Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 13-0190
02-06-2014
DOUGLAS LEE POMEROY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. NEW ARIZONA FAMILY, INC.; PEOPLE OF COLOR NETWORK; MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVICES, Defendants/Appellees.
Douglas Lee Pomeroy, Phoenix Plaintiff/Appellant in Propria Persona The Doyle Firm, P.C., Phoenix By William H. Doyle, J. Randall Jue Counsel for New Arizona Family, Inc. Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C., Phoenix By William G. Fairbourn Counsel for People of Color Network Campbell, Yost, Claire & Norell, P.C., Phoenix By Mary G. Isban Counsel for Magellan Health Services of Arizona, Inc.
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
CV 2011-052869
The Honorable Alfred M. Fenzel, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Douglas Lee Pomeroy, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant in Propria Persona
The Doyle Firm, P.C., Phoenix
By William H. Doyle, J. Randall Jue
Counsel for New Arizona Family, Inc.
Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C., Phoenix
By William G. Fairbourn
Counsel for People of Color Network Campbell, Yost, Claire & Norell, P.C., Phoenix
By Mary G. Isban
Counsel for Magellan Health Services of Arizona, Inc.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Randall M. Howe joined. GEMMILL, Judge:
¶1 Douglas Lee Pomeroy appeals from a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants New Arizona Family, Inc. ("New Arizona"), People of Color Network ("POC Network"), and Magellan Health Services ("Magellan") (collectively "the Defendants"). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Pomeroy filed a complaint against the Defendants seeking compensatory and punitive damages for "lying," "almost killing [him]," and "falsifying information," and also alleging that New Arizona was practicing medicine without a license. An amended complaint clarified that Pomeroy's complaint was asserting a "medical malpractice" claim. The amended complaint noted that these allegations stemmed from circumstances related to treatment received by Pomeroy and various other events, including an alleged eviction from a treatment facility. After answering, New Arizona filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Pomeroy had failed to indicate New Arizona's duty, the applicable standard of care, and the elements of proof required to bring a medical malpractice claim. POC Network and Magellan joined New Arizona's motion soon after it was filed.
¶3 Pomeroy responded to the motion by quoting Arizona Revised Statute ("A.R.S.") § 12-563 in its entirety and reiterating that the Defendants were liable for damages because of multiple "false statements" and "lying." The trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings in a signed minute entry. Pomeroy timely appeals, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
ANALYSIS
¶4 Pomeroy argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. "A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to [Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)] tests the sufficiency of the complaint, and judgment should be entered for the defendant if the complaint fails to state a claim for relief." Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 195 Ariz. 358, 359, ¶ 2, 988 P.2d 143, 144 (App. 1999). We view the complaint's well-pled factual allegations as true and review de novo the trial court's legal rulings. Mobile Cmty. Council for Progress, Inc. v. Brock, 211 Ariz. 196, 198, ¶ 5, 119 P.3d 463, 465 (App. 2005).
¶5 Medical malpractice claims in Arizona are brought pursuant to Title 12, Chapter 5.1 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. The scope of medical malpractice claims is defined in A.R.S. § 12-561(2), which provides in relevant part:
"Medical malpractice action" or "cause of action for medical malpractice" means an action for injury or death against a licensed health care provider based upon such provider's alleged negligence, misconduct, errors or omissions, or breach of contract in the rendering of health care, medical services, nursing services or other health-related services or for the rendering of such health care, medical services, nursing services or other health-related services, without express or implied consent including an action based upon the alleged negligence, misconduct, errors or omissions or breach of contract in collecting, processing or distributing whole human blood, blood components, plasma, blood fractions or blood derivatives.
¶6 The allegations in Pomeroy's complaint are outside the scope of medical malpractice as defined in § 12-561(2). Pomeroy also does not identify, as is required by A.R.S. § 12-563, the appropriate standard of care that the Defendants were under a duty to provide him, how Defendants failed to discharge that standard, and how his alleged damages are causally related to the breach of duty. See Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85, 94, ¶ 32, 203 P.3d 483, 492 (2009) (noting that "[i]n medical malpractice actions, as in all negligence actions, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages."); Smethers v. Campion, 210 Ariz. 167, 170, ¶ 12, 108 P.3d 946, 949 (App. 2005) (observing that "a plaintiff must allege" all three elements in medical malpractice actions). Pomeroy's recitation of § 12-563 is not sufficient to fulfill the statute's pleading requirements, and his references to the Defendants' supposed "cover up" and "lies" fail to sufficiently articulate how the defendants breached any duty owed to him under that statute. Therefore, Pomeroy's complaint does not adequately plead a medical malpractice claim, meaning the complaint failed to state a claim for relief and judgment on the pleadings was proper. See Neiderhiser v. Henry's Drive-In, Inc., 96 Ariz. 305, 308, 394 P.2d 420, 422 (1964) (holding that the superior court "was compelled to look only to the allegations of the complaint and appellee was entitled to a judgment on the pleadings only if the complaint failed to state a claim for relief.").
To the extent that Pomeroy presents additional claims that are separate from his medical malpractice claim, he has failed to develop and support such claims with appropriate record citations and legal authorities. Therefore, any such claims are waived. Sholes v. Fernando, 228 Ariz. 455, 461, ¶ 16, 268 P.3d 1112, 1118 (App. 2011).
¶7 Pomeroy raises several other arguments regarding the hearing in which the trial court granted the Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Some of these arguments are raised for the first time on appeal, and we decline to address them. See Cullum v. Cullum, 215 Ariz. 352, 355 n. 5, ¶ 14, 160 P.3d 231, 234 n. 5 (App. 2007). Furthermore, we cannot address Pomeroy's argument that the trial court considered improper evidence at the hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the hearing. Pomeroy's assertion that he "is doing everything possible" to place a transcript in the record does not relieve him from the terms of ARCAP 11(b)(1), which requires the appellant to ensure that all documents necessary to consider the issues raised on appeal are included in the record. See also Blair v. Burgener, 226 Ariz. 213, 217, ¶ 9, 245 P.3d 898, 902 (App. 2010). In any event, there is nothing to suggest that the trial court considered evidence outside the pleadings in addressing the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings in favor the Defendants.
CONCLUSION
¶8 For the preceding reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.