Opinion
23-1869
07-16-2024
DENNIS NOE PINTO VILLEDA, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
James Doyle Brousseau, BROUSSEAU &LEE, PLLC, Falls Church, Virginia, for Petitioner. Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Zoe J. Heller, Senior Litigation Counsel, Jaclyn E. Shea, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: June 12, 2024
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
ON BRIEF:
James Doyle Brousseau, BROUSSEAU &LEE, PLLC, Falls Church, Virginia, for Petitioner.
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Zoe J. Heller, Senior Litigation Counsel, Jaclyn E. Shea, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Before KING, HARRIS, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dennis Noe Pinto Villeda, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board") denying his motion to reopen and declining to reopen sua sponte. We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that Pinto Villeda did not establish changed country conditions to warrant granting an untimely motion for reopening. Garcia Hernandez v. Garland, 27 F.4th 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2022) (stating standard of review). Accordingly, we deny the petition in part. And we dismiss the petition in part because this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Board's order sua sponte denying reopening. See Lawrence v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 198, 20607 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming that this court lacks jurisdiction to review how the Board exercises its sua sponte discretion); Mosere v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 397, 400-01 (4th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review in part and dismiss in part. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART