Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:07-CV-0216-ODE, PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
February 27, 2007
ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Telfair State Prison in Helena, Georgia, has submitted the instant pro se civil rights action. For the purpose of dismissal only, leave to proceed in forma pauperis is hereby GRANTED. The matter is now before the Court for a 28 U.S.C. § 1915A frivolity determination.
I. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A Frivolity Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of a prisoner complaint seeking redress from a governmental entity, or an officer or employee thereof, to determine whether the action (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A claim is frivolous when it "has little or no chance of success," i.e., when it appears "from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are clearly baseless or that the legal theories are indisputably meritless."Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). A complaint fails to state a claim when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989). "[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts[,] or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Oxford Asset Mgmt. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 2002) (reviewing the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim).
Moreover, a prisoner complaint may be dismissed as frivolous if it appears "beyond a doubt from the complaint itself" that the prisoner "can prove no set of facts [to] avoid a statute of limitations bar." Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a claim as time-barred when there was no indication in the record that the limitations period should be tolled — during, for example, the pursuit of administrative remedies). See also Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[w]here it is clear from the face of a complaint filed in forma pauperis that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, those claims are properly dismissed pursuant to § 1915") (internal quotations omitted) (affirming the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissal of a time-barred 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint as frivolous).
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant's act or omission under color of state law deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a plaintiff fails to satisfy these requirements or to provide factual allegations supporting a viable cause of action, the claim is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a § 1983 complaint because plaintiffs' factual allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation).
II. Plaintiffs allegations
In this complaint, filed on January 24, 2007, Plaintiff sets forth the following allegations against the members of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (the Board). On February 27, 1985, Plaintiff was sentenced for rape, kidnaping, armed robbery, and aggravated sodomy to three consecutive twenty-year sentences, with an additional twenty-year sentence to run concurrently. On July 5, 1985, using the Parole Decision Guidelines, the Board set Plaintiff's tentative parole month (TPM) as July 1992. Thereafter, the Board departed from the guidelines and reset his TPM as July 1994; departed from the guidelines again in July 1994, set his TPM as July 2016, and scheduled reconsideration for July 2000; departed from the guidelines again on November 14, 2000, and scheduled reconsideration for July 2003; departed again on October 9, 2003, setting his TPM as July 2023; and departed again on August 14, 2006, setting his TPM as July 2024 and scheduling reconsideration for August 2009. [Doc. 1 ¶ IV.]
Plaintiff also claims that "white inmates" with the same crimes and criminal history as himself have been paroled under the Parole Decision Guidelines, and that he has been the victim of "invidious and racial discrimination . . . when most of the reconsideration rules [are] ex post facto and do not apply" to him. [Id.] Plaintiff seeks $650,000 in damages for mental anguish and distress, ten million dollars in punitive damages, and any other relief the Court deems proper. [Id. ¶ V.]
III. Discussion
"The statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim arising out of events occurring in Georgia is two years." Thigpen v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231, 1243 (11th Cir. 2000). A § 1983 claim accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when "the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights." Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987). See Ashcroft v. Randel, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1219 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (Story, J.) (noting that the federal "discovery rule" governing the accrual of a § 1983 action provides that "a claim accrues when the injured party knew or should have known both (1) that he has suffered the injury that forms the basis of his complaint and (2) who inflicted that injury").
It is apparent from the face of Plaintiff's complaint that he was aware by July 1994, or soon thereafter, that the Board had not adopted the TPM recommendation from the Parole Decision Guidelines in effect at the time of his offenses of conviction, but instead had departed upward significantly from that recommendation. Therefore, the facts supporting Plaintiff's claims against the Board members, namely, his alleged injury and who caused it, should have been apparent to him no later than July 1994, more than twelve years before he filed the instant action.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims regarding the deferral of his TPM in 1994, and thereafter, are time-barred. Indeed, every Board decision of which Plaintiff complains occurred more than two years before he signed and submitted the instant lawsuit in January 2007, except for the latest Board decision on August 14, 2006. However, because that decision was merely the latest in a long series of similar ones, Plaintiff's claim is time-barred with respect to it as well. See Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1260-62 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiffs § 1983 action, filed in February 2002 and claiming that the Board's April 2001 decision violated his ex post facto rights, was time-barred because the Board had informed him in 1995 of the facts supporting his ex post facto claims; and rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the April 2001 decision "to delay his parole reconsideration until 2007 was either: (1) a continuing violation of his constitutional rights against Ex Post Facto laws; or (2) a separate and distinct injury from the original decision in 1995 to make the new Georgia Parole Board policy retroactive").
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).