Opinion
02-23-00107-CV
05-25-2023
Deloris Phillips, Appellant v. Sugar Creek Apartments, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022-001468-2
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dana Womack Justice
On December 30, 2022, the trial court signed a default judgment in favor of Appellant Deloris Phillips, the plaintiff below, against Appellee Sugar Creek Apartments, the defendant below. On February 21, 2023-after the trial court's plenary power had expired-Phillips filed her "Verified Motion for Court Reporter's Record/Transcript; Motion to Preserve Record; Motion to Enforce Judgment; and Request for Hearing on Aforementioned Motions." On April 5, 2023, the trial court signed an order granting Phillips's "Motion for Court Reporter's Record/Transcript" and denying Phillips's "Motion to Preserve Record." Phillips now attempts to appeal the trial court's order denying her "Motion to Preserve Record."
No post-judgment motion was filed that would have extended the trial court's plenary power. Thus, the trial court's plenary power expired thirty days after the default judgment was signed. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(d).
As best as we can glean, through her "Motion to Preserve Record," Phillips requested that the trial court order that certain aspects of the record be preserved "for a longer period than statutorily required."
On April 17, 2023, we notified Phillips of our concern that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the order that she appeals from does not appear to be a final judgment or appealable order. We informed Phillips that unless she or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response by April 27, 2023, showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we could dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. See Tex.R.App.P. 42.3(a), 44.3. While Phillips has filed a response, it does not show grounds for continuing the appeal.
Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory orders that are authorized by statute. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex. 2001). Most post-judgment orders made to enforce or carry into effect that judgment are not appealable because those orders are not themselves final judgments or orders for which appeals are statutorily authorized. Sunnyland Dev., Inc. v. Shawn Ibrahim, Inc., 597 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.); In re Doe, 397 S.W.3d 847, 849 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). A narrow exception exists, however, for orders that operate like a mandatory injunction resolving property rights. Sunnyland Dev., Inc., 597 S.W.3d at 3; Doe, 397 S.W.3d at 849. "[T]his exception does not encompass most orders made to aid in the collection of a money judgment." Sunnyland Dev., Inc., 597 S.W.3d at 3. "For anything other than what could properly be characterized as a final judgment, a post-judgment order in the nature of a mandatory injunction, or an order subject to a statutorily authorized appeal, mandamus is the proper form to obtain review of a trial court's orders." Doe, 397 S.W.3d at 849.
Here, Phillips is attempting to appeal an order denying her "Motion to Preserve Record." Such an order is not a final judgment, nor does it act in the nature of a mandatory injunction resolving property rights, nor is it an order subject to a statutorily authorized appeal. Thus, it is not appealable. See Sunnyland Dev., Inc., 597 S.W.3d at 2-3; Doe, 397 S.W.3d at 849-50. Because the order denying Phillips's "Motion to Preserve Record" is not appealable, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal, and we must dismiss it. See Sunnyland Dev., Inc., 597 S.W.3d at 3 ("An appeal from a post-judgment order that is not appealable must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."); Doe, 397 S.W.3d at 850 ("Because the order denying Doe's [postjudgment motion] is not appealable, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. If we lack jurisdiction over an appeal, our only option is to dismiss the appeal."). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex.R.App.P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).