Opinion
No. 3-422 / 02-2053
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Bryan H. McKinley, Judge.
The petitioner appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the respondent's revocation of his driver's license for a chemical test refusal under the implied consent law. AFFIRMED.
Linda Hall of Gallagher, Langlas Gallagher, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas Miller, Attorney General, and Carolyn Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Ames, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Robert Michael Plager appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming a Department of Transportation (DOT) decision revoking his driver's license for refusing to submit to a chemical test. He maintains the district court erred in concluding there was substantial evidence in the record to support a reasonable belief that he was operating under the influence. We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
On February 11, 2002, a Bremer County Deputy Sheriff pulled over Plager for driving seventy-one miles per hour in a fifty-five miles per hour zone. Plager failed to stop his vehicle promptly. When the deputy approached Plager's vehicle he detected a strong odor of alcohol. He also observed that Plager had difficulty producing his registration and insurance documents, slurred his speech, and had bloodshot and watery eyes. The deputy reported that Plager seemed to stagger as he got out of his vehicle, and admitted having consumed alcohol. In the deputy's opinion, Plager failed three field sobriety tests. Plager refused to perform a preliminary breath-screening test.
Plager was subsequently arrested, taken to a law enforcement facility, and advised that refusal to submit to chemical testing would result in revocation of his driver's license. After consulting by telephone with an attorney, Plager declined to take an Intoxilyzer test and his license was revoked under Iowa's Implied Consent law.
Plager challenged the revocation of his license on the basis that the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe he was under the influence when driving his vehicle on February 11, 2002. Following an administrative hearing at which the administrative law judge (ALJ) heard testimony from the deputy, Plager, and several witnesses for Plager, the license revocation was sustained. The DOT's reviewing officer affirmed the decision, as did the district court on judicial review. This appeal followed.
The ALJ determined the results of the field sobriety tests should be disregarded.
II. Standards of Review
Plager asserts the DOT's decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would find it adequate to reach a given conclusion. Burns v. Bd. of Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698, 699 (Iowa 1993). The question is not whether the evidence might support a different finding, but whether it supports the findings actually made. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2000).
III. Analysis
The only issue on appeal is whether the DOT's conclusion that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe Plager was driving under the influence is supported by substantial evidence. Iowa Code § 321J.6(1) (2001). The reasonable grounds test "is met when the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time action was required would have warranted a prudent person's belief that an offense had been committed." Ramsey v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Division, 576 N.W.2d 103, 107 (Iowa 1998).
Plager contends the arresting officer could not have had reasonable grounds to conclude he was driving under the influence because (1) he reached his conclusion based on circumstantial facts that were equally indicative of innocence; and (2) the facts the deputy relied upon were uncorroborated by any other evidence. Plager also generally contends the evidence was not of sufficient quantity and quality to constitute substantial evidence.
We agree the record concerning Plager's state of intoxication at the time of the stop was conflicting. However, it is the agency's duty, not ours, to resolve conflicts in the testimony. Elliot v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 377 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa Ct.App. 1985). The agency chose to accept the officer's testimony over the statements of the other witnesses, finding his testimony more credible. We are not at liberty to reassess the weight accorded the evidence. See Burns, 495 N.W.2d at 699. We also are not free to reevaluate credibility determinations made by the agency. See Benning v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 441 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa 1989). The district court made the following observations in concluding that the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence:
Petitioner was operating a motor vehicle at the speed of 71 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. Upon being stopped by the officer, the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, difficulty producing his registration and insurance documents, and poor balance. Petitioner admitted having consumed alcohol and failed all field sobriety tests.
Plager is critical of the district court for relying on the results of field sobriety tests specifically rejected by the agency. The record reveals the agency discounted the results of the three field sobriety tests which Plager performed before his arrest. Even if this evidence is not considered, we conclude the remaining evidence clearly satisfies the reasonable grounds test. Ramsey v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., 576 N.W.2d at 107.