Opinion
2015-01103 Index No. 1383/10.
01-20-2016
Kristen PONSIGLIONE, etc., et al., appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., respondents.
Robert J. Renna, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellants. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing, Margaret G. King, and Diana Lawless of counsel), for respondents.
Robert J. Renna, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellants.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing, Margaret G. King, and Diana Lawless of counsel), for respondents.
Opinion
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jimenez–Salta, J.), dated November 18, 2014, as granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In January 2009, the plaintiff Kristen Ponsiglione (hereinafter the infant plaintiff) was walking down a staircase in Public School 142 when she allegedly was pushed from behind by a fellow student, lost her balance, and fell.
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant City of New York, as the defendants established, prima facie, that the City is not a proper party to the action (see Staten v. City of New York, 127 A.D.3d 1066, 1068; Thomas v. City of New York, 124 A.D.3d 872, 873; Myers v. City of New York, 64 A.D.3d 546, 547, 882 N.Y.S.2d 306). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging negligent supervision insofar as asserted against the defendant Board of Education of the City of New York (hereinafter the Board of Education). The Board of Education established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging negligent supervision by submitting evidence demonstrating that it did not have sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct that caused the injury, and that the act of pushing the infant plaintiff from behind as she was walking down a staircase was impulsive and could not have been anticipated (see Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49–50, 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 637 N.E.2d 263; Kamara v. City of New York, 93 A.D.3d 449, 450, 940 N.Y.S.2d 53; Martinez v. City of New York, 85 A.D.3d 586, 586–587, 925 N.Y.S.2d 490; MacCormack v. Hudson City School Distr. Bd. of Educ., 51 A.D.3d 1121, 1122–1123, 856 N.Y.S.2d 721; Siegell v. Herricks Union Free School Dist., 7 A.D.3d 607, 609, 777 N.Y.S.2d 148). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The plaintiffs' remaining contention is without merit.