Opinion
1:03-cv-755-LJM-VSS
November 25, 2003
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Court onDefendants', Muncie Police Department ("Muncie"or"City ofMuncie") and Muncie Police Chief Joseph Winkle ("ChiefWinkle") (collectively "Defendants"), Motion to Dismiss the claims of Plaintiff, Charley A. Pond, IV ("Pond"). Pond's suit arises from injuries sustained incident to his arrest on May 23, 2002, in Muncie, Indiana. In his complaint, Pond includes a § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim and a state law negligence claim against Muncie and Chief Winkle. In addition, Pond advances a § 1983 claim and a series of state law claims against Ball State University, the Ball State University board of trustees, Ball State Police Chief Gene Burton, and Ball State police officers Craig Hudson and Mike Rehfus. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity). In the instant motion, Muncie and Chief Winkle seek dismissal of both claims against them. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the following well-pleaded factual allegations. Pond and another person were in an abandoned building ("Building") located at 518 North Calvert Street, Muncie, Indiana, on the night of May 23, 2002. Comp. ¶ 17. Ball State Officer Mike Rehfus ("Rehfus"), also a defendant in this case, heard the sound of glass breaking, reported over the police radio what he heard, and proceeded to drive to the area where he suspected the glass breaking was originating. Id. ¶ 19. After arriving near the Building, Rehfus heard glass breaking inside the Building and proceeded to the rear of the structure. Id. ¶ 20. Rehfus noticed Pond standing in an open doorway at the rear of the Building and told him to stop. Id. ¶ 21. Pond turned from the open doorway and ran through the Building to the front door, which was also open. Id. ¶ 22. Rehfus followed Pond through the building. Id.
Pond exited the Building through the front door to find Ball State Officer Craig Hodson ("Hodson") (also a defendant in this case) waiting with his police dog, K-9 Boyka. Id. ¶ 23. Hodson ordered Pond to stop. Id. ¶ 25. Pond continued to run whereupon Hodson released K-9 Boyka to chase him. Id. ¶ 26. Hodson himself did not attempt to pursue Pond onfoot. Id. 34. K-9 Boyka, on command from Hodson, took Pond down to the pavement by biting his left arm and dragging him down. Id. ¶ 27. and Rehfus stood by while K-9 Boyka was mauling Pond, causing significant bodily injury that resulted in 16 sutures and dental damage. Id. ¶ 28. Pond pleaded with Hodson and Rehfus to call off K-9 Boyka, but they refiised to assist Pond and allowed the dog to continue to attack after Pond had been subdued. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Eventually, Hodson and Rehfus pulled K-9 Boyka off Pond. Id. ¶ 31.
Pond was arrested and taken by ambulance for medical treatment at the Ball State Memorial Hospital Emergency Room. Id. ¶ 32. Pond was charged with striking a law enforcement animal, criminal mischief, disorderly conduct (two counts), resisting law enforcement (two counts), and public intoxication. Id. ¶ 36. All charges are misdemeanors.
At the time of the incident, the Ball State University Police Department had a policy about the use of K-9 units in subduing suspects. Id. ¶ 37. The policy provided that the use of K-9 units was appropriate in subduing suspects when an officer had probable cause to believe that a suspect had committed or was attempting to commit a felony, or to prevent injury, harm, or potential harm to officers or other persons during the commission of any criminal act. Id.
On January 18, 1996, Muncie Police Chief Winkle sent the following letter to the Ball State University Police Department and board of trustees:
Indiana Code 20-12-3.5 gives the Ball State University Board of Trustees the authority to appoint police officers for the university and confers general police powers on those appointed.
The Act sets out that university police officers shall exercise the powers therein granted upon any real property owned or occupied by Ball State University, including the streets passing through and adjacent thereto, with the provisions that additional jurisdiction may be established by agreement with the Chief of Police of the municipality of the jurisdiction involved.
In order to continue a program of mutual cooperation between the Muncie Police Department and the Ball State University Police Department. I, Joseph R. Winkle, Chief of Police of the City of Muncie, Indiana, agree that the duly appointed police officers of Ball State University may exercise the powers granted in I.C. 20-12-3.5 throughout my area of jurisdiction, the City of Muncie, Indiana.
Def.'s Ex. 1 (the "Agreement") (emphasis added).
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and the inferences reasonably drawn from them. See Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1994). Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint that would entitle it to relief. See Hi-Lite Prods. Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 11 F.3d 1402, 1405 (7th Cir. 1993). This standard means that if any set of facts, even hypothesized facts, could be proven consistent with the complaint, then the complaint must not be dismissed. See Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995).
Further, Plaintiff is "not required to plead the particulars of [his] claim[s]," Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 1994), except in cases alleging fraud or mistake where plaintiffs must plead the circumstances constituting such fraud or mistake with particularity. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); Hammes, 33 F.3d at 778. "Particularity" requires plaintiffs to plead the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud. See Ackerman v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1999); DiLeo v. Ernst Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
Finally, the Court need not ignore facts set out in the complaint that undermine Plaintiffs claims, see Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., 91 F.3d 959, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Ill., 783 F.2d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 1986)), nor is the Court required to accept Plaintiff's legal conclusions. See Reed v. City of Chi., 77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Gray v. Dane County, 854 F.2d 179, 182 (7th Cir. 1988).
III. DISCUSSION A. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER § 1983
For purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that the K-9 Boyka's "mauling" of Pond constitutes a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 123, 112 S.Ct. 1061 (1992) (explaining that courts may assume a constitutional violation has been adequately alleged or proved to focus on the separate issue of whether a municipality can be held liable for the violation). The issue that the Court must decide is whether the City of Muncie can be held liable for such a constitutional violation under § 1983 when the officers involved in the arrest were from the Ball State University Police Department.
Municipalities like Muncie cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the torts of their employees. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). Instead, municipal liability attaches under § 1983 if action pursuant to an official policy or custom of the municipality causes a constitutional tort. See id. at 694. "Furthermore, plaintiffs cannot claim municipal liability unless they can demonstrate that the enforcement of its policy was the `moving force' behind the constitutional violation." Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2247 (1985)). "There must be an affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged." Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823.
Federal courts look to state law to determine if a particular official has final policymaking authority such that the official's actions can be attributed to the municipality itself. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924 (1988). Policymaking authority "may be granted directly by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986).
Muncie asserts that it cannot be held liable for any constitutional violations Pond suffered at the hands of Ball State University police officers. According to Muncie, it did not have the authority to make policy for Ball State's police officers, and consequently, the Ball State officers were not acting pursuant to any Muncie Police Department policies. In addition, Muncie contends that it cannot be held liable for Pond's injuries because the Agreement between the Muncie Police Department and Ball State did not compel or allow the Ball State officers to use excessive force.
Muncie attached the Agreement to its Motion to Dismiss. Generally speaking, a court may not consider matters outside the pleadings in connection with a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1996). However, "documents attached to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiffs complaint and are central to his claim." Wright v. Assoc. Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994). Because Pond refers to the Agreement between the Muncie Police Department and the Ball State Police Department in his complaint and because the Agreement is central to Pond's claims against Muncie and Chief Winkle, the Court will consider it in connection with this Motion to Dismiss.
In response, Pond argues that the Agreement between Muncie and Ball State was invalid. Pond asserts: "Had Defendant Muncie recognized that the letter [the Agreement] was void, supervision of Defendant [Ball State] law enforcement officers would have been required, and Defendants Muncie and Chief Winkle could have avoided the violation of Plaintiff Pond's constitutional rights . . . these Defendants owed the Plaintiff a duty to supervise an outside agency that exercised police powers." PL's Memo in Opposition at 5.
Pond's arguments about how the City of Muncie can be held liable for the actions of Ball State University police officers are difficult to follow and unsupported by relevant legal authority. As stated above, state law dictates whether an official has final policymaking authority for purposes of § 1983. The Indiana legislature granted the Ball State University board of trustees the authority to direct the conduct of and set policy for the Ball State University Police Department:
The Ball State University board of trustees . . . is authorized:
(1) to appoint police officers for the institution for which it is responsible;
(2) to prescribe their duties and direct their conduct;
(3) to prescribe distinctive uniforms for the police of the institution or campus; and
(4) to designate and operate emergency vehicles.
IND. CODE § 20-12-3.5-1. The Ball State University officers who arrested Pond were acting (or should have been acting) pursuant to the rules and policies prescribed by the Ball State board of trustees, not pursuant to the policies of the Muncie Police Department. See Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 716 (7th Cir. 1995) (codirectors of multi-jurisdictional drug task force acted pursuant to rules and regulations of their respective law agencies and did not have policymaking authority within the meaning of Monell and its progeny); Patrick v. Jasper Co., 901 F.2d 561, 569 (7th Cir. 1990) (observing that once prisoner was transferred from the Jasper County Jail to the LaPorte County Jail, he was no longer under control of Jasper County policymakers); Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1987). Because the Muncie Police Department did not have the authority to set policy for the Ball State officers, Pond cannot argue that action pursuant to a Muncie Police Department policy caused the Fourth Amendment violation.
In addition, the jurisdiction extension Agreement between the Muncie Police Department and Ball State did not give Muncie policymaking authority over Ball State's Police Department. Indiana law limits the jurisdiction of university police officers to a university's real property, but allows municipal police chiefs like Chief Winkle to grant them additional jurisdiction. IND. CODE § 20-12-3.5-2. In accordance with § 20-12-3.5-2, Chief Winkle granted the Ball State police officers jurisdiction throughout Muncie. The additional jurisdiction provision is contained in the same chapter of the Indiana Code that grants the board of trustees the ability to appoint and set policy for university police officers, and nothing in the chapter indicates that a grant of additional jurisdiction by the relevant law enforcement agency would divest the board of trustees of policymaking authority over the university officers. The January 1996 letter that Chief Winkle sent to the Ball State Police Department and board of trustees was a lawful extension of Ball State Police Department's jurisdiction pursuant to § 20-12-3.5-2.
IND. CODE § 20-12-3.5-2 provides in relevant part:
(b) Such [university] police officers may exercise the powers granted under this section only upon any real property owned or occupied by their institutions, including the streets passing through and adjacent thereto. Additional jurisdiction may be established by agreement with the chief of police of the municipality or sheriff of the county or the appropriate law enforcement agency where the property is located, dependent upon the jurisdiction involved.
Pond argues that the Agreement between the Muncie Police Department and the Ball State Police Department was invalid because it did not comply with the requirements imposed by Indiana law for interlocal agreements. See IND. CODE § 36-1-7-3, et seq (the "Interlocal Agreement Act"). Pond does not explain why he believes the Agreement is an interlocal agreement or why the validity of the Agreement bears on the § 1983 municipal liability issue. Nor does he cite any case law in support of this argument. The Interlocal Agreement Act (the "Act") governs joint undertakings by the state, political subdivisions, and state agencies. Interlocal agreements entail joint financing, joint boards, and joint provision of services. IND. CODE § 36-1-7-2. Nothing in the Act or cases interpreting the Act suggests that it would apply to the current situation, which was simply an extension of jurisdiction by a police chief to a university police department. See, e.g., In re Jacobi, 715 N.E.2d 873 (Ind. 1999) (involving interlocal agreement between towns and cities for the sharing of governmental and management functions over federal excess property); Town of Plainfield v. Town of Avon, 757 N.E.2d 705 (Ind.App. 2001) (involving a proposed interlocal agreement regarding sewer service between two towns); Kentucky-Indiana Municipal Power Assoc. v. Public Serv. Co., 393 N.E.2d 776 (Ind.App. 1979) (involving joint agreement entered into between municipalities to form a power association). Moreover, the university police statute was clearly drafted to allow for cooperative arrangements like the instant one between Muncie and Ball State, and the statute does not require compliance with the Act. Accordingly, the Court rejects Pond's arguments that the Agreement had to comply with the Interlocal Agreement Act.
Section 1983 liability is limited "to situations in which the official who commits the alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights has authority that is final in the special sense that there is no higher authority." Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2001). The Muncie Police Department did not have any authority to set policy for the Ball State police officers who allegedly violated Pond's constitutional rights. The Agreement between Chief Winkle and the Ball State Police Department was a valid agreement that gave the Ball State police additionaljurisdictionthroughout Muncie, and the Agreement did not confer any policymaking authority on Muncie over Ball State's officers. Accordingly, the City of Muncie cannot be held liable under § 1983 even if Ball State officers violated Pond's constitutional rights. The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the claims against Muncie.
B. INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF CHIEF WINKLE FOR § 1983 CLAIM
Muncie correctly contends that any claim against Chief Winkle in his official capacity is redundant of the claim against Muncie, which already has been dismissed. See, e.g., Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1986). Muncie also argues that Chief Winkle cannot be individually liable for any constitutional deprivation resulting from Pond's arrest because he was not personally involved. In response, Pond asserts that Chief Winkle should have supervised Ball State's law enforcement officers, and that his deliberate indifference to his supervisory responsibilities suffices to hold him responsible individually.
Personal involvement is a requirement for individual liability for § 1983 claims. See Rascon, 803 F.2d at 273. The complaint alleges that Ball State officers Hodson and Rehrus were personally involved in the May 23, 2002, arrest where Pond's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The complaint fails to allege that Chief Winkle had any involvement at all in the arrest. The only link that Chief Winkle has to this case is that he entered into the jurisdiction extension Agreement with the Ball State Police Department. As explained above, this was a lawful grant of additional jurisdiction to university police. Chief Winkle cannot be held individually liable in this case because he was not personally involved in any constitutional tort. See Palmer, 327 F.3d at 594 ("§ 1983 lawsuits against individuals require personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation to support a viable claim."). Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the individual liability claim against Chief Winkle.
C. STATE LAW CLAIM AGAINST WINKLE AND MUNCIE
The only state law claim against Chief Winkle and Muncie is a negligence claim. Comp. ¶¶ 73-77. The negligence claim revolves around the jurisdiction extension Agreement between the Muncie Police Department and Ball State. Pond alleges, in relevant part:
75. Such agreements negligently did not include provisions regarding proper use of Ball State police dogs in the apprehension of suspects . . .
77. Defendant Police Chief Winkle, in his individual capacity, was the individual responsible for the approval of such agreements that led up to the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff, and was negligent in the adoption, approval, and supervision of such agreements.
Id.
Muncie argues that Chief Winkle is immune from this tort claim under Indiana law because he was acting within the scope of his employment. Muncie asserts that the City of Muncie is immune from liability under two of the specific immunity provisions: the law enforcement immunity provision and the acts of non-public employees provision. IND. CODE § 34-13-3(8) and (10). In addition, Muncie contends that the city did not owe Pond a duty to supervise Ball State police officers. In response, Pond repeats his arguments about the invalidity of the Agreement between the Muncie Police Department and Ball State.
1. Negligence Claim Against Winkle
The Indiana Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") governs suits against political subdivisions like the city of Muncie and its employees. See Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind. 2000). Under the ITCA, plaintiffs may not sue a government employee personally in tort if the acts leading to the claim occurred within the scope of the government worker's employment. IND. CODE § 34-13-3-5(b). This immunity "allows government employees acting in the scope of their employment the freedom to carry out their duties without the fear of litigation." Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003).
Indiana courts look to the Restatement of Agency for guidance when considering scope of employment issues. See Celebration, 121 N.E.2d at 453. The Restatement provides, "To be within the scope of employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized." Restatement (Second) Agency § 229 (1958).
As the Chief of Police for Muncie, Chief Winkle is a government employee. IND. CODE §§ 34-6-2-38; 34-6-2-110 (employees of political subdivisions, such as cities, towns, and municipalities are public employees for purposes of ITCA). As noted above, the only link that Chief Winkle has to this case is that he entered into the jurisdiction extension Agreement with the Ball State Police Department. The Court has little trouble concluding that this conduct falls within the scope of Chief Winkle's employment because he was explicitly authorized to do so by the Indiana legislature. IND. CODE § 20-12-3.5-2. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Chief Winkle is immune from suit under Indiana law, and GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the negligence claim against Chief Winkle.
2. Negligence Claim Against Muncie
The City of Muncie is also immune from Pond's negligence claim. The ITCA explicitly immunizes a wide range of governmental activities from tort liability. IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3 (immunizing both governmental entities and governmental employees from liability where the loss results from any of the listed activities). Relevant to Pond's claim against Muncie, governmental entities are not liable if a loss results from the "failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment." IND. CODE § 34-13-3-3(8) (the law enforcement immunity provision). Pond alleges that the City of Muncie negligently failed to adopt rules regarding proper use of Ball State police dogs in the apprehension of suspects. Assuming for the sake of Pond's argument that Muncie had authority to adopt such rules for Ball State's police, the negligent failure to adopt allegation falls squarely within the contours of the law enforcement immunity provision. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the city of Muncie is immune from Pond's negligence count. The Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the extent it requests dismissal of the negligence claim against Muncie.
Summary
Because Muncie did not have policymaking authority over Ball State police officers within the meaning of Monell and its progeny, it cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the alleged constitutional tort. Chief Winkle cannot be held individually liable under § 1983 because he was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Chief Winkle is immune from Pond's negligence claim because his allegedly negligent behavior occurred within the scope of his employment. Finally, Muncie is immune from the negligence claim against it under Indiana's law enforcement immunity provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in its entirety. The claims against the defendants affiliated with Ball State remain pending before the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.