Opinion
CASE NO. C15-1983 RSM
01-24-2018
STEPHANIE L PICKERING and TERRY A. O'KEEFE, Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF AMERICA HOME LOANS, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on review of Chief Judge Ricardo Martinez's Order [Dkt. #59] declining to recuse himself in response to pro se Plaintiffs' "Motion for Recusal of Judge Ricardo S. Martinez for Bias and Prejudice and Extra Prejudicial" [Dkt. #57]. The Order was referred to this Court as the most senior non-Chief Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and LCR 3(e).
A federal judge should recuse himself if "a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 144; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455; Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993). This objective inquiry is concerned with whether there is the appearance of bias, not whether there is bias in fact. See Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 1980). ). In the absence of specific allegations of personal bias, prejudice, or interest, neither prior adverse rulings of a judge nor his participation in a related or prior proceeding is sufficient" to establish bias. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981). Judicial rulings alone "almost never" constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Plaintiffs' motion for recusal is based on a prior adverse ruling in "Judge Martinez's Order dated January 24, 2017." Dkt. 57 at 3. But prior adverse rulings are insufficient to establish bias requiring recusal. Because Plaintiffs do not articulate any factual basis to reasonably question Chief Judge Martinez's impartiality, the Motion to Recuse [Dkt. #57] is DENIED and Chief Judge Martinez's Order Denying Motion to Recuse [Dkt. #59] is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 24th day of January, 2018.
/s/_________
Ronald B. Leighton
United States District Judge