Opinion
4:22-CV-00162-CDL-MSH
12-28-2022
GEORGE W PITTS, JR., Plaintiff, v. JUDGE ARTHUR L SMITH, III, et. al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
STEPHEN HYLES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In accordance with the Court's previous orders and instructions, pro se Plaintiff George W. Pitts, Jr., an inmate currently confined at the Dooly State Prison in Unadilla, Georgia, has paid the required initial partial filing fee. Plaintiff's claims are now ripe for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A. Having conducted such review, the undersigned concludes each of Plaintiff's claims is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED without prejudice.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
I. Standard of Review
In accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the district courts are obligated to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010; Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
II. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff's claims arise from documents he filed in the Chattahoochee County Superior Court beginning on or about June 28, 2022. Compl. 8, ECF No. 1. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff filed a “Commercial Affidavit of Truth” with the court and served a copy of the document on Defendant Jackson, the district attorney. Id. On July 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request with the court. Id. On August 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and served a copy on Defendant Jackson. Id. Defendant Smith, a superior court judge, denied the affidavit, motion for summary judgment, and FOIA request in one order. Id. at 8-9. Judge Smith also filed an amended order shortly thereafter that likewise denied each of Plaintiff's requests. Id. These orders were signed and dated by Defendant Smith, the certificates of service were signed and filed by law clerk Defendant Kennedy, and the orders were stamped “filed” by court clerk Defendant Wade. Id. at 9. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Smith “deliberately and arbitrarily denied” Plaintiff's “unrebutted commercial affidavit of truth” and his summary judgment motion based thereon. Id. at 10. Plaintiff contends this denial violated his constitutional rights, and he accordingly seeks “to be released immediately from unlaw[ful] custody and incarceration.” Id.
III. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff's claims in this case are subject to dismissal. As a preliminary matter, it appears that the only relief Plaintiff seeks in this action is his release from custody. Compl. 10, ECF No. 1. But Plaintiff cannot obtain a dismissal of pending charges or speedier release through a § 1983 action. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487, 489 (1973). “[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release[.]” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks his release from prison as a remedy for the constitutional violations he alleges, such relief is not available in a Section 1983 case.
Even if Plaintiff's Complaint could somehow be construed as seeking damages, it is still subject to dismissal. First, judicial immunity bars Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Smith. “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages under section 1983 for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” McBrearty v. Koji, 348 Fed.Appx. 437, 439 (11th Cir. 2009). “A judge does not act in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction' when he acts erroneously, maliciously, or in excess of his authority, but instead, only when he acts without subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. In this case, Defendant Smith's allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred entirely during Plaintiff's state court proceedings; there is no suggestion that he acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Thus, Defendant Smith is entitled to judicial immunity, and the claims against him should be dismissed.
Defendant Kennedy and Defendant Wade are likewise entitled to absolute judicial immunity. “Absolute judicial immunity extends not only to judges, but to other persons whose official duties have an integral relationship with the judicial process.” Jallali v. Florida, 404 Fed.Appx. 455, 456 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). These individuals, however, enjoy a slightly “narrower ambit of immunity than judges.” Hyland v. Kolhage, 267 Fed.Appx. 836, 842 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981)). Though they “have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge's direction,” they are only protected by “qualified immunity from all other actions for damages.” Id. In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Kennedy and Wade effectuated Defendant Smith's order by filing it and serving it on the appropriate parties. Because this is an integral part of the judicial process, Defendants Kennedy and Wade are entitled to judicial immunity. Smith v. Erickson, 884 F.3d 1108, 111 (8th Cir. 1989) (filing of documents by clerk is integral part of judicial process and protected by judicial immunity); see also Finfrock v. Flint, No. 2:06-cv-230-FtM-29DNF, 2006 WL 2884953, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2006) (finding clerk entitled to judicial immunity on claims that clerk failed to timely serve complaint because “[t]he decision[] regarding when to issue service of process” is a judicial action).
Plaintiff has also sued District Attorney Jackson and Attorney General Christopher Carr in this action. Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. It is not clear, however, how each of these individuals violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Indeed, Plaintiff makes no allegations against Defendant Carr whatsoever. Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants should therefore be dismissed. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissal of defendants appropriate where plaintiff failed to allege facts associating defendants with a particular constitutional violation).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that any of the named Defendants violated his constitutional right of access to the courts, his claims are subject to dismissal. “Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth Amendment.” Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n. 12 (2002)). “To have standing to seek relief under this right, however, a plaintiff must show actual injury by ‘demonstrat[ing] that a nonfrivolous legal claim ha[s] been frustrated or . . . impeded.'” Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 331 F.3d 790, 797 (11th Cir. 2003) (alterations and omission in original) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996)). In other words, “[t]he injury requirement means that the plaintiff must have an underlying cause of action the vindication of which is prevented by the denial of access to the courts.” Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney's Office for Escambia Cnty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that Defendants frustrated or impeded the filing of a non-frivolous claim in state court. Plaintiff's filings in the state court are attached to the Complaint as exhibits. Those filings are largely nonsensical, and they bear at least some of “the hallmarks of the ‘sovereign citizen' theory that has been consistently rejected by the federal courts as an utterly frivolous attempt to avoid the statutes, rules, and regulations that apply to all litigants, regardless of how they portray themselves.” Mells v. Loncon, No. CV 418-296, 2019 WL 1339618, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2019) (emphasis in original). A so-called “sovereign citizen” generally relies “on the Uniform Commercial Code (‘UCC'), admiralty laws, and other commercial statutes to argue that, because he has made no contract with [the court or government], neither entity can foist any agreement upon him.” See United States v. Perkins, No. 1:10-cr-97-1, 2013 WL 3820716, at *1 (N.D.Ga. July 23, 2013) aff'd, 787 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015). Criminal statutes are “apparently not one of the groups of statutes whose validity [these ‘sovereign citizens'] will acknowledge,” and as such the prisoner will argue that he cannot be found guilty of any crime. See id.
The sovereign citizen approach is a frivolous legal theory that has been consistently rejected by federal courts. See, e.g., Trevino v. Florida, 687 Fed.Appx. 861, 862 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (finding plaintiff's sovereign citizen arguments frivolous and “clearly baseless”); Linge v. State of Georgia Inc., 569 Fed.Appx. 895, 896 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding the sovereign citizen argument to be to “wholly insubstantial and frivolous”); United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir.1993) (rejecting sovereign citizen argument as “shop worn” and frivolous); Muhammad v. Smith, No. 3:13-cv-760 (MAD/DEP), 2014 WL 3670609, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (collecting cases and noting that “[t]heories presented by redemptionist and sovereign citizen adherents have not only been rejected by courts, but also recognized as frivolous and a waste of court resources”). Because Plaintiff's underlying state court claim is based on a plainly frivolous theory, he cannot show that any of Defendants' actions frustrated or impeded his pursuit of a nonfrivolous claim. Plaintiff has therefore failed to demonstrate that Defendants violated his right of access to the courts, and all such claims should also be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's claims are frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Clay D. Land, United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO RECOMMENDED.