Opinion
March 9, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Posner, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated January 17, 1997, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated June 12, 1997, made upon reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated June 12, 1997, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the respondents Zamir Korn and Gabriela Korn are awarded one bill of costs.
The Supreme Court properly treated the plaintiff's motion, denominated as one to "reargue and renew", as a motion to reargue. "When a motion denominated as one to renew is predicated upon information which could have been raised at the time of the original motion and was not, and the plaintiff has offered no excuse for failing to present the evidence at that time, the motion to renew is in actuality a motion to reargue" ( Carson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 237 A.D.2d 242, 243; see also, Marine Midland Bank v. Freedom Rd. Realty Assocs., 203 A.D.2d 538, 539; Bartolo v. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 198 A.D.2d 204).
The Supreme Court also properly granted the motion of the defendants Zamir Korn and Gabriela Korn for summary judgment, as the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant Freddy Carrasco was employed by the Korns as superintendent of their building at the time of the alleged incident here. The plaintiff's affidavit, which was not only conclusory but which, in many ways, contradicted the plaintiff's deposition testimony, did not constitute the type of evidence necessary to defeat the Korns' motion for summary judgment ( see, Leale v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 222 A.D.2d 414; Matter of Kalati v. Independent Diamond Brokers, 209 A.D.2d 412).
Finally, the plaintiff's cross motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant Carrasco was also properly denied. The plaintiff waited for more than two years after Carrasco's default in answering before moving for leave to enter a judgment, and he offered no excuse for the delay or sufficient cause why the complaint should not be dismissed ( see, CPLR 3215 [c]; Nevling v. Chrysler Corp., 206 A.D.2d 221, 224).
Pizzuto, J. P., Santucci, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.