Opinion
C/A No. 3:19-2992-MGL-PJG
11-26-2019
Parrish Rayquan Pollard, Plaintiff, v. James C. Campbell; Bryan Keith Griffin, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The plaintiff, Parrish Rayquan Pollard, a self-represented state pretrial detainee, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915; § 1915A. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiff is currently detained on state criminal charges in the Sumter Lee Regional Detention Center. He claims that in February 2019, the defendants—a state magistrate (Defendant Bryan Keith Griffin) and clerk of court (Defendant James C. Campbell)—ignored errors in an arrest warrant affidavit, leading to his unlawful arrest. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5.) For instance, Plaintiff claims the warrant merely recited the statutory elements of the crime, which he argues was not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. (Id.at 6.) Plaintiff raises claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment, seeking damages and to have the arrest warrant quashed. (Id. at 4, 8.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2009). Section 1915A requires, and § 1915 allows, a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
B. Analysis
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
However, the defendants are immune from Plaintiff's claims for damages. It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (providing that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment of damages, for judicial actions taken within their jurisdiction); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions."); see also Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding state magistrates are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for act performed in their judicial capacity). Judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith, nor will a judge "be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Griffin, a state magistrate, violated Plaintiff's rights by signing a warrant that was not supported by probable cause. But such an action is a judicial function for which judges are entitled to immunity from suit. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1993) (stating that the "touchstone" for the applicability of judicial immunity is the "performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights") (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 486, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Griffin should be dismissed.
Similarly, Defendant Campbell, a clerk of court, is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Judicial immunity has been extended to non-judicial officers, such as clerks of court, "where their duties had an integral relationship with the judicial process." Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Eades v. Sterlinske, 810 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also Mayes v. Wheaton, No. 97 C 8072, 1999 WL 1000510, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1999) ("Judicial immunity extends to all persons performing judicial and quasi-judicial functions, as well as those acting under the orders, or at the discretion, of a judicial officer.") (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988)). Here, Plaintiff alleges Campbell issued the warrant that lacked probable cause. Such an action is a judicial act that entitled Campbell to immunity from suit. See Boyer v. Cty. of Washington, 971 F.2d 100, 102 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that a court clerk that signed and issued an arrest warrant was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, whether or not the judge instructed the clerk to do so, because the issuance of a warrant is a judicial act).
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to quash the state criminal indictment, the court should abstain from equitably interfering in an ongoing state criminal prosecution. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. See Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (citation omitted). From Younger and its progeny, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
The first part of the test is satisfied in this case because Petitioner indicated he is currently detained on state criminal charges. The second part of the test is met because the Supreme Court has noted that "the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975). Because Petitioner can pursue his claims in his pending state criminal matter in state court, he is precluded from seeking federal habeas relief at this time. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Thus, Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which injunctive relief can be granted.
Consequently, this matter should be summarily dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii) and § 1915A(b)(2) because the defendants are immune from suit and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which injunctive relief can be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 400-01 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Courts, including this one, have held that when a complaint is incurable through amendment, dismissal is properly rendered with prejudice and without leave to amend.").
/s/_________
Paige J. Gossett
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE November 26, 2019
Columbia, South Carolina
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).