Opinion
No. 2-483 / 01-0661
Filed November 15, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County, CARL D. BAKER, Judge.
Heather Tremmel appeals the district court decision granting summary judgment to the Peytons on her counterclaims. AFFIRMED.
Darrell Meyer, Marshalltown, for appellant.
Raymond Drew of Raymond P. Drew, P.C., Hampton, for appellees.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Heather Tremmel was previously engaged in Bret Peyton. Bret's father, Ron Peyton, loaned them $4000, which was used as a down payment on a residence. The deed to the residence was placed in the names of Heather and Bret, as joint tenants. They obtained a mortgage on the home. Heather and Bret did not get married. The residence was later the subject of foreclosure proceedings. Bret purchased the property at a sheriff's sale.
Ron filed a small claims action against Heather seeking to recover $2000 plus interest, which represented her share of the $4000 loan. Heather filed counterclaims against Ron and Bret, as a third-party defendant, alleging (1) interference with contract; (2) interference with economic advantage; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) negligence; (5) intentional breach of contract; (6) breach of contract; (7) conversion; and (8) abuse of process. The gist of Heather's complaints was that Bret had purposefully defaulted on the mortgage, forcing foreclosure and the sale of the property in order to remove her from the deed. The case was then transferred to district court.
All parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court denied Ron's request for summary judgment against Heather. The court granted summary judgment to Ron and Bret on Heather's counterclaims. The court noted Heather had notice of the foreclosure action and chose not to appear, so that "she knowingly allowed her ownership interest to be extinguished in the foreclosure action." The court denied Heather's motion for a new trial.
Heather appealed in August 2000, but the supreme court dismissed her appeal as interlocutory. See Iowa R.App.P. 6.1(3). Despite the fact there had still not been a hearing or a ruling on Ron's petition, Heather filed a new notice of appeal in April 2001. The supreme court at that time determined Heather had the ability to appeal as of right.
II. Scope of Review
We review a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors of law. Financial Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Hawkeye Bank Trust, 588 N.W.2d 450, 455 (Iowa 1999). Summary judgment will be upheld when the moving party shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.981(3). A fact is material only when its determination might affect the outcome of the suit. Keokuk Junction Ry. Co. v. IES Indus., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 2000). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Crippen v. City of Cedar Rapids, 618 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 2000).
III. Merits
In ruling on Heather's motion for new trial, the district court stated, "because Heather failed to defend the foreclosure action and allowed a default judgment to be entered against her, her ownership interest in the real estate was extinguished, thereby extinguishing the claims set out in her petition at law." We agree with the district court's conclusion.
Heather's counterclaims in the present case are an improper collateral attack on the foreclosure action. Heather received notice in the foreclosure action, the foreclosure became final, and Heather did not appeal. A final judgment is not subject to collateral attack except on jurisdictional grounds. In re Estate of Boyd, 634 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Iowa 2001). Mere error in a judgment is not reviewable in a collateral proceeding. Sanford v. Manternach, 601 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Iowa 1999). Heather has not raised any jurisdictional claims in this action. If the court has jurisdiction both over the person and the subject matter, the judgment is conclusive on collateral attack. Morris Plan Co. v. Bruner, 458 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990).
We affirm the decision of the district court.