Opinion
No. 02-3642, SECTION "L" (3)
March 13, 2003
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Richard Poret, and Christina Poret, individually and on behalf of their minor children, filed this suit for alleged injuries Mr. Poret sustained in the course of his employment as a stevedore with Pacorini USA ("Pacorini"). According to the Plaintiff, on July 11, 2002, Plaintiff was aboard the M/V AGIA THALASSINI, which was docked midstream in the Mississippi River, unloading steel piping onto an adjacent barge using a mechanical forklift truck. Plaintiff claims that the stevedoring employees were instructed to attach hooks to the piping and then maneuver the steel piping from the vessel to the barge. During the unloading operations, Plaintiff claims that he was crushed between the weight of the forklift truck and the handrail of the vessel while the truck was being operated by another employee of Pacorini. Plaintiff alleges that the forklift truck had defective brakes and, therefore, the operator of the truck was unable to stop the forklift truck before it crushed the Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the owner of the forklift truck, Louisiana Lift and Equipment, Inc., alleging negligence under the general maritime law for leasing a defective forklift truck to Pacorini for use in the offloading operations.
Defendant, Louisiana Lift and Equipment, Inc., brought the present motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that admiralty jurisdiction does not exist because the incident giving rise to the injury could not potentially disrupt maritime commerce and does not have a substantial relationship to a traditional maritime activity.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 over a tort claim must satisfy conditions of both location and connection with a maritime activity. Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., et al., 115 S.Ct. 1043, 1048 (1995). "A Court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether the injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water." Id. The connection test is comprised of two prongs: (1) the court must "assess the general features of the type of incident involved" to determine whether the incident has "a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce"; and (2) the court must determine whether the "general character" of the "activity giving rise to the incident" shows a "substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id. (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S.Ct. 2892 (1990)).
The location test in this case is readily satisfied, as Defendant concedes. The Plaintiff was injured on a vessel that was docked midstream in the Mississippi River. The Fifth Circuit has previously held that the Mississippi River is a navigable waterway. See IMTT-Gretna v. ROBERT E. LEE, SS, 999 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1993); Marastro Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Canadian Maritime Carriers, Ltd., 959 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the location test of the admiralty jurisdiction is met.
Next, this Court must determine whether the incident giving rise to the injury passes the connection test, that is, whether there is a connection with a maritime activity. With regard to the first prong of the connection test, whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce, the court must focus not on the particular facts of the incident, but on the general features of the incident and whether it was likely to disrupt commercial activity. Grubart, 115 S.Ct. at 1048. The Defendant argues that incident giving rise to the injury in this case is the leasing of a forklift truck, which Defendant argues has no potential to disrupt maritime commerce.
Contrary to the Defendant's characterization of the incident, the general features of the incident involve leasing a forklift truck to a stevedoring company for use in loading and unloading a vessel, not simply the lease of a forklift itself. One Court has recognized that "an injury to a barge crane operator has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce in that it could delay the transfer of goods, material and cargo to and from the barge." Hall v. Environmental Chem. Corp., 64 F. Supp.2d 638, 640 (S.D. Tex. 1999). Similarly, an stevedore who is working with a forklift truck in loading and unloading a vessel has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce — the injury could delay the transfer of cargo to and from the vessel. Therefore, the incident giving rise to the injury in this case meets the first prong of the connection test.
Under the second prong of the connection test, the Court again must look to the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident and determine whether it has a substantial relationship to a traditional maritime activity. Grubart, 115 S.Ct. at 1048. The focus is whether a tortfeasor's activity, commercial or noncommercial, on navigable waters is so closely related to activity traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules would apply in the suit at hand. Id. Again, the Defendant argues that the "tortfeasor's activity" was leasing the forklift to another company, which has nothing to do with a traditional maritime activity. In addition, the Defendant argues that admiralty jurisdiction does not need uniform development of law governing the lease of a forklift by a land-based company to another entity.
The problem with Defendant's argument again lies in its description of the activity giving rise to the incident. The activity is not simply the lease of a forklift, but leasing a forklift to a stevedoring company for use in vessel loading and unloading. The unloading of a ship's cargo is a traditional maritime activity. See Drachenberg v. Canal Barge Co., 571 F.2d 912, 917 (5th Cir. 1978); Solano v. Beilby, 761 F.2d 1369, 1371 (9th Cir. 1985); Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping, Inc. CIE Chambon Maclovia, S.A., 562 F.2d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 1977). Because the forklift was leased for use during loading and unloading operations, it is closely related and has a substantial relationship to a traditional maritime activity. Therefore, the second prong of the connection test is met.
Defendant tries to distinguish various cases finding admiralty jurisdiction when a claimant is injured loading and unloading a vessel on the basis that all such cases involved defendants who were the claimant's employer or were the vessel owner and, thus, there was a substantial relationship to a traditional maritime activity. However, the Defendant fails to recognize that courts have found that injuries may involve non-vessels or parties who do not own vessels, yet still bear a relationship to traditional maritime activity sufficient to invoke general maritime law. Pellegrin v. Sci-Tech Instruments (U.S.A.), Inc. No. 95-3972, 1998 WL 779842, *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 4, 1998) (citations omitted). Furthermore, a general maritime negligence claim can be maintained against a defendant who is neither an employer nor a vessel owner. Id. In Pellegrin, this Court specifically found that a plaintiff who was injured when the handrail broke on the quarterboat that he was boarding had a general maritime negligence action against whomever was responsible for the handrails. Id. This Court explained that the quarter boats were floating in navigable waters and had the potential to interface with other vessels and that the purported injury occurred during the disembarkation from one vessel onto another pursuant to a salvage operation. For these reasons, this Court held that there was a sufficient nexus to bring the dispute within maritime jurisdiction. Id. The same reasoning applies in the present case. The Plaintiff's injuries occurred on a vessel on navigable water, which had the potential to interface with other vessels and the purported injury involved using equipment to load and unload the vessel. Therefore, there is a sufficient nexus to bring the Plaintiff's claim for his injuries against the forklift owner within maritime jurisdiction.
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is DENIED.