Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. TC023171, William Barry, Judge.
Edward N. Morris for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Hanger, Steinberg, Shapiro & Ash, Marc S. Shapiro and Christopher G. Kerr, for Defendants and Respondents.
TURNER, P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, Melissa Ponce (Ms. Ponce) and her minor children, appeal from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend defendants’ demurrer to their second amended complaint. The second amended complaint alleges the negligent failure of the owners to make repairs and rid the rented premises of vermin, insects, and rodents resulted in physical injuries to plaintiffs. The trial court ruled the negligence claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata arising from a previous unlawful detainer action. We reverse the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
On August 12, 2008, defendants, John Holmberg and Kurt Demeire, brought an unlawful detainer action against Ms. Ponce for failure to pay rent for the month of August 2008. Defendants in the current action are Mr. Holmberg, Cynthia Holmberg, Mr. Demeire, and Sandra Demeire, the owners of the apartment where plaintiffs had resided. In response to the unlawful detainer action, Ms. Ponce, in pro per, asserted the affirmative defense of breach of the habitability warranty. Ms. Ponce listed the following supporting facts to the affirmative defense, “Rats, roaches, spiders, fleas, filthy carpet, peeling paint, holes in walls.” On September 9, 2008, final judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Holmberg and Mr. Demeire in the unlawful detainer action.
On June 10, 2009, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging negligence, warranty of habitability breach, and intentional emotional distress infliction. On August 25, 2009, defendants demurred to all counts and requested judicial notice of the previous unlawful detainer judgment. On September 11, 2009, before a hearing on defendants’ demurrers, plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint alleging, negligence, warranty of habitability breach, and intentional emotional distress infliction. Defendants again demurred on all counts. On November 3, 2009, the trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend the habitability warranty breach and intentional emotional distress claims. The demurrer as to the negligence claim was sustained with leave to amend.
On November 19, 2009, plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint alleging only negligence. The second amended complaint is the operative complaint for purposes of this appeal. The second amended complaint alleges: plaintiff had a rental agreement with the defendants; on or before June 2008, the rented premises “became infested with roaches, rodents, toxic mold, and otherwise fell into disrepair;” plaintiffs did not cause the infestation or condition of disrepair; plaintiffs notified defendants of the condition of the apartment; defendants failed to make repairs and take measures to rid the premises of the pest infestation; plaintiffs suffered physical injuries including roach and rodent bites; and defendants breached their duty to provide residential premises free of infestation and disrepair.
On December 15, 2009, defendants demurred to the second amended complaint. On February 3, 2010, the general demurrer was sustained without leave to amend on res judicata grounds. On February 12, 2010, a judgment of dismissal was entered. On April 1, 2010, plaintiffs received notice of entry of the final judgment. On April 15, 2010, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Our Supreme Court has held, ‘“Our only task in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer is to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action.’” (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 300; Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) We assume the truth of allegations in the second amended complaint which have been properly pleaded and give them a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and with all its parts in their context. (Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 558; People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 300.) However, the assumption of truth does not apply to contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law and fact. (Id. at pp. 300-301; Moore v. Regents of University of California, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 125.) Additionally, we consider all matters which properly may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Serrano v. Priest (1971)5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) We first review the second amended complaint de novo to determine whether plaintiffs’ allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879; see Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
B. Limited Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Effect of the Unlawful Detainer Judgment
The principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are to prevent vexatious litigation and to require litigants to rest upon decisions in a controversy between them. (Holman v. Holman (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 445, 451; Miller & Lux, Inc. v. James (1919) 180 Cal. 38, 44; People ex rel. Mosk v. Barenfeld (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 166, 176.) Our Supreme Court has held: “Collateral estoppel is one of two aspects of the doctrine of res judicata. In its narrowest form, res judicata “‘precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action [finally resolved in a prior proceeding].’” [Citations.] But res judicata also includes a broader principle, commonly termed collateral estoppel, under which an issue “‘necessarily decided in [prior] litigation [may be] conclusively determined as [against] the parties [thereto] or their privies... in a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of action.’” [Citation.]” (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828; see California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 249, fn. 5.)
Unlawful detainer actions are summary in nature and ordinarily only address the issue of immediate possession of property. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255; Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 632-634; Knowles v. Robinson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 620, 625.) Cross-complaints, counter-claims, and affirmative defenses are not permitted, unless success on the claim would preclude removal of the tenant. (Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 255; Green v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 634, fn. 19; Vasey v. California Dance Co., Inc. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 746-747; Union Oil Co. v. Chandler (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 721-722.)
Given the summary nature of a detainer action, our Supreme Court has held: “[A] judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action... to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the parties. [Citations.]” (Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 255; see Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371; Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1557.) Later in Vella, our Supreme Court held, “In return for speedy determination of his right to possession [in an unlawful detainer action], [the owner] sacrifices the comprehensive finality that characterizes judgments in nonsummary [actions].” (Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 258.)
Here, plaintiffs were unable to litigate issues and recover damages for personal injury in the unlawful detainer action. The only recovery available to Ms. Ponce if she had prevailed on her affirmative defense in the unlawful detainer action would have been abatement of rent; she would not have been entitled to monetary damages. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174.2, subd. (a) ; Underwood v. Corsino (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 132, 136.) Since the summary nature of the unlawful detainer proceeding precluded Ms. Ponce from asserting any claims that do not relate to possession of the premises, she and her children may bring a subsequent action to recover for personal injuries arising from defendants’ negligence. Res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action because Ms. Ponce did not have an opportunity to litigate the negligence issue in the unlawful detainer action.
All further statutory references are to the California Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
Additionally, the affirmative defense of warranty of habitability breach applicable to unlawful detainer actions is substantively different than a tort action for personal injuries arising from an owner’s negligence. In order to prevail on such an affirmative defense in an unlawful detainer action, the tenant must show the owner substantially breached the warranty of habitability. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174.2, subd. (a); Hyatt v. Tedesco (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th Supp. 62, 67.) “Substantial breach” is defined as the owner’s failure to comply with applicable building and housing code standards that materially affect health and safety. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1174.2, subd. (c); see Hyatt v. Tedesco, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th Supp. at p. 67.) Here, Mr. Holmberg and Mr. Demeire prevailed in the prior unlawful detainer action, thus obtaining a judgment that no “substantial breach” of the warranty of habitability existed at that time. But, the prior September 9, 2008 judgment does not preclude plaintiffs from bringing a claim against the defendants for damages occurring in a different time period from which the unlawful detainer occurred. (Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1174; see Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968, 976.) Further, an owner can be negligent in maintaining rental property without substantially breaching the habitability warranty. Thus, the negligence claim is not barred by the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of the prior September 8, 2008 unlawful detainer judgment.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Plaintiff, Melissa Ponce, individually and as the guardian ad litem of Marcelino, Ruben and Dalia Ponce, are to recover their costs on appeal from defendants, John and Cynthia Holmberg and Kurt and Sandra Demeire.
We concur: MOSK, J., KRIEGLER, J.