Opinion
CIV-24-120-R
05-13-2024
RAHEEM LA'MONZE PLATER, Plaintiff, v. GEO GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFIELD GREEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed an action alleging violations of his civil rights. (Doc. 1). United States District Judge David L. Russell referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). (Doc. 5). A review of the Complaint (Doc. 1) has been conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Based on that review, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint.
I. The Court's Duty to Screen Prisoner Complaints
Federal law mandates the screening of each complaint in a civil action filed by a prisoner seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity and each case in which the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(e)(2). The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
The court's review of a complaint under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors that required for reviewing a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court must accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A complaint fails to state such a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint, however, are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that although courts construe pro se pleadings liberally, courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint”). Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal). “A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. Discussion
Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner who presents three claims based on events which allegedly occurred while he was housed at Lawton Correctional Facility (LCF), a private prison owned and operated by Defendant GEO Group, Inc. Although Plaintiff did not disclose it, (see Doc. 1, at 1-2), the Court will be familiar with these events from Plaintiff's earlier-filed lawsuit still pending before this Court, which deals with the same parties and the same facts and circumstances. See Plater v. Topping, Case. No. CIV-22-780-R (W.D. Okla.) (“Plater I”). Here, Plaintiff offers essentially a Third Amended Complaint for Plater I, containing additional facts and arguments in support of his previously rejected Claims One and Two against these Defendants and a new but closely related Claim Three. (See Doc. 9).
“The rule against claim-splitting requires a [litigant] to assert all of [his] causes of action arising from a common set of facts in one lawsuit.” Katz v. Gerardi, 655 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2011). To that end, “[d]istrict courts have discretion to control their dockets by dismissing duplicative cases.” Id. (citation omitted). This doctrine, arising from the Court's ability to comprehensively manage its docket, is rooted in the principle that “[p]laintiffs have no right to maintain two actions on the same subject in the same court, against the same defendant at the same time.” Stout ex rel. C.S. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Highway Patrol, et al., No. 13-CV-753-WPJ and No. 14-CV-427-WPJ, 2015 WL 1473504 at *4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 27, 2015) (quoting Katz, 655 F.3d at 1217-18); see also Carmichael v. Allbaugh, No. CIV-20-109-D, 2020 WL 6491660, at *3-4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 4, 2020).
Claim-splitting is analyzed “as an aspect of res judicata,” but the existence of a final judgment is not necessary. Stout, 2015 WL 1473504 at *4. Instead, “the appropriate inquiry is whether, assuming that the first suit were already final, the second suit could be precluded pursuant to claim preclusion.” Hartsel Springs Ranch of Colo., Inc. v. Bluegreen Corp., 296 F.3d 987, 987 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002). Under claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” See Kreme v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6 (1982). Since the claim-splitting analysis does not require a final judgment on the merits, a party asserting claim-splitting allegations need only establish that: (1) the parties or their privies are identical, and (2) the causes of action are identical. Stout, at *4 (citing Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 471 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2006)). As to the causes of action, the Tenth Circuit has adopted the “transactional approach.” Nwosun v. Gen. Mills Restaurant, 124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997). Under this approach, the relevant question is whether a cause of action “includes all claims or legal theories or recovery that arise from the same transaction, event, or occurrence.” Id.
The parties in Plater I and the instant lawsuit are identical, and the causes of action stem from a common set of facts. Though the claims and relief sought might be different, the underlying facts are the same. Plaintiff should have amended his complaint in Plater I to assert the instant claims rather than filing a new lawsuit. Thus, these claims were improperly split, and Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed.
III. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
The undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) as improperly split from Plater I.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before June 3, 2024, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is rereferred.