Opinion
Civil No. 1:20-CV-15
01-07-2020
KENNETH PONDS, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Defendant
(Judge Brann)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a legally-mandated screening review of the plaintiff's pro se civil complaint. Kenneth Ponds is a state prisoner who is currently housed at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Dallas. Ponds has filed a complaint which names the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole as the sole defendant. (Doc. 2). According to Ponds' complaint, he was released on parole in September 2016. (Id. at 3). At that time, Ponds alleges his maximum parole date was December 2017. (Id.) By his own account, Ponds' parole adjustment has been uneven and unsuccessful since the plaintiff asserts that in May of 2018 and January of 2019, his parole was revoked for technical violations and new criminal conduct. As a result of these Parole Board decisions, Ponds' maximum release date was revised and recalculated. According to Ponds his maximum release date currently is January 11, 2020. (Id.)
Based on these allegations, Ponds' complaint makes a hybrid claim for relief, seeking two types of mutually inconsistent relief. First, Ponds asks that we order the Parole Board to immediately release him from incarceration. By challenging the duration of his detention, Ponds appears to invoke the habeas corpus jurisdiction of this court—a form of jurisdiction that typically does not embrace damages claims. However, Ponds' complaint also asserts that he is seeking damages, specifically $1,000 per day for each day that he was incarcerated after September 16, 2019. (Id. at 6). This request for damages seemingly invokes a separate and independent ground of federal jurisdiction, the court's civil rights jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Along with this complaint, Ponds filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 1). We will provisionally grant Ponds leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but for the reasons set forth below, recommend that this complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This Court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis in cases which seek redress against government officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Thus, in this case we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the court of appeals has observed: "The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the 'plausibility' standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings 'allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing 'more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.' Id. A complaint which pleads facts 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, [ ] 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement of relief." ' " Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1861, 182 L. Ed. 2d 644 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis: "First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Id. at 1950. Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.' Id." Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is recommended that this complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
B. In its Current Form , this Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.
In this case, Ponds' complaint runs afoul of a several legal obstacles. At the outset, the complaint seeks two very different forms of relief—release from custody and damages. This hybrid form of pleading creates a legal ambiguity concerning whether this case is a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a civil rights action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This ambiguity has a legal significance for Ponds since the writ of habeas corpus, one of the protections of individual liberties enshrined in our Constitution, serves a specific and well-defined purpose. The writ of habeas corpus exists to allow those in the custody of the state to challenge in court the fact, duration, and lawfulness of that custody. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted: "The underlying purpose of proceedings under the 'Great Writ' of habeas corpus has traditionally been to 'inquire into the legality of the detention, and the only judicial relief authorized was the discharge of the prisoner or his admission to bail, and that only if his detention were found to be unlawful.' " Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availability and Scope of Review, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1551, 1553 (2001)).
However, there is a necessary corollary to this principle, one which has long been recognized by the courts; namely, "[i]f a . . . prisoner is seeking [other relief], he is attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release-the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In [such cases], habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973). Thus, to the extent that Ponds seeks damages, he may not pursue this relief through a petition for writ of habeas corpus but must file a civil rights lawsuit, and to the extent that he wishes to directly challenge the fact or duration of his detention and obtain release from custody, this relief is not available in a civil rights lawsuit but must be obtained through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, because the filing requirements for habeas corpus and § 1983 civil rights actions differ, and the two types of actions raise different issues in terms of procedural requirements and substantive standards, it would not be appropriate for us to unilaterally construe Ponds' pleading either as a habeas petition, or as a civil rights lawsuit. Instead, it is recommended that this case be dismissed without prejudice to Ponds later filing a separate action that clarifies the jurisdiction and relief which he seeks. See Woodruff v. Williamson, No. 06-2310, 2009 WL 703200, at 6 (M.D. Pa. March 12, 2009) (dismissing habeas petition challenging prison placement without prejudice to filing a separate civil rights action).
Furthermore, to the extent that Ponds is seeking damages from a state agency, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, this pro se complaint runs afoul of basic constitutional and statutory rules limiting lawsuits against state agencies and officials.
First, as a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the . . . States . . . ." U.S. Const. Amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in his or her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and therefore also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies, and state officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Under the Eleventh Amendment, the Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law unless waived by the state, or expressly and unequivocally abrogated by Congress. In this case, it is apparent that Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional immunity with respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against these state agencies and the Commonwealth clearly has not waived its immunity. See Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dept. of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000); Foster v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n., 157 F. App'x 488, 490 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the District Court's finding of immunity for the PHRC and the PDLI was proper, as they were all clearly state agencies). Quite the contrary, the Commonwealth has specifically invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521(b). Thus, while Pennsylvania has, by law, waived sovereign immunity in limited categories of cases brought against the Commonwealth in state court, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522, section 8521(b) flatly states that: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521(b).
These constitutional principles are directly applicable here and are fatal to Ponds' claim for damages against the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. As the Court of Appeals has aptly noted in this regard:
[t]he Eleventh Amendment affords the Board protection from suit in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 n. 4 (3d Cir.1986) (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam)). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its rights under the Eleventh Amendment. See Lavia v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir.2000); 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8521(b). ASpuck v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 563 F. App'x 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2014).
Moreover, beyond these constitutional considerations and as a matter of statutory interpretation, the plaintiff cannot bring a damages action against the Commonwealth since it is also well-settled that a state, a state agency, or a state official acting in an official capacity is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principal federal civil rights statute. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
These basic legal tenets apply here and defeat the plaintiff's damages claims against the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. In sum, as to this state agency, this federal civil rights claim for damages is barred both by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and by cases construing the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, since the state cannot be sued in this fashion in federal court, this claim should be dismissed. Parks v. SCI Camp Hill, No. 1:19-CV-109, 2019 WL 1303203, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-0109, 2019 WL 1298996 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2019).
While this screening merits analysis calls for dismissal of this action in its current form, we recommend that the plaintiff be given another, final opportunity to further litigate this matter by endeavoring to promptly file an amended complaint setting forth well-pleaded claims within the period of the statute of limitations. We recommend this course mindful of the fact that in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend is not necessary in a case such as this where amendment would be futile or result in undue delay, Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies in the pro se complaint, by dismissing this deficient complaint at this time without prejudice to one final effort by the plaintiff to comply with the rules governing civil actions in federal court, by filing an amended complaint containing any timely and proper claims which he may have.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, (Doc 1), but IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 20 days of any dismissal order.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 7th day of January 2020.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge