Opinion
Civil File No. 02-3826 (PAM/RLE)
January 30, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant also moved for a continuance of the settlement conference and for a continuance of the trial date. Because the Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment in part and dismisses Plaintiffs remaining claims, Defendant's Motion for a continuance will be denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
This case involves allegations of disability discrimination by Plaintiff Terry Picha against his former employer Hance Locating. Hance Locating is wholly owned by Defendant CCS Enterprises LLC ("CCS"). Picha worked seasonally for CCS. His job entailed locating underground utility lines and marking the location of those lines. He began working for CCS in March 2001, was seasonally terminated in December 2001, and was finally terminated in May 2002. He contends that his final termination in May 2002 constituted disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363A.03 et seq. He does not allege that he is disabled, but rather that CCS fired him because it regarded him as being disabled. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1); Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 12.
Sometime in the fall of 2001, Picha hurt his right arm while working. He reported the injury to his supervisor and he visited the doctor. The injury was not serious and required only one visit to the doctor. After Picha was laid off for the season in December, he sought workers' compensation from CCS for the $78 doctor's bill. CCS referred the matter to its workers' compensation insurer, State Fund Mutual ("State Fund"). The claims investigator questioned Picha about any previous workers' compensation claims and Picha denied making any such claims. The investigator subsequently discovered that Picha had made a workers' compensation claim for an injury to his left arm in 1992. State Fund ultimately denied Picha's $78 workers' compensation claim. (Peterson Aff. Ex. E.) Picha did not appeal that denial or otherwise pursue the matter.
Shortly after Picha was seasonally terminated, he underwent surgery on his left arm to repair damage caused by the 1992 injury. Picha remained under a physician's care for several months and was on work restrictions until the middle of May 2002. There is no dispute that these work restrictions prevented Picha from returning to his job as a utility line locator. According to CCS, because of an early thaw, business started picking up in March 2002, at which time Picha was unable to return to work. By the time Picha was cleared to work, CCS had hired new locators and did not have a position for Picha. On May 2, 2002, CCS terminated Picha's employment. (Peterson Aff. Ex. G.)
Picha filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on May 16, 2002. (Williams Aff. Ex. C.) The EEOC found no violation of the ADA and dismissed Picha's charge on July 12, 2002. (Id. Ex. D.) This dismissal gave Picha the right to bring suit in federal court, which he did on October 4, 2002. In addition to the allegations of disability discrimination, Picha also contends that CCS interfered with his workers' compensation claim and discriminated against him for filing a workers' compensation claim in violation of Minn. Stat. § 176.82.
The Complaint also mentions a violation of Minn. Stat. § 176.822, but there is no such section in the statute. It appears that Picha actually intends to raise a claim under § 176.82, subd. 2.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Enter, Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik v. Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). In employment discrimination cases, the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment should be granted sparingly. Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994).
B. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA precludes employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employer may illegally discriminate against a non-disabled employee if the employer regards the employee as being disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Both parties operate under the mistaken assumption that discrimination claims under the ADA are analyzed under the three-step analytical framework ofMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). However, as this Court held in Gonzalez v. City of Minneapolis, 267 F. Supp.2d 1004 (D. Minn. 2003) (Magnuson, J.), the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, ___ U.S. ___ 123 S.Ct. 2148 (2003), eliminated the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme for ADA claims. Such claims must be analyzed instead under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Gonzalez, 267 F. Supp.2d at 1010;see also 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (applying Title VII's allocation of burdens to ADA claims).
Thus, to avoid summary judgment, Picha must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of a prima facie case of disability discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment on the basis of perceived disability, Picha must show that (1) CCS regarded him as disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he "suffered an adverse employment action as a result of the [perception of] disability." See Gonzalez, 267 F. Supp.2d at 1014 (quoting Fenney v. Dakota. Minnesota E. R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2003)).
1. "Regarded As" Disabled
To succeed on the first element, Picha must establish that CCS "believe[d] either that [he] ha[d] a substantially limiting impairment that [he did] not have or that [he] ha[d] a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment [was] not so limiting."Conant v. City of Hibbing, 271 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)). Picha has failed to establish that CCS regarded him as being disabled.
Picha claims that CCS regarded him as being substantially limited in the major life activity of working. In order to survive summary judgment, Picha must establish more than that CCS regarded him as being unable to perform the functions of his own job. See Taylor v. Nimock's Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[i]nability to perform one particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation on working"). Picha must show that CCS regarded him as being unable to work in a broad class of jobs. See Shipley v. City of University City, 195 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1999); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(3)(i) ("The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working."). Picha has failed to demonstrate that genuine issues of fact exist as to whether CCS regarded him as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
Picha contends that the termination letter he received from CCS shows that CCS regarded him as unable to perform a broad class of jobs. In pertinent part, the termination letter states, "as of May 2, 2002 your position with Hance Locating as in-field technician has been terminated due to your inability to perform the tasks required. . . ." (Peterson Aff. Ex. G.) This statement simply does not support the notion that CCS regarded Picha as being disabled. Rather, the plain meaning of this statement is that CCS thought that Picha could not perform the functions of his previous job, something Picha concedes was true at the time the letter was written.
Picha urges the Court, pursuant to Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), to allow this matter to go to a jury because of subsequent statements by CCS that allegedly cast doubt on CCS's belief regarding Picha's disability. In particular, Picha contends that CCS did not originally believe that Picha was only temporarily unable to perform the functions of his job, but only manufactured this "excuse" after Picha filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Picha further argues that CCS further manufactured other excuses for his termination in its response to the EEOC charge, and that these fabrications cast doubt on justification for his termination stated in the termination letter.
None of CCS's subsequent statements contradict the statements made in the termination letter. It is of no moment whether, at the time CCS terminated Picha, it believed that he was permanently unable to perform a single job or temporarily unable to perform a single job. An inability to perform a single job does not, as a matter of law, constitute a disability. Moreover, even if CCS's comments to the EEOC showed that CCS believed that Picha falsified time records or filed a false workers' compensation claim, these comments do not in any way support a claim for disability discrimination. Picha has failed to establish that genuine issues of fact remain on the first element of his prima facie case.
2. Ability to Perform Previous Job
Even if Picha could establish that CCS regarded him as disabled, his ADA claim fails because he cannot establish that he was able to perform the essential functions of the job. Indeed, Picha concedes that, as of May 2, 2002, he had not been cleared to return to work and that he could not perform his previous job under the lifting restrictions in place at that time. The only way CCS could have accommodated Picha is by holding the position open until he was able to return to work. Picha offers no support for the proposition that an employer must wait until the employee is ready to return to work before filling that employee's position. Picha has failed to show that he was able to perform his previous job on May 2, 2002, and his ADA claim therefore fails.
B. Minnesota Human Rights Act
A person may be considered disabled under the MHRA if she or he "(1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment." Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subd. 13 (2000). The MHRA's definition of disability is different from and less stringent than the ADA's definition, which defines disabled as substantially limited in a major life activity. Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 545 n. 8 (Minn. 2001). Disability discrimination claims under the MHRA continue to be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm noted above. Gonzalez, 267 F. Supp.2d at 1011.
Even under the MHRA's less stringent definition of disability, Picha has failed to establish that CCS regarded him as being disabled. Picha's inability to perform the functions of a single job does not materially limit any major life activity, and as noted above, there is no evidence that CCS regarded Picha as anything other than unable to perform the duties of his previous position. Picha's MHRA claim fails. See Dinyer v. Univ. of Minn., No. C7-98-1648, 1999 WL 138741, at *3 (disability discrimination plaintiff "must demonstrate more than a limitation on the ability to obtain and retain one particular job") (Minn.Ct.App. Mar. 16, 1999) (citing Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander Sons Co., 532 N.W.2d 225, 229 (Minn. 1995)).
C. Workers' Compensation
Picha's claims under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act ("WCA"), Minn. Stat.
§ 176.82, turn on whether CCS interfered with Picha's $78 workers' compensation claim. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Picha, there are questions of fact as to whether CCS communicated with State Fund for the purpose of interfering with the workers' compensation claim. However, Picha's WCA claims do not belong in federal court. The Court has dismissed the only federal claim in the Complaint. Prudence dictates that the Court dismiss without prejudice Picha's WCA claims and allow the Minnesota state courts to resolve the matter. See, e.g., Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) ("State courts, not federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state law.").
CONCLUSION
In his memorandum opposing summary judgment, Picha mentions that he intends to file retaliation and defamation claims in state court. It makes sense for him to do so, because his allegations in this case are allegations of retaliation and defamation, not of disability discrimination. His disability discrimination claims fail as a matter of law, and his workers' compensation claims belong in state court.
Accordingly, based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
2. Plaintiffs claims under the ADA and MHRA are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
3. Plaintiff's claims under the WCA are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
4. Defendant's Motion for Relief from D. Minn. L.R. 7.1 and for a Continuance (Clerk Doc. No. 22) is DENIED as moot.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.