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describing order entered after trial court lost jurisdiction as a "nullity"
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Case No. 2D18-2500
04-08-2020
Aaron C. PORTER, Appellant, v. Chad CHRONISTER, Sheriff of Hillsborough County; and Naphcare, Inc., Appellees.
Aaron C. Porter, pro se. Jason M. Azzarone and Barbara Chapman, Tampa, for Appellees.
Aaron C. Porter, pro se.
Jason M. Azzarone and Barbara Chapman, Tampa, for Appellees.
VILLANTI, Judge.
Aaron C. Porter appeals the amended order dismissing his third amended statement of claim with prejudice and entering a prefiling order that prohibited him from filing any further pro se documents in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit. Because the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the amended order, we reverse and remand for the amended order to be vacated. In all other respects, we affirm.
Porter filed his statement of claim against Chad Chronister, as Sheriff of Hillsborough County (the Sheriff), and Naphcare, Inc., based on events that occurred while Porter, who is serving a life sentence in the Department of Corrections, was temporarily in the custody of the Sheriff at the Hillsborough County Jail. In his statement of claim, Porter alleged that during his stay in jail, his prescription eyeglasses were first damaged and then lost, allegedly by jail personnel, and that both the jail personnel and Naphcare, the company under contract to provide health care to jail inmates, refused to provide him with a replacement pair. Porter alleged that this refusal constituted a failure to provide him with reasonable and necessary medical care and treatment.
After extensive proceedings, including several amendments to the statement of claim and several hearings that Porter attended by phone, the trial court dismissed Porter's third amended statement of claim on several grounds, but primarily on the basis that he had committed a fraud on the court by failing to list all of his prior and pending court cases on his application for civil indigency. This order, rendered March 10, 2018, dismissed the case with prejudice and imposed a requirement that any future pleadings or papers filed by Porter be signed by a member of The Florida Bar.
On April 13, 2018, Porter filed a motion for rehearing directed to the March 10 order by placing it in the hands of prison officials for mailing. On that same date, he also filed a notice of appeal of the March 10 order. On May 17, 2018, this court dismissed Porter's appeal of the March 10 order as untimely. See Porter v. Gee, 245 So. 3d 709 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (table decision). Also on May 17, 2018, the trial court denied Porter's motion for rehearing as untimely. These rulings should have ended the proceedings in this case. However, despite its May 17 ruling denying the motion for rehearing as untimely and this court's order dismissing the appeal, on May 18, 2018, the trial court entered an amended order that purported to modify the March 10 order so as to prohibit Porter from filing pro se documents only in civil cases. Porter filed a timely appeal from that amended order, which is the appeal at issue here, raising several issues relating to the dismissal of his case and the prefiling sanction entered against him. We conclude that Porter is not entitled to the relief he seeks because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order on appeal.
The law on the jurisdictional issue presented by this case is clear.
"The rule is firmly established in this State that the trial [c]ourt loses jurisdiction of a cause after a judgment or final decree has been entered and the time for filing petition for rehearing or motion for new trial has expired or same has been denied." Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Milne, 98 So. 3d 613, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting State ex rel. Am. Home Ins. Co. v. Seay, 355 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) ); see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Culbreath Isles Prop. Owners Ass'n, 103 So. 3d 896, 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
Pelphrey-Weigand v. Weigand, 283 So. 3d 822, 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ; see also Rodriguez v. Temperature Concepts, Inc., 267 So. 3d 36, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ("Outside of a [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.540 motion, when an order of dismissal is filed, ‘[t]he trial court has jurisdiction to entertain a timely motion for rehearing or to revisit the cause on the court's own initiative within the time allowed for a rehearing motion.’ " (second alteration in original) (quoting Magloire v. Bank of N.Y., 147 So. 3d 594, 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) )). Once the trial court loses jurisdiction over a case, it may act again in the case only if a motion properly invoking its jurisdiction is timely filed. See Rodriguez, 267 So. 3d at 38 (recognizing that a trial court's jurisdiction may be reinvoked by a timely filed motion under rule 1.540 ).
In this case, the trial court rendered the original order dismissing Porter's case with prejudice on March 10. As an order that dismissed the entire case with prejudice, that order constituted a final judgment or decree in the case. See Capone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 116 So. 3d 363, 372 (Fla. 2013). Once that order was entered, Porter was entitled to file a motion for rehearing pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(b) within fifteen days after the final order was rendered, making any such motion due no later than March 26. When no motion was filed by that date, the trial court lost jurisdiction over Porter's case and no longer had jurisdiction to revisit the final order or enter an amended final order. Accordingly, the trial court's May 18 amended order was entered without jurisdiction and is a nullity.
In this appeal, Porter argues that his motion for rehearing was not untimely because it was intended to be a motion filed pursuant to rule 1.540(b) and therefore he had at least a year in which to file the motion. But this argument does not afford him relief for three reasons. First, Porter's notice of appeal says that he is appealing the May 18 amended order; it does not state that he is appealing the May 17 order dismissing his motion for rehearing as untimely. Therefore, the merits of the trial court's May 17 ruling on the alleged rule 1.540(b) motion are not properly before this court. Second, even if Porter's motion for rehearing was treated as a rule 1.540(b) motion for relief from judgment, the filing of that motion would not stay rendition of the March 10 order. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) ("A motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or decree or suspend its operation."); see also Stubbs v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 250 So. 3d 151, 152-53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ; In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Hence, any appeal from the ruling on the rule 1.540(b) motion would be limited to review of the relief that was granted or denied pursuant to the motion; it would not entitle Porter to appeal the already-final March 10 order.
And third, regardless of whether the motion was treated as one under rule 1.530 or 1.540, once that motion was either denied or dismissed on May 17, the trial court no longer had any jurisdiction to reconsider the original order entered on March 10. Had the trial court concluded that Porter's motion was a timely filed motion for rehearing, it would have been able to enter the amended order because the motion would have stayed rendition of the March 10 order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)(B), (h)(2)(A). But the trial court did not do so; it dismissed the motion as untimely. Having done so, the trial court lost any jurisdiction it might otherwise have had to enter an amended order changing any of the provisions of the March 10 order. For all of these reasons, Porter's arguments concerning the nature of his motion for rehearing or reconsideration or relief from judgment do not entitle him to the relief he seeks in this appeal.
The final question we must address is how to dispose of this appeal. The Sheriff filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, arguing that because Porter is really challenging the substance of the March 10 order his notice of appeal is untimely. But this assertion ignores the actual procedural posture of this case. The trial court entered the amended final order on May 18, and Porter's notice of appeal, filed June 14, 2018, is timely as to that order. Once the amended order was rendered as a purported amended final order, Porter had the right to bring an appeal. Therefore, this appeal is not subject to being dismissed as untimely, and so we deny the Sheriff's motion to dismiss.
Instead, we reverse the May 18 amended order that was entered without jurisdiction and remand with directions to vacate that order and reinstate the final order of dismissal entered on March 10. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 267 So. 3d at 38 ; Trerice v. Trerice, 250 So. 3d 695, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The May 17 order denying the motion for rehearing as untimely may stand. See Griffith v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 485 So. 2d 818, 821 (Fla. 1986) ("Without jurisdiction, the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." (emphasis added) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) )).
Reversed and remanded with directions; motion to dismiss denied.
BLACK, J., Concurs.
ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, J., Concurs in result only.