Opinion
23-0426
03-06-2024
GAYLE POHL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
Joshua M. Moon of Daniels, Hines, Kalkoff, Cook &Swanson, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, David Faith (until withdrawal) and Tessa M. Register, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.
A professor appeals from judicial review affirming discipline following findings of research misconduct. AFFIRMED.
Joshua M. Moon of Daniels, Hines, Kalkoff, Cook &Swanson, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, David Faith (until withdrawal) and Tessa M. Register, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Heard by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ. Langholz, J., takes no part.
BULLER, Judge.
Gayle Pohl appeals from judicial review following discipline imposed based on findings of research misconduct in her academic work conducted at the University of Northern Iowa (UNI). She makes a variety of claims, including some grounded in university policy and federal regulations, allegations of improper motive or bias, a challenge to substantial evidence, and a catch-all challenge to UNI's reasoning and decision-making. Pohl's primary claim is the specific types of research misconduct she committed are not covered by existing UNI policy. After giving appropriate deference to UNI's expertise in matters of academic research misconduct, we affirm the district court's judicial-review ruling.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Pohl is a tenured professor in the communication and media department at UNI. In December 2017, the former chair of the department filed a complaint about Pohl's written work with UNI's research integrity officer (RIO). The complaint alleged plagiarism or research misconduct in a book chapter Pohl published in 2017 and an article she published in 2013. The alleged misconduct was discovered when Pohl sought a merit-based pay increase and submitted the book chapter to the department chair as proof of her accomplishments. According to the complaint, Pohl engaged in "patchwork paraphrasing" (sometimes called "patchwork plagiarism") by using verbatim language from another author interspersed with her own words, without quotation marks or other adequate citation to the other author. The complaint also relayed a history of other research misconduct by Pohl, alleging a total of eight scholarly works "that contain substantial plagiarized material" and recounting a past disciplinary process that found Pohl engaged in a pattern of plagiarism and imposed sanctions.
UNI has a university-wide "policy on research misconduct" that applies to all departments. See 13.13 Policy on Research Misconduct, University of Northern Iowa: University Policies (Dec. 2009) (hereinafter "Policy 13.13"). The purpose of the policy is to "provide guidance in addressing alleged research misconduct by faculty, staff, and students affiliated with the University of Northern Iowa." Id. The policy prohibits research misconduct and provides,
3. Research misconduct means the fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting research. It does not include honest error or honest differences in interpretations or judgments of data. Research misconduct is an intentional or knowing act of deception or a flagrant disregard of commonly accepted research or ethical practices. The kinds of research misconduct listed below are the most common, but are not necessarily exhaustive.
1. Fabrication
Fabrication is making up a data or results and/or recording or reporting them.
2. Falsification
Falsification is manipulating research materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately represented in the research record.
3. Plagiarism
Plagiarism is intentionally or knowingly representing the works of another as one's own. Plagiarism includes both the theft or misappropriation of intellectual property and the substantial unattributed textual copying of another's work. The theft or misappropriation of intellectual property includes the unauthorized use of ideas or unique methods obtained by a privileged communication, such as a grant, manuscript review or intellectual property disclosure. Substantial unattributed textual copying of another's work means the unattributed verbatim or nearly verbatim copying of sentences and paragraphs, which materially mislead an ordinary reader regarding the contributions of the author.Id. Policy 13.13 also includes a procedural framework providing for an inquiry committee, an investigative committee, and a final decision by the provost with appeal to the university president through arbitration. The policy assigns administrative and investigative functions to the RIO. Id. UNI has specific written "procedures for responding to allegations of research misconduct" (some of which merely re-state Policy 13.13 or are appendices) to guide the specifics of the process.
Following those written procedures, the RIO determined there was sufficient information in the complaint to move forward with an inquiry into Pohl's written work. The provost subsequently authorized the RIO to assemble an inquiry committee, and UNI informed Pohl it had opened an inquiry into her alleged research misconduct. The RIO told Pohl the inquiry concerned both her 2013 article and 2017 book chapter. Pohl was also informed the inquiry would proceed under the relevant UNI policy and procedures.
Consistent with these policies and procedures, the inquiry committee met multiple times and examined documents concerning Pohl's 2013 article and 2017 book chapter. The RIO provided the inquiry committee with the former department chair's complaint but did not include any information about Pohl's prior discipline or history of alleged misconduct falling outside the policy's six-year limitations period. The inquiry committee concluded there was sufficient evidence of possible research misconduct to warrant a more formal investigation. Pohl received and, with help from the faculty-union president, responded to a draft version of the inquiry committee's report.
As relates to the 2013 article, Pohl objected to the report because she claimed she authored the source material the inquiry committee believed she plagiarized-in other words she "borrowed from herself." Pohl made more general objections to the report's conclusions about the 2017 book chapter. She also "declined to respond to" specific questions propounded by the inquiry committee. Based on this information, the inquiry committee voted again and was no longer unanimous: three out of five members voted to further investigate the 2013 article and four out of five members voted to further investigate the 2017 book chapter. The inquiry committee provided its final report to the provost in May 2018, recommending further investigation of both the article and book chapter.
Again consistent with UNI policies and procedures, the provost reviewed the report, found it supported further investigation, and directed the RIO to convene an investigation committee. Pohl was again informed of this development.
The RIO, at the provost's direction, assembled an investigation committee. This group met seventeen times, usually with the RIO in attendance. The investigation committee interviewed Pohl, the former department chair who made the complaint, and two additional relevant faculty witnesses identified by Pohl. The investigation committee also reviewed the complaint, the 2013 and 2017 publications in manuscript and final form, and a variety of other materials- including those submitted by Pohl.
At first, the RIO did not disclose to the investigation committee that Pohl was previously found to have committed plagiarism in 2013 for works published in 2008 and 2011. But a witness eventually disclosed that fact during the investigation committee's interviews. The investigation committee then directed the RIO to provide them with the file concerning those prior allegations, and the RIO did so. Among other things, the 2013 investigation documents described "clear evidence of a pattern" in Pohl's research misconduct and noted she engaged in a "serious and significant departure from standard academic practice." Some of the specific misconduct findings included that more than 80% of the text in Pohl's 2011 article had been copied directly from other sources without proper attribution, and the 2008 article contained verbatim text without attribution "in an amount that would exceed . . . honest error." Some of the specific sanctions included requiring Pohl to attend training on research misconduct and a warning against committing future instances of research misconduct or plagiarism. After receiving the documents about Pohl's prior misconduct, the investigation committee "was instructed not to consider information relating to this prior investigation in determining whether or not Dr. Pohl engaged in research misconduct with respect to her 2013 or 2017 publications." The committee was advised it could only "consider the prior research misconduct finding and sanctions in recommending possible sanctions in this case."
Consistent with UNI policies and procedures, Pohl received a draft copy of the investigation committee's report, and she exercised her right to comment on it. The investigation committee issued its final report in January 2019, noting its investigation addressed research misconduct covered by Policy 13.13, including but not limited to "plagiarism." The investigation committee ultimately found Pohl did not commit research misconduct violating Policy 13.13 with "self-plagiarism" in her 2013 article but did engage in "several" instances of research misconduct in her 2017 book chapter. Consistent with the university's policy and procedures, the investigation committee's findings were made by a preponderance of the evidence. The report also observed that, if a student engaged in the conduct Pohl had, the student would be disciplined for violating the UNI plagiarism policy.
The investigation committee's findings on the 2017 book chapter specifically identified instances where Pohl: mixed verbatim quotes and close paraphrases without adequate attribution; failed to use quotation marks when using verbatim text from other publications; incorrectly attributed quoted material to the wrong author; failed to cite authors at appropriate locations in the text; used "nearly verbatim text" from secondary sources without adequate attribution; and relayed contents of original sources that appeared to match secondary sources.
The investigation committee considered and rejected the possibility that problems with the 2017 book chapter were honest errors:
Of concern to the [investigation] committee, it is not that there are one or two errors in the publication. Rather, there is a high frequency and overall pattern of instances described above that we conclude constitute a serious deviation from commonly accepted research practices (e.g. sources being accurately cited, direct quotes having appropriate punctuation signifying they are quotes, quotations in the publication actually matching the original source). Thus, the [investigation] committee believes there are too many errors in the 2017 publication to be attributed to honest error according to Policy 13.13. These occurrences also deviate from commonly accepted practices in the field of public relations (see Appendix B.). We find that Dr. Pohl acted in flagrant disregard of commonly accepted research or ethical practices in her 2017 publication.
The investigation committee also considered Pohl's assertion that standards for trade-publication public-relations articles were different than standards required by scholarship in all other academic fields. The investigation committee found "no evidence" to support this claim, instead finding the public relations professionals' code of ethics required citation to sources and that Pohl may have breached these ethical rules. And the investigation committee noted Pohl listed the book chapter at issue on her faculty activity report under "research, scholarly, and creative activities" and as "scholarship and creative activity" in her application for a meritpay increase, which suggests she considered it scholarship or other academic writing.
The investigation committee recommended seven sanctions against Pohl, all with a duration of "perhaps three years." The recommended sanctions would have required Pohl to find a mentor who would work with the department chair to review her future publications for potential plagiarism or research misconduct; prohibited her from supervising graduate-student research or scholarship; discouraged her from working with non-tenured faculty on research or scholarship; prohibited her consideration for promotion to full professor; rendered her ineligible for UNI research awards; stopped her from serving on an editorial board or in any other scholarly leadership position; and required her to complete additional training in research ethics. The investigation committee also discussed recommending Policy 13.13 be revised to clarify that "plagiarism" should include some of the conduct the committee found was "research misconduct."
The provost accepted the investigation committee's report and agreed the findings proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Pohl committed research misconduct in violation of Policy 13.13 with her 2017 book chapter. The provost informed Pohl there appeared to be a basis for discipline and invited her to respond and provide mitigating evidence before any sanctions were imposed. After meeting with Pohl and hearing her mitigating evidence, the provost imposed five sanctions for a term of five academic years, prohibiting Pohl from: (1) teaching or supervising graduate students; (2) working with non-tenured faculty on research projects; (3) applying for promotion to full professor; (4) receiving any UNI research award; and (5) serving on any UNI or external scholarship committee. The provost also conveyed he was disappointed Pohl did not accept responsibility for the misconduct and instead blamed her editors.
Pohl appealed to the provost and UNI's executive vice president for academic affairs in May 2019, raising claims generally similar to those in this appeal. The provost denied the appeal but stayed the sanctions pending further appeals by Pohl.
Pohl requested arbitration. After a contested evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator ruled in September 2021 that Pohl failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that UNI had not followed its procedures or that discipline was imposed on an inappropriate or lacking basis. The arbitrator's forty-one-page ruling recommended to UNI's president that the appeal be denied. In December, the president accepted the arbitrator's recommendation in full and informed Pohl he planned to impose the sanctions upon completion of the appeal process.
Pohl sought a discretionary appeal before the Iowa Board of Regents. In January 2022, the board's executive director informed Pohl he exercised his discretion to not present her appeal to the full board and UNI's acceptance of the arbitrator's ruling would be final agency action. UNI imposed the sanctions in midJanuary 2022.
Pohl petitioned for judicial review that February. She alleged UNI acted unconstitutionally or in violation of its rules. The district court denied the petition for judicial review. Pohl appealed to the supreme court, which transferred the matter to our court for resolution.
II. Standard of Review
Judicial review of agency action is governed by Iowa Code chapter 17A (2021), applying the standards found in Iowa Code section 17A.19(10). "The petitioner challenging agency action has the burden of demonstrating the prejudice and invalidity of the challenged agency action." Colwell v. Iowa Dep't of Hum. Servs., 923 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Iowa 2019) (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a)). And "[t]he standard of review differs depending on the error alleged." Env't L. &Pol'y Ctr. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 989 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Iowa 2023).
When the General Assembly has not clearly vested an agency with interpretative authority, we review interpretative issues for correction of error at law. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c); Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 343 (Iowa 2013).
When an agency is tasked with deciding a factual issue, the agency's factual findings must be upheld unless they are "not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f); see also Burton v. Hilltop Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa 2012). In reviewing the evidence, we are instructed to "consider only the evidence favorable to the [agency's] findings, whether or not contradicted." Cargill, Inc. v. Conley, 620 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2000) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
When an agency is granted discretion, we review whether that discretion was abused. An agency abuses its discretion when it exercises that discretion "on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." Marovec v. PMX Indus., 693 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted); see also Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(l)-(n). "An abuse of discretion also means the decision lacked rationality and was made clearly against reason and evidence." Marovec, 693 N.W.2d at 782.
A challenge asserting an agency failed to follow its own rules only warrants reversal when the overall agency conduct "is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Stratton v. Emp. Appeal Bd., No. 22-0045, 2023 WL 2671924, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2023).
III. Discussion
In her appellate brief, Pohl makes a variety of often-overlapping claims challenging UNI's finding she engaged in research misconduct and the resulting sanctions. In this opinion, we address all of the claims Pohl briefed on appeal, whether we mention them explicitly or not. And we have organized the issues differently than Pohl's brief, as her issue headings did not always correspond to her substantive arguments and some arguments were repetitious or a re-hash of other claims. We take each of Pohl's arguments-as we understand them-in turn.
A. Challenges Based on Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(d), (g)
The first bucket of claims pressed by Pohl is that UNI violated its procedures, policies, and rules in various ways. We break these into different subarguments we can discern from the briefing and address each question presented for review.
1. Are "patchwork paraphrasing" and other non-enumerated forms of research misconduct governed by UNI's Policy 13.13?
Pohl's main challenge on appeal is that her misconduct falls outside the scope of Policy 13.13. She emphasizes that UNI, acting through faculty committees and administrators, did not find she engaged in "fabrication, falsification or plagiarism"-the three categories of research misconduct expressly delineated in Policy 13.13. Instead, UNI found Pohl committed "research misconduct" that is not captured by the three express categories, including but not limited to patchwork paraphrasing. According to Pohl, because she did not commit any of the three specific examples of research misconduct, UNI's investigation and resulting sanctions are flawed and unlawful.
But Pohl overlooks the dispositive sentence in Policy 13.13, which precedes the three specific examples. It reads: "The kinds of research misconduct listed below are the most common, but are not necessarily exhaustive." We find this sentence means what it says: the three specific examples are just that- examples-and the policy also applies to other forms of research misconduct. The policy further defines what this bucket of other research misconduct includes: "other practices" that (1) "seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting research"; (2) constitute "an intentional or knowing act of deception or flagrant disregard of commonly accepted research or ethical practices"; and (3) were proven by a preponderance of the evidence during the investigative process.
The only argument Pohl makes that engages directly with this language urges that UNI must have intended, and we must find, the clause "other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community" is limited to the existing definitions of fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism. She bases this argument on a misunderstanding of ejusdem generis, the fancy Latin name for a statutory canon that "applies when a drafter has tacked on a catchall phrase at the end of an enumeration of specifics." Antonin Scalia &Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199 (2012) [hereinafter Scalia &Garner, Reading Law]; accord Maxim Techs., Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 690 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Iowa 2005) (applying the canon when "an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word or phrase" to find the "general word or phrase" refers to "things of the same kind" (citation omitted)). A textbook example of the canon in action is "dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other animals." Scalia &Garner, Reading Law, at 199. The implication is that we read in "similar" before "other animals," such that other animals really means other similar animals. Id. The canon has been subject to both praise and criticism, ranging from those commending it as "a gem of common sense" to those calling for its abolition. Id. at 211 (citation omitted) (collecting commentary); see also Sec. &Exch. Comm'n v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943) (observing this canon came "down to us from sources that were hostile toward the legislative process itself and thought it generally wise to restrict the operation of an act to its narrowest permissible compass").
Assuming without deciding the ejusdem generis canon is of use here, Pohl has it wrong when she argues this canon supports a restrictive, rather than expansive, reading as applied to this case. Cf. Iowa Individual Health Benefit Reins. Ass'n v. State Univ. of Iowa, 999 N.W.2d 656, 664-65 (Iowa 2023) (rejecting "an unduly restrictive interpretation of the word 'including'"). The "patchwork paraphrasing" and other research misconduct Pohl committed is similar to fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism, which are the specific words the canon directs us to contemplate when interpreting the general phrase "other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community." See Scalia &Garner, Reading Law, at 199. If ejusdem generis tells us anything, it's that UNI's policy covers Pohl's research misconduct. Thus we find no basis to reverse on this issue.
We would come to the same conclusion regardless of the canon cited by Pohl because the plain language of the policy applies to "other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community." By asking us to artificially limit the policy to the enumerated categories of fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism, Pohl asks us to render the "other practices" language a nullity or surplusage. This we cannot do. Cf. Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa 2013) ("Normally we do not interpret statutes so they contain surplusage."). To the extent Pohl maintains, as she did below, that the plain language of the policy does not reach research misconduct, we agree with the district court that argument is "demonstrably false," and we reject it.
We also note that, contrary to Pohl's argument on appeal, the misconduct found by the investigation committee extends beyond subcategories of plagiarism. Specific to the 2017 book chapter, UNI found Pohl attributed quoted material to the wrong author, incorrectly quoted material, and used incomplete secondary sources rather than primary sources. The investigation committee specifically considered and rejected the possibility that these and other problems with the 2017 book chapter were honest errors, emphasizing there were not just "one or two errors" but instead "a high frequency and overall pattern" that seriously deviated from commonly accepted research practices. And UNI determined these errors were significant enough deviations from accepted practice in the field that Pohl "acted in flagrant disregard" of established research and ethical practices. We conclude this determination was supported by substantial evidence and we have no basis to disturb it.
We recognize Pohl points to recommendations made by the investigation committee's draft report, which encouraged future clarification of Policy 13.13 to enumerate more specific categories of research misconduct and clarify the meaning of "flagrant disregard." But just because the policy would benefit from future clarification does not mean it was inadequate to govern the research misconduct committed by Pohl. We credit a colorful observation from the arbitrator that an open-ended provision like the other-research-misconduct language in Policy 13.13 is likely necessary for an institution like UNI "to respond to the infinitely creative ways written words and citations can be presented." We also appreciate UNI's emphasis at oral argument that the policy must be written broadly enough to apply not just to the communications and media department (of which Pohl is a member), but also to all other manner of scientific and scholarly research conducted on campus. We conclude UNI is permitted to consider updates to the policy without condemning past proceedings. To hold otherwise would leave a research misconduct policy frozen in time despite advances in technology or creativity.
2. Do federal regulations dictate the outcome of the disciplinary investigation, rather than the language of UNI's policy?
It is not clear whether Pohl's argument about federal regulations is subsumed within or separate from other arguments she advances on appeal. We address this challenge on the merits in the interests of completeness. In short, Pohl claims our understanding of Policy 13.13 should be strictly circumscribed by a federal regulation defining research misconduct at 42 C.F.R. section 93.103. UNI responds that these regulations only apply to biomedical or behavioral research that receives federal funding.
We, like the arbitrator and the district court, conclude UNI is correct. The plain language of the regulatory scheme provides it only governs "biomedical or behavioral research." 42 C.F.R. § 93.102(a). The regulation also specifically provides it "does not prohibit or otherwise limit how institutions handle allegations of misconduct that do not fall within this part's definition of research misconduct or that do not involve [Public Health Service] support." Id. § 93.102(d). Everyone agrees Pohl's alleged misconduct did not involve the performance of "biomedical or behavioral research" or otherwise involve Public Health Service support. This ends the inquiry.
3. Was UNI permitted to consider Pohl's past misconduct for at least some purposes or does any consideration of the past misconduct warrant reversal?
Pohl also urges a few different versions of her claim that UNI policy allowed the investigation committee to consider her past misconduct. At various times, she relies on the policy's limitations period, an argument the evidence was not relevant, and the RIO's affirmative (though unsuccessful) steps to screen the committees from evidence of past misconduct.
The written procedures implementing Policy 13.13 provide it "applies only to intentional research misconduct . . . that has occurred within the last [six] years." This limitations period concerns when a complaint can be filed; it does not prescribe the universe of evidence a committee may consider. We analogize this argument to the statute of limitations in criminal law, where we are concerned with when a trial information may be found, not what evidence of other misconduct may be submitted in the minutes of testimony or at trial. Cf. United States v. Musacchio, 968 F.2d 782, 790 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding "no support" for defendant's argument "attempting to convert the statute of limitations from a procedural rule that requires the bringing of a complaint within a certain time after the completion of a crime to a rule that restricts the introduction of evidence").
As to relevance, UNI argues the past-misconduct evidence was probative on "the seriousness of [Pohl's] misconduct and what sanctions were appropriate." This is akin to arguing for a harsher criminal sentence based on an offender's criminal history. And that is done in our courts on a daily basis, with such frequency criminal history is required in pre-sentence investigation reports. Iowa Code § 901.3(1)(b). We are not persuaded our courts should permit arguments about recidivism in criminal cases but not administrative hearings. And even if we entertained the relevance claim applying rules-of-evidence concepts, we would not find error as "agencies are not bound by technical rules of evidence" and "the scope of evidence an agency may consider is expanded, rather than contracted." IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 630 (Iowa 2000).
We also conclude the prior-misconduct evidence could have been properly considered on another substantive question: whether Pohl had the culpable mental state required by UNI policy. Policy 13.13 required the committee to evaluate whether Pohl's conduct was an honest mistake or instead reckless or knowing. That Pohl was previously disciplined for similar conduct and took a supposedly rehabilitative class on the topic is probative on her knowledge and intent, which can seldom be proven through direct evidence and necessarily invites consideration of circumstantial proof. E.g., State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003) ("Intent is a matter that is seldom capable of direct proof.").
To the extent it is pursued on appeal, we also reject a more technical claim Pohl may be making, which is that the policies, procedures, and rules do not expressly authorize UNI to consider past misconduct. We note Pohl has failed to identify a particular policy, procedure, or rule she believes was violated, or how such a potential violation amounts to an abuse of discretion. To the extent Pohl relies generally on all pertinent UNI policies and procedure, we see nothing in the certified record that would prohibit the consideration of Pohl's past misconduct when evaluating her mental state or what sanctions were appropriate.
Last, we do not find UNI's attempts to screen the inquiry and investigation committees from the past misconduct tell us anything beyond the fact UNI took a cautious approach. We again see parallels with criminal law. Evidence of a criminal defendant's past misconduct might be admissible for at least some purpose at trial, but a careful prosecutor may choose not to present that evidence given the strength of the case. UNI was entitled to make a similar calculation while investigating Pohl's research misconduct, and we will not punish UNI because its overly cautious attempts to screen the committee from this evidence proved unworkable or unsuccessful.
4. Did UNI act with improper purpose or bias?
For her bias claim, Pohl relies on Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(e), which requires her to allege UNI's decision to discipline her was "undertaken by persons who were improperly constituted as a decision-making body, were motivated by an improper purpose, or were subject to disqualification." This provision incorporates "general conflict-of-interest standards." Iowa Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Env't Prot. Comm'n, 850 N.W.2d 403, 414 (Iowa 2014). Pohl does not specify the precise standard she asks us to deploy. But we find her claim fails against even the most stringent conflicts test, imposed on contested cases and adjudicative proceedings. Under that standard, there is a presumption of objectivity that "can only be overcome by 'direct, compelling evidence to the contrary.'" Id. at 415 (quoting Bd. of Dirs. v. Justmann, 476 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Iowa 1991)).
Even taking all complaints made in Pohl's appellate brief as true, there is no direct, compelling evidence of bias or improper motive. At oral argument, Pohl's counsel urged that the evidence of past misconduct supplies the allegedly improper motive that warrants reversal on this basis. We reject that claim for the same reasons we set forth in the previous division of this opinion, as UNI was entitled to consider that evidence for at least some purposes. And we note that, despite being under no obligation to do so, the RIO provided the equivalent of a jury-trial limiting instruction, directing committee members to not consider the past misconduct when determining whether Pohl committed the research misconduct alleged in the complaint and to only consider the past misconduct when fashioning an appropriate sanction. See State v. Richards, 879 N.W.2d 140, 153 (Iowa 2016) (approving use of limiting instructions that convey to jurors for what purposes they may and may not consider evidence prior bad acts). While we decline to opine on whether the equivalent of a limiting instruction is required in the administrative context, we approve of its use here because it mitigated any potential that evidence of Pohl's past misconduct would be used for an improper purpose.
B. Substantial Evidence
Outside Pohl's attacks on the policy and process, she levies a more traditional challenge to the finding she committed research misconduct, arguing it was not supported by substantial evidence. For purposes of this argument, she asks us to assume she concedes her research misconduct is covered by Policy 13.13. From there, she focuses on the findings that she acted "recklessly" or in "flagrant disregard" of commonly accepted research practices.
Pohl points to Black's Law Dictionary, which defines recklessness as "the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate) disregard for or indifference to that risk; heedless; rash." Reckless, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This definition also describes "reckless conduct" as that which "is much more than mere negligence: it is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do." Id. For "flagrant," Pohl switches to Merriam-Webster, which equates the term with "conspicuously offensive" and "so obviously inconsistent with what is right or proper as to appear to be a flouting of law or morality." Flagrant, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/flagrant (last visited Feb. 27, 2024). She also cites Oxford Learner's Dictionary, which defines "flagrant" as something "that shocks you because it is done in a very obvious way and shows no respect for people, laws, etc." Flagrant, Oxford Learner's Dictionaries, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/flag rant (last visited Feb. 27, 2024).
Pohl does not make much or any substantive argument for why her conduct did not meet these definitions (which we will assume without deciding are appropriate for purposes of this appeal). Instead, she makes the conclusory assertion that the investigation committee only found negligence, despite the written report finding recklessness and flagrant disregard. Once again, Pohl points to policy changes the investigation committee discussed recommending. But these informal discussions, made during the drafting stage of the report, are not smoking guns. At most, these communications recognize the committee was doing its best to apply the existing policy. This does not conclusively tell us, as Pohl suggests, that the investigation committee would have preferred a different standard, let alone that they applied something other than the existing policy. And we doubt this type of discussion about gradations between intentional, knowing, reckless, and some other mental state are all that different from conversations jurors have had across the state when evaluating recklessness in criminal and civil cases.
Overall, we find substantial evidence supports UNI's findings. The final investigative report details several instances of research misconduct and multiple kinds of misconduct at that. UNI reasonably concluded Pohl violated academic and scholarly norms. The record also supports that Pohl knew these standards, as she was a professional academic with a history of publishing scholarship and supervising students conducting their own research. Pohl also told the investigation committee she was "very" familiar with Policy 13.13-the basis for her discipline. The record evidence supports UNI's determination Pohl committed research misconduct.
C. Challenge to Agency Reasoning and Use of Discretion
In the final division of her brief, Pohl urges that UNI's reasoning was "so illogical as to render it wholly irrational" and in violation of both Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(i) and (n). It is difficult for us to discern anything about the nature of this complaint that is not a re-hash of Pohl's previous arguments, and we see no reversible error for the reasons we have expressed elsewhere in this opinion.
To the extent Pohl, in wrapping these arguments together, asks our court to substitute our judgment for what constitutes research misconduct in place of UNI's, we decline the invitation. We have reviewed this case mindful of chapter 17A's admonitions to respect agency expertise-here, the expertise possessed by UNI and the faculty committees who investigated Pohl's research misconduct. UNI's application of its Policy 13.13, its decisionmaking, and the resulting discipline against Pohl were not illogical, nor were they wholly irrational, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
IV. Disposition
We affirm the district court's ruling on judicial review and the underlying agency action.
AFFIRMED