That is, you must determine whether Mr. Porterfield has proven that CSX was negligent, and if so, whether its negligence was a legal cause of the damages sustained by Mr. Porterfield.
The jury took these instructions and, in answering verdict interrogatory question #1 affirmatively, determined that Plaintiff met his burden of proof in proving the third element referenced in the charge: "that CSX was negligent in failing to properly maintain, inspect or repair the ballast where Mr. Porterfield's fall occurred on October 16, 2007." EXHIBIT A at 8; EXHIBIT C. The next step, according to the jury instructions, was to determine whether "such negligence by CSX was a 'legal cause' of the damages sustained by Mr. Porterfield." Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Damages Claimed
Matthew Porterfield claimed that he suffered a fractured right ankle, comminuted fractured fibula, ruptured anterior inferior tibiofibular ligament, a ruptured deltoid ligament, early onset post-traumatic arthritis at the site of his fractured ankle, a peroneal neuropathy of his right foot, loss of sensation in part of his right foot with associated pain, suffering and wage loss.
CSX disputed the extent of permanent physical impairment, the extent of the arthritis and the extent and duration of the pain and suffering.
Causation Standard In A FELA Case
The FELA statute is a federal statute that departs from common law negligence principles, making recovery easier for injured workers than would be under a traditional common law approach. See Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 356 US 326, 329, 78 S.Ct. 758 (1958). "FELA renders railroads liable for employees' injuries or deaths resulting in whole or in part from carrier negligence." CSX Transportation v. McBride, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 564 US __, (2011)(citing, 45 USC §51)(emphasis added). McBride emphasizes the intent behind the phrase "in whole or in part" used in describing the FELA's causation requirement was to provide for broad recovery for workplace injuries:
"Liability under FELA is limited in these key respects: Railroads are liable only to their employees, and only for injuries sustained in the course of employment. FELA's language on causation, however, 'is as broad as could be framed.' Urie v.McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2642-43.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 93 L. Ed. 1282 (1949). Given the breadth of the phrase "resulting in whole or in part from the [railroad's] negligence," and Congress' "humanitarian" and "remedial goal[s]," we have recognized that, in comparison to tort litigation at common law, "a relaxed standard of causation applies under FELA." Gottshall, 512 U.S., at 542-543, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 129 L. Ed. 2d 427."
Under this relaxed standard, the test for FELA causation "is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Id. (citing, Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S. Ct. 443 (1957). Thus, to prevail on his claim, Matthew Porterfield need only show that CSX's negligence in failing to properly maintain, inspect or repair the ballast where his fall occurred on October 16, 2007 played any part, no matter how slight, in causing any of his claimed injuries.
Causation Evidence
"A jury cannot freely ignore evidence of obvious injury." Dougherty v. Marshalls of MA, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1622, 8-9 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished)(citing, Neison v. Hines, 539 Pa. 516, 653 A.2d 634, 639 (Pa. 1995)). A jury is also "not permitted to disregard the uncontroverted evidence of causation and find [a defendant's] negligence was not a substantial factor in causing at least some injury to [the plaintiff]." Lemmon v. Ernst, 2003 PA Super 105 (2003)(citing, Andrews v. Jackson, 2002 PA Super 173, 800 A.2d 959 (Pa. Super. 2002). A jury verdict that goes against the weight of the competent evidence offered by both parties' medical experts should be overturned and a new trial ordered. Id.
The evidence at trial was uncontroverted and unequivocal that Matthew Porterfield's broken ankle was causally related to his fall. Both Matthew Porterfield's treating orthopedist and CSX's orthopedist opined that Mr. Porterfield's damages were due to his on-the-job accident. Dr. Robert Weiss, the treating orthopedic surgeon, testified:
A: Matt first presented to my office on October 16, 2007. He stated that he was a 35-year-old. He worked as a conductor for CSX Railroad and that he had injured his ankle early that morning when he twisted the ankle while walking on some railroad tracks or ballasts.Deposition of Dr. Weiss, relevant portions attached hereto as EXHIBIT D at 7-9.
Q: Did you examine Matt's ankle?
A: We did.
Q: What did your examination indicate?
A: It revealed a bimalleolar swelling and tenderness of the right ankle, meaning over both malleoli and there was no neurologic deficit.
***
Q: Did you obtain x-rays of Matt's ankle around that time?
A: We did.
Q: What did the x-rays show?
A: X-rays - - reading from my note from 2007, X-rays obtained at that time of his visit on October 16, 2007 revealed type C - - that is a classification we use - -fracture subluxation of the ankle with fracture of the fibula, widening of the sydesmosis and widening of the medial clear space. It also revealed several chip fractures medially clear space. It also revealed several chip fractures medially indicative of prior injuries.
***
Q: What treatment did you recommend for these problems?
A: I recommended surgery.
Q: Did you perform surgery?
A: We did.
Dr. Weiss also testified that Matthew Porterfield's traumatic arthritis resulted from his October 16, 2007 on-the-job injury:
Q: Did you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to whether the mild posttraumatic arthritis was or was not related to his injury from October of 2007?EXHIBIT D at 23.
A: I felt it was causally related to the injury of 2007.
Dr. Weiss also causally related Matthew Porterfield's neuropathy and pain to his October 16, 2007 injury:
Q: Now, I think you have seen Matt 16 or 17 times in your office. You have seen him 3 times during operations. This is in the context a posing question. Are Matt's ankle problems the, superficial peroneal neuropathy, the posttraumatic arthritis, the pain that he has got, from your perspective based on seeing him these many times and operating on him these many times were they all caused by his October 2007 injury?EXHIBIT D at 35-36.
A: I would say yes. I would say during the period that I have known Matt he has been honest and straight forward and has never in my opinion exaggerated his symptoms.
More importantly, the orthopedist retained by CSX to examine Matthew Porterfield, Dr. Stephen Conti, agreed that Mr. Porterfield's broken ankle was caused by his October 16, 2007 on-the-job injury:
Q: And you thought his injury was caused by his on-the-job injury; correct?Deposition of Dr. Conti, relevant portions attached hereto as EXHIBIT E at 28. CSX's Dr. Conti also related Matthew Porterfield's nerve damage to the on-the-job injury or the treatment required after the on-the-job injury:
A: Sure.
Q: [T]he bottom line is, as I understand it, is that the superficial peroneal nerve in Matt's right ankle isn't working, and you think the fact it isn't working is as a result of either the on-the-job injury or the treatment that Dr. Weiss provided shortly after the injury; right?EXHIBIT E at 17-18.
A: Yes, but I want to be clear about what we're talking about. So when someone has their ankle broken, the nerve can be stretched at that time, or when we do surgery, because the nerve is right next to the surgical site, Dr. Weiss will not cut Mr. Porterfield's nerve, but the nerve may be trapped in some of the scar that occurs in that area, and I don't think it's important for this case, but neither way, Mr. Porterfield's superficial peroneal nerve is not working and will never work properly.
Q: ...And if his peroneal nerve became entrapped as a result of this scar tissue, that is just one of the risks that comes with trying to fix him up after the on-the-job injury; right?
A: Yes.
Q: All right. And you are not aware of any evidence from any of the records that Matt had that problem before his on-the-job injury; correct?
A: I'm not aware of any problem with the nerve.
Q: Now, I think you said that as far as you are concerned, that the problem with the peroneal nerve is a permanent problem. It's not going to get better; correct?
A: Right.
Q: And why is that?
A: Well, the nerve has been damaged, and you can't undamage a nerve that has been permanently damaged.
Both medical witnesses agreed on the crucial issue of causation of most of Matthew Porterfield's injuries - a fractured ankle and peroneal nerve damage. This undisputed evidence was ignored by the jury.
Legal Cause Instruction
The instructions were clear that the question regarding "legal cause" on the verdict sheet concerned whether CSX's negligence caused or contributed to Matthew Porterfield's injuries or damages: "That is, you must determine whether Mr. Porterfield has proven that CSX was negligent, and if so, whether its negligence was a legal cause of the damages sustained by Mr. Porterfield." EXHIBIT A at 9 (emphasis added). The instructions further stated:
"For the purpose of this case, negligence is a 'legal cause' of damage if it played any part, no matter how small, in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage. Again, if you should find from the evidence in this case that the negligence of CSX contributed in any way to any injury or damages suffered by Mr. Porterfield, you must find that such injury or damage was "legally caused" by CSX's negligence."EXHIBIT A at 11 (emphasis added).
The jury's finding that CSX's negligence was not a legal cause of the plaintiff's damages is unsupported by any evidence, much less the weight of the evidence, presented at trial. While there was dispute as to the extent of some of Matthew Porterfield's resulting damages, such as his arthritis, all of the evidence, presented by both parties, demonstrates that the legal cause of Matthew Porterfield's broken ankle was his workplace accident on October 16, 2007. In fact, there was not a single witness called to testify who disputed that Matthew Porterfield fell at work on October 16, 2007 and sustained a fractured ankle in the fall.
If this verdict is permitted to stand, a miscarriage of justice would result in allowing the jury to either ignore the undisputed objective injury of Matthew Porterfield's broken ankle, or ignore the undisputed, uncontroverted evidence that Matthew Porterfield's ankle was broken in the workplace accident on October 16, 2007.
Conclusion
A FELA plaintiff must prove the common law elements of negligence to prevail on a claim: duty, breach, foreseeability and causation. Happ v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 2:05-cv-419 (W.D.Pa. 2006); Sinclair v. Long Island R.R., 985 F.2d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1993); Robert v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 832 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1987). In this case, the jury found that CSX was negligent - i.e., that it had a duty to Matthew Porterfield, it breached that duty on October 16, 2007, the breaching of which could forseeably cause injury, and that the breach of the duty caused Matthew Porterfield's accident. The only remaining questions for the jury after determining that CSX was negligent on October 16, 2007 in failing to provide Matthew Porterfield with a safe place to work were (1) whether Matthew Porterfield had suffered any physical injury from the accident; and (2) what monetary amount would compensate him for those injuries.
The standard of causation on a FELA case is a more relaxed standard where the injured worker only needs to show that the railroad's negligence played any part, no matter how slight, in causing the worker's injuries. The evidence from both parties demonstrated that Matthew Porterfield's objective injuries were caused or contributed to by his workplace accident. The jury ignored the undisputed, uncontroverted evidence of the causation of Matthew Porterfield's fractured ankle, and a new trial should be granted to rectify this miscarriage of justice.
Respectfully submitted,
______________________
Christopher M. Murphy, Esq.
Doran & Murphy, PLLC
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs
______________________
David L. Lockard, Esq.
David Lockard & Associates
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served electronically via the CM/ECF court system to all counsel of record as listed below April 26, 2012.
Anthony Rash, Esq.
John Wall, Esq.
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, PC
______________________
Christopher M. Murphy, Esq.