Summary
affirming trial court's power to find that judgment debtor's deposit of into the registry of the court satisfied judgment
Summary of this case from Custom Corp. v. Security St.Opinion
No. 04-05-00413-CV
Delivered and Filed: June 21, 2006.
Appeal from the 216th Judicial District Court, Bandera County, Texas, Trial Court No. 7940-01, Honorable Stephen B. Ables, Judge Presiding.
Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction.
Sitting: Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice (concurring in the judgment only) Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ryan Webster Pope appeals the trial court's order granting motion to strike Pope's second original petition and order granting Michael James Gaffney's motion to compel satisfaction of judgment. Pope contends that the trial court's order is void because: (1) no second original petition was filed in the underlying cause that was subject to being stricken by the trial court; and (2) the granting of the motion to compel was not necessary and it modified the judgment outside the trial court's plenary jurisdiction. Because the trial court's order is not void, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Wall Street Deli, Inc. v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 110 S.W.3d 67, 69-70 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.) (dismissing appeal because order made for purpose of carrying into effect a prior judgment is not a final judgment and cannot be appealed from); In re L.A.M. Associates, 975 S.W.2d 80, 85 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding) (noting general rule that writs and orders issued to aid in enforcement of judgment are not appealable); see also State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995) (noting where void order is appealed, appellate court may declare order void but must dismiss appeal for lack of jurisdiction); Moore Landrey, L.L.P. v. Hirsch Westheimer, P.C., 126 S.W.2d 536, 543 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 2003, no pet.) (same).
Background
This appeal arises from post-judgment activity relating to a judgment entered in favor of Pope. Gaffney made several attempts to pay the judgment to Pope who refused to accept payment. The trial court ultimately entered an order allowing Gaffney to deposit the judgment amount with the Bandera County District Clerk to be maintained in the registry of the court until Pope retrieved the funds. In its order granting Gaffney's motion to compel satisfaction of judgment, the court found such a deposit constituted a full and final satisfaction of Pope's judgment. The court also struck Pope's second amended petition filed in the original case after judgment was rendered.
Discussion
1. Pope initially complains that the trial court's order striking "Plaintiff's Second Original Petition" was erroneous because the petition was filed in a new cause number not the underlying cause. The record contains a new pleading with the underlying cause number that Pope prepared for filing after judgment. This new pleading is attached to Pope's motion to reconsider. The clerk's record is unclear with regard to whether the pleading was actually filed; however, the reporter's record is clear that the trial court only intended to strike any new pleadings filed in the underlying cause number after judgment was entered. The motion to strike only refers to pleadings filed in the underlying cause number and does not refer to a new cause number. Pleadings cannot be filed after a judgment is rendered. See Mayhew v. Dealey, 143 S.W.3d 356, 371 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied); Cantu v. Martin, 934 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ); Boarder to Boarder Trucking, Inc. v. Mondi, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ). Accordingly, the trial court's order striking new pleadings filed in the underlying cause after judgment was rendered is not void.
With regard to new causes, the following dialogue occurred:
THE COURT: If he files another lawsuit based on the same facts, you're going to have to respond and you can look to those — that portion of the rules about filing a frivolous lawsuit and the Court can sanction Mr. Pope if he tries to go back and file a lawsuit based on the same facts.
[Gaffney's attorney]: On the same accident
THE COURT: I can't anticipate. I'm going to have to wait and see what he files, and you're going to have to wait and see what he files. Sorry.
2. Pope also contends that the trial court was without plenary jurisdiction to grant Gaffney's motion to compel and that the order was not necessary. "The general rule is that every court having jurisdiction to render a judgment has the inherent power to enforce its judgments." Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1982); see also Kortebein v. American Mut. Life Ins. Co., 49 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied); Tex. R. Civ. P. 308. "That power is part of the court's jurisdiction, and the court may employ suitable methods to enforce its jurisdiction." Arndt, 633 S.W.2d at 499. The trial court's enforcement order may not, however, be inconsistent with the original judgment or constitute a material change in the substantive adjudicative portions of the judgment. Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Denisco, 132 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2004, no pet.). In this case, the trial court's order requires Gaffney to deposit the payment in satisfaction of the judgment into the trial court's registry because Pope refused to accept payment. Permitting Gaffney to deposit the payment into the trial court's registry was within the trial court's inherent power to enforce its judgment, is not inconsistent with the original judgment, and does not constitute a material change in the substantive adjudicative portions of the judgment. Accordingly, the trial court's order granting the motion to compel satisfaction of judgment by permitting Gaffney to deposit the funds in satisfaction of the judgment into the trial court's registry is not void.
Conclusion
Because the trial court's order is not void, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.