Opinion
No. CV07-5003502S
October 20, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
FACTS
By writ, summons and complaint, the plaintiff, Kenneth Petrushonis, commenced this action against the defendants, Jessie W. Andrews, Precision Moving, LLC (Precision Moving), Penske Truck Leasing, Inc. (Penske), Plymouth Rock Assurance Corporation, and the state of Connecticut, by service of process made on June 25, 2007. In the first count of the six-count complaint, Petrushonis alleges the following facts. On July 15, 2005, while he was acting in the course of his employment and operating a truck owned by the state of Connecticut, Petrushonis was parked in a construction zone in the right lane on Interstate 95 in Greenwich, Connecticut. His vehicle was struck by a "box truck" operated by Andrews resulting in Petrushonis' personal injuries and loss of income. Andrews was "an employee of . . . Precision Moving, LLC, [who was] acting within the course of his employment, and was operating a box truck, owned by the defendant Penske Truck Leasing, Inc., and rented or leased to . . . Precision Moving, LLC . . ." In the third count of his complaint, which is the only count directed against Penske, Petrushonis incorporates all of the allegations made in the first count and realleges them against Penske, making no additional allegations therein.
On December 26, 2008, Penske filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the action against it is "barred by 49 U.S.C. § 30106 . . . [which] preempts any state law providing for vicarious liability on the part of the owner of a motor vehicle or an affiliated company engaged in the business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for harm resulting from the use, operation or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease agreement." Penske submitted a memorandum of law in support of its motion and, additionally, the affidavit of Carlos Perez, an employee of Penske, a copy of a "Vehicle Lease Service Agreement" between Penske and Precision Moving, and a copy of an invoice. Petrushonis has filed no memorandum of law in opposition to summary judgment. Oral argument was heard at short calendar on September 8, 2009.
Penske filed the motion for summary judgment on the additional ground that Andrews was not an agent for Penske. The preemption ground is dispositive of the issue.
DISCUSSION
"[A]ny party may move for a summary judgment at any time, except that the party must obtain the judicial authority's permission to file a motion for summary judgment after the case has been assigned for trial." Practice Book § 17-44. "Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).
Penske argues that as of August 10, 2005, claims of vicarious liability against the owner of a rented or leased vehicle have been barred by 49 U.S.C. § 30106. Penske maintains that § 30106(a) "prohibits imposition of liability on the owner of a leased or rented vehicle `under the law of any state or political subdivision thereof by reason of being the owner of the vehicle.'" Thus, Penske asserts that summary judgment should enter on a state law claim that conflicts with the federal law.
"[The Federal Public Transportation Act of 2005] embodied in 49 U.S.C. § 30106, abolished vicarious liability of commercial motor vehicle lessors." Doran v. Rivera, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5014989 (September 22, 2008, Keegan, J.). In pertinent part, the act, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a), provides: "An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)."
Though not specifically identified in the complaint, the facts alleged by Petrushonis give rise to the inference that his vicarious liability action against Penske is premised upon General Statutes § 14-154a(a), which provides: "Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator would have been liable if he had also been the owner." In the complaint, Petrushonis alleges the vicarious liability of Penske as the owner of the box truck rented or leased to Precision Moving. "Section 14-154a imposes vicarious liability unknown at common law. The statute creates what has been termed a `statutory suretyship,' and holds the owner of a rented vehicle liable for injuries caused by the operation of the vehicle as if he were the operator . . . Underlying the imposition of this type of liability is a legislative policy of a deliberate allocation of a risk, which holds an enterprise liable for such injuries as a cost of doing business." (Citations omitted). Hughes v. National Car Rental Systems, Inc., 22 Conn.App. 586, 588, 577 A.2d 1132, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 817, 580 A.2d 57 (1990).
Under Connecticut practice rules, "[w]hen any claim made in a complaint . . . is grounded on a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by its number." Practice Book § 10-3(a). "[T]his rule has been construed as directory rather than mandatory . . . As long as the defendant is sufficiently apprised of the nature of the action . . . the failure to comply with the directive of Practice Book § 10-3(a) will not bar recovery." (Citations omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 66 Conn.App. 669, 675-76, 785 A.2d 1181 (2001), aff'd, 263 Conn. 22, 818 A.2d 37 (2003).
"The law on the question of the effect of 49 U.S.C. § 30106 is well settled. Connecticut can no longer impose vicarious liability on the owner of a rented or leased vehicle . . . Moreover, the preemption of our state statute by the federal act has been recognized by both the Supreme and Appellate courts." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vallombroso v. Formica, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 06 5000751 (July 16, 2009, Gould, J.). See Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 544 n. 9, 923 A.2d 673 (2007) (noting that 49 U.S.C. § 30106, though inapplicable to that action, preemptively eliminated vicarious liability imposed by § 14-154a); Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668 n. 1, 911 A.2d 315 (2006) (noting that as of August 10, 2005, federal law preempts state law and abolishes claims for vicarious liability against lease companies). A review of other Superior Court opinions shows that the preemption of § 14-154a(a), lessor liability claims, by 49 U.S.C. § 30106 has been upheld and lessors have been granted summary judgment. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Testa, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 06 5002252 (December 11, 2008, Brunetti, J.) (granting summary judgment, finding that 49 U.S.C. § 30106 preempts state statute governing lessor liability when no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff sought to impose vicarious liability upon lessor, and plaintiff did not allege any negligence or criminal wrongdoing by lessor); Doran v. Rivera, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 5104989 (same); Halligan v. Wallingford, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 07 5012748 (April 22, 2008, Corradino, J.) (same); Carmichael v. M.I.B. Enterprises, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 06 6000370 (January 11, 2008, Arnold, J.) ( 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 824) (same); Dorsey v. Beverly, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 06 5004081 (March 7, 2007, Jones, J.) ( 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 51) (same).
In the present case, Penske has produced evidence that the vehicle operated by Andrews was the subject of a lease or rental agreement between Precision Moving as the lessee, and Penske as the lessor. In his sworn affidavit, Carlos Perez, an employee of Penske, attests that on December 14, 2004, Precision Moving as lessee entered into a Vehicle Lease Service Agreement with Penske as lessor, that the vehicle operated by Andrews on July 15, 2005, was subject to that agreement, and that the box truck at issue was owned by Penske but at that time was possessed by, in the custody of, and in the control of Precision Moving. Moreover, Petrushonis' complaint does not contradict these averments, as he alleges therein that Andrews was an employee or agent of Precision Moving and was operating a box truck, owned by Penske and rented or leased to Precision Moving at the time of the collision. Petrushonis does not allege that Penske is liable because of its own direct negligence or criminal actions. As the owner of the vehicle at issue who is engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles, Penske falls within the purview of 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a), and is thus excluded from vicarious liability under § 14-154a.
In his affidavit, Carlos Perez attests further that he has been employed as a "Litigation Examiner" for Penske for eleven years and that at no time was Andrews an employee, agent or servant of Penske nor was he acting on behalf of, or performing any services for, Penske or any of its corporate entities.
Accordingly, Penske's motion for summary judgment is granted.